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ABSTRACT 
How We Act Together 
by 
Matthew Rachar 
Advisor: Carol Gould 
This dissertation gives a philosophical account of acting together with others in the sense of 
collaboration or partnership. One part of that project is empirical. I report and elaborate on 
experimental research conducted on our everyday notion of acting together in order to better 
understand what it is. Another part, which offers a philosophical theory of how we do it, defends 
the “higher-order interdependence view” of collective intention. I argue that, compared to other 
kinds of existing views, this theory provides the best explanation of the results of the empirical 
research. 
I begin by adopting conceptions of intention and action on which an intention is a 
representation that causes an action by representing itself as causing that action and an intentional 
action is an action done with an intention to do it.  I then consider how these conceptions apply to 
collective intention and action, and distinguish between various ways in which we act together. 
According to the framework I propose, the things we do in the sense of partnership or collaboration 
are collective actions, and those things are explained by collective intentions. 
After arguing that one prominent kind view of collective intention, which I label 
“Psychological,” fails to satisfy plausible conceptual conditions on intention, I introduce and 
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discuss some recent empirical results about collective action. The results suggest that collective 
actions have three features: (i) there is an obligation to notify the others before leaving, (ii) this 
obligation is present in cases of “morally wrong” collective actions, and (iii) there is no obligation 
to seek the permission of the others to leave. 
I then claim that two further kinds of view of collective intention fail to explain these 
features. Quasi-Psychological views fail because of their metaphysical commitments. Since they 
rely on the persisting presence of individual intentions concerning participation in a collective 
action, they are in a poor position to explain (i), the obligation to notify, which only comes into 
effect once those participatory intentions have been dropped. Non-Psychological views do not 
have this difficulty, but the only instance of such a view in the literature entails that there is an 
obligation to seek the permission of the others before leaving, which conflicts with (iii). 
I then develop an account of collective intention aimed at meeting the conceptual 
conditions on intention and explaining these three judgments about collective action. On this view, 
collective intentions are combinations of public, conditional intentions, where the condition on 
each intention is the conditional intentions of the others. Because they are public this view does 
not have the metaphysical difficulties of quasi-psychological views. And because they are 
conditional, they do not have the implication that there is an obligation to seek permission. 
Participation in a collective action is ended simply by notifying the others that the condition on 
their conditional commitment is not satisfied. Further, the nature of the conditions offers a novel 
explanation of the source of interpersonal normativity in collective action. Say we have a collective 
intention, on this view. It is not just that my conditional commitment is dependent on yours and 
yours is dependent on mine, it is that mine is dependent on yours being dependent on mine and 
yours is dependent on mine being dependent on yours. This higher-order interdependence between 
v 
our intentions generates directed obligations between us. People who form a collective intention 
owe each other something, are accountable to one another, because they choose to co-determine 
their action in an obligation-generating way. 
vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Fittingly, a dissertation is never the project of one person. Those who are owed thanks for their 
contributions to this project or my philosophical development are many, too many, in fact, to 
explicitly list in these acknowledgments, but if that description fits, thank you. 
I was deeply happy to discover several people with related interests upon my arrival at 
CUNY. In addition to valued friendships, discussions with Aaron Bentley, Joshua Keton, Jules 
Salamone, and Jesse Spafford over the course of five years have resulted in several changes of 
mind, all of which are represented in this dissertation. I also found the philosophical and 
professional guidance of Jennifer Morton, David Rosenthal, and Kate Ritchie particularly helpful 
for finding my way. Profound thanks to Chris Ewing and Javier-Gomez Lavin. Their hospitality 
and introduction to New York made clear from the beginning what an enjoyable experience I was 
going to have, and I’m grateful that it turned into a lifelong friendship. Without Javier, this 
dissertation wouldn’t be what it is, literally. Our work together has been the guiding principle of 
the views developed here. I’m grateful for both a collaborator with whom I can do things that 
would be unimaginable on my own and, more importantly, a true friend. 
My committee is also owed a large debt of gratitude. John Greenwood saw the earliest seed 
of this project in my first qualifying paper, and showed me that a paper is never finished, only 
given up on. He tirelessly read my attempts and suggested improvements, and it was during the 
process of doing revisions inspired by his comments that much of what I say here was originally 
conceived. Thanks to Jesse Prinz for his help with the experimental work and for help receiving 
the funding required to conduct it. In the development of the positive view, discussions with David 
Velleman have been incredibly helpful. I am deeply thankful for his willingness to work through 
his ideas on the topic with me, and for his invitation to participate in one of the most rewarding 
vii 
parts of my time in New York, TAing a class on philosophy and literature at the Metropolitan 
Detention Center. 
Carol Gould has been and continues to be a wonderful mentor and advisor. She is the reason 
I went to the Graduate Center, and has supported me throughout, giving comments, writing 
reference letters, and advising a qualifying paper. With respect to this project, her careful reading 
has resulted in many improvements, stylistic and philosophical. Having a mentor to guide one 
through graduate school, with all of its surprises and difficulties, is an immeasurable help. I am 
truly thankful for her vital support and guidance. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family, extended and immediate. Thank you Darcy James, 
Kevin Patriquin, Sean Massicotte, Daniel Baek, Randy Rolfe, Blake Johnson, Karol, and Scott 
Farrell. Thanks also to the Lanzingers, Rachars, Schreibers, Leddys, Becks and Preston-
Lanzingers. My brother, Devin Rachar, and my parents, Irene Lanzinger and Lee Rachar, have 
unwaveringly supported me at every step and their attempts to make the world better continue to 
inspire me. Also, my father was the first reader of this dissertation, and I am thankful for the 
comments and corrections. What do you owe to someone who makes your life worthwhile? 
Whatever that is, I owe it to Veronika and Lukas. 
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..1 
Chapter 1: Action and Intention, Individual and Collective ......................................................... 15 
§ 1.1 What It Is to Intend......................................................................................................... 16 
§ 1.2 Kinds of Action .............................................................................................................. 23 
§ 1.3 Contrast Cases ................................................................................................................ 36 
§ 1.4 Doing Things Together .................................................................................................. 39 
§ 1.5 Collective Intention and Action ..................................................................................... 49 
Chapter 2: Pyschological Views ................................................................................................... 53 
§ 2.1 Searle’s Account ............................................................................................................ 54 
§ 2.2 Problems with Searle’s Account .................................................................................... 59 
§ 2.3 Enter Alignment ............................................................................................................. 62 
§ 2.4 Definitions of Collective Action in Psychological Research ......................................... 68 
§ 2.5 Reconciling Philosophical and Psychological Views .................................................... 73 
§ 2.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 81 
Chapter 3: Quasi-Psychological Views ........................................................................................ 82 
§ 3.1 Experimental Research: Justification and Results ......................................................... 84 
§ 3.2 Quasi-Psychological, Non-Normative Views ................................................................ 86 
§ 3.3 The Walking Case: The Obligation to Notify ................................................................ 90 
§ 3.4 Bratman’s Potential Responses ...................................................................................... 95 
§ 3.5 Quasi-psychological, Normative Views ....................................................................... 102 
§ 3.6 The Failure of Quasi-Psychological Views .................................................................. 108 
§ 3.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 113 
Appendix: Details of Obligation to Notify Study ................................................................... 115 
Chapter 4: Non-Psychological Views ......................................................................................... 116 
§ 4.1 Non-Psychological, Normativist Views ....................................................................... 119 
§ 4.2 The Obligation to Notify Explained ............................................................................. 125 
§ 4.3 The Robber Case .......................................................................................................... 126 
ix 
§ 4.4 The Walking Case: The Obligation to Seek Permission .............................................. 131 
§ 4.5 Other Objections, Methodological Considerations, and What They Mean Going
Forward ................................................................................................................................... 137 
§ 4.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 146 
Appendix A: Details of the Robber Case ................................................................................ 148 
Appendix B: Details of the Obligation to Seek Permission Study .......................................... 148 
Chapter 5: The Higher-Order Interdependence View ................................................................. 149 
§ 5.1 Velleman’s View .......................................................................................................... 152 
§ 5.2 Extending the View ...................................................................................................... 156 
§ 5.3 Explaining Collective Action ....................................................................................... 168 
§ 5.4 Explaining Normativity ................................................................................................ 174 
§ 5.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 182 
Bilbiography ............................................................................................................................... 184 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Payoff Matrix for Hawk/Dove 43 
Figure 2: Payoff Matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma 45 
Figure 3: Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across three conditions in the 
Walking Case. 94 
Figure 4: Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across three conditions in the 
Robber Case. 130 
Figure 5: Box and whisker plot comparing dependent measures in the Walking Case with 




When we do something together, a shared status allows us to negotiate, encourage, criticize, 
propose, and cajole in ways that are not licensed for outsiders. Getting certain things done, things 
we find important, requires this status, sometimes practically and sometimes conceptually. Alone, 
I might be able to solve a jigsaw puzzle, but, for me personally, not if I want to enjoy myself, and 
under no circumstances can I dance a tango. Much of our lives take place within this context: 
games, plays, performances, research, rites, political action, but also exhortations to “play as a 
team,” discussions about the quickest route, duets sung at karaoke, and debates about what color 
to paint the walls. We have structures of thought and judgment that we use to engage in these 
endeavors, and understand what we do when we do so, but there is much to be done regarding our 
philosophical description and account of them. What follows is an attempt to identify, characterize, 
and explicate the concepts involved in these structures of thought and judgment about the things 
we do together, in order to improve our description of what it is to act together and develop an 
explanatorily fruitful account of how we do it. 
As a loose first approximation, we can start out by thinking about some everyday situations 
in which we find ourselves doing something with others, in some sense, and asking: What is it for 
a collection of individuals to act together, in the fullest sense? It is not parallel action in close 
proximity. Two strangers reading the same newspaper side-by-side on a park bench are not acting 
together. It is not simple coordination. People walking down a crowded sidewalk, avoiding running 





not cooperation understood as a certain balance of personal cost and mutual benefit.1 A passenger 
standing near the door of a crowded subway who momentarily gets off to let others out of the train 
is cooperating with the other passengers, but they are not acting together. It is not strategic 
reasoning and mutual responsiveness. Traders in a commodity market engage in reasoning about 
each others’ habits, beliefs, and intentions, and are highly responsive to changes in trading patterns, 
but they are not acting together. What is essential to acting together in the fullest sense is that 
something is aimed at by the participants as participants. The actions they undertake are not simply 
coincidental. They are, in a sense to be explained, purposefully together. And a particular sense of 
aiming at, or purposefulness, is missing from the above cases. 
Let us consider the market trader case a little more closely, to see what it would take for 
traders to act together and specify a little more carefully what acting together requires. There is a 
standard story how about how prices get determined in a commodity market that runs roughly as 
follows. Traders buy and sell for their own purposes. The price of any commodity is the direct 
outcome of these individual decisions and actions where these decisions and actions are based 
partly on strategic reasoning about what others are likely to do. The strategic reasoning involved 
is complex, and doing it successfully requires extensive knowledge about other traders and 
contextual factors, prices, patterns, trends, and technologies. But at no point is the price of any 
commodity something the traders try to bring about; a price is something that just happens. Now 
imagine a case in which a price is the result of a prior agreement amongst a certain group of traders 
to keep that price at a particular level by executing a preordained pattern of trades. If we are only 
                                                          
1 The distinction between coordination and cooperation here can be understood in game-theoretic terms as the 
difference between coordination games (sidewalk case) and so-called “collective action problems” (subway case). 
The difference is that in the subway case there is a cost involved in getting off the train, a cost that may be borne by 
someone else. There is thus an incentive not to do the prosocial thing in the subway case that there isn’t in the 





privy to the behavior after the agreement, there may be no outward difference between the cases; 
it is possible that the same pattern of trading is instantiated in both. And so, just adding up what 
each individual does and looking at the resulting prices would make it appear as if the cases are 
identical. Yet in the price-fixing case, the traders are doing something together in the sense in 
question, whereas in the standard story they are not. 
These cases illustrate a difference between parallel individual action and collective action. 
Parallel individual action may involve many interactive features, and admit of a description of the 
collective outcome that looks like an action. It seems appropriate for one of the traders in the 
standard case to say, “we set the price,” and the price is a common effect that none of the 
individuals could produce on their own. This rules out a purely distributive reading of the standard 
case; it is not true of each that they determine the price. As a result, there is one sense in which it 
seems appropriate to say that the participants in the market determine the price together, namely 
that the price is the result of all their actions taken together. Togetherness in this sense is not 
enough. Neither is a weak sense of purposefulness. We can imagine, idealistically, that, under the 
sway of a misunderstanding of Adam Smith, the traders in the standard case share a goal to help 
humanity by pursuing their own self-interest.2 Purposefulness in this sense is also not enough. The 
essential feature that distinguishes the price-fixing case is that the traders do what they do in 
partnership or collaboration while nothing of the sort is true in the standard case. Making sense 
of the concept of togetherness in the sense of partnership or collaboration as it is used in these 
instances of aimed-at partnership or collaboration is the purpose of my thesis. 
Acting together, in partnership or collaboration, is a noteworthy ability that lies at the 
center of our social world and our understanding of ourselves. The distinction between individual 
                                                          





action and collective action marks out legal and moral differences in cases like price-fixing and 
important personal and social differences in innocuous cases like walking together. It is more than 
merely ubiquitous, however. Creating or maintaining the social structures that guide our individual 
behavior and shape our identities also usually involves collective action. Conventions, rules, 
norms, social groups, and institutions are often instituted and preserved, but also reshaped and 
overthrown, by collective action. In turn, these social frameworks give significance to the gestures 
and utterances, the communicative acts, that initiate collective action, to the environmental factors 
that induce collective action among strangers, to the practices and patterns that allow us to execute 
collective actions successfully. The things we do together structure, and are structured by, our 
individual behaviors, identities, and schemes of social organization.3 
 
While recognizing the symmetrical dependence between social structure and collective action, my 
presentation takes social structure as fixed to focus on collective action. My concern is twofold: to 
investigate the concepts involved in our everyday understanding of acting together and to provide 
a philosophical account that encompasses the results of that investigation. The assumption, to make 
it explicit, is that an account of collective action requires an understanding of acting in 
collaboration, acting together for short, which is meant as a description of our everyday 
understanding of doing things with others in the fullest sense.4  
                                                          
3 Making our understanding of this interplay more precise is particularly important for working out the social and 
political consequences of a view of collective action. Gould (1988, 2004, 2013), for example, develops a view on 
which it is “common activities” and shared goals that play a constitutive role for both individual subjectivity and the 
democratic subject, and on which the self-determination rights of the individuals involved in these activities are 
foundational to the justification of democracy. 
4 As an assumption, it is not something for which I argue. The appropriate relation between everyday concepts and 
concepts appropriate for social scientific research that appear to apply to similar phenomena has, however, been the 






The first aim of the project is then one of conceptual articulation of our everyday notions. 
What exactly are we looking for when we ask ourselves whether two people came to the party 
together? What needs to be the case for us to assent to the claim that they did? More generally, 
what are the minimal conditions under which we judge two people to be acting together? Does it 
require explicit agreement, regular interaction over time, a simple look or gesture, collective 
awareness or knowledge? This investigation uses the methods of social psychology, following 
research methods developed in recent work in experimental philosophy.5  
In collaborative research, Javier Gomez-Lavin and I have developed an experimental 
paradigm that allows us to explore and interrogate the descriptive and observational components 
of the philosophical work aimed at explaining collective action. It is common practice to employ 
thought experiments about cases of acting together in order to elicit intuitions meant to support a 
particular view of collective action.6 Our research models, and aims to improve upon, this 
methodology by using controlled experiments to reveal the judgments of our participants about 
appropriate behavioral responses in cases of parallel action, coordination, cooperation, and 
collective action. I present a summary of this research in chapters 3 and 4, and discuss the results 
when they are relevant to the property of collective action under discussion. 
The second aim is conceptual explication. Here I use more traditional philosophical 
methods to develop a novel account of collective action responsive to the empirical research on 
our everyday sense of acting together. The distinction between parallel individual action and 
collective action bears some resemblance to the distinction between mere behavior and 
autonomous action in the individual case. The second distinction is frequently drawn using the 
                                                          
5 For an introduction, see Knobe and Nichols (2008). 
6 See Bratman (2006, p. 7) and Gilbert (2013, p. 25-6) for a striking example of this in which similar thought 





concept of intention.7 So, following a significant body of philosophical research, I employ the 
concept of collective intention to draw the distinction between individual and collective action. 8 
Let me here note that the terms “joint,” “shared,” “collective,” or “we-” intention are all commonly 
used in the literature to refer to the phenomenon under consideration. I take these terms to be 
interchangeable and use the particular term of the theorist under discussion, saving collective 
intention for the presentation of my view. So, in my account, collective action is the technical term 
meant to correspond to the everyday phenomenon of acting together in collaboration, in which the 
togetherness of the actors is aimed at and jointly guided by those actors in a particular way, and is 
to be explained by collective intention. 
The distinction between the aims of conceptual articulation and explication is important 
because there is no folk-psychological notion of collective intention from which to begin a 
philosophical analysis. But, I claim, there is a folk-psychological understanding of the various 
ways we act together, ways to be made more precise in Chapter 1, and how we do so. Therefore, 
one aim, conceptual articulation, is directed towards our everyday notions, towards a 
characterization of what we think we’re doing when we act together with others and how we think 
we are capable of doing so, and the other, conceptual explication, towards our theoretical notions, 
towards the mechanism that guides our collective action, specified using technical philosophical 
terms and concepts. These two aims are pursued in tandem throughout, and this dissertation makes 
novel contributions with respect to both. Reliance on thought experiments alone has limited our 
ability to come to an accurate description of everyday cases of acting together. By conducting 
                                                          
7 Seminal discussions of the relation between intentions and intentional actions in the individual case may be found 
in Anscombe (2000), Bratman (1987, 1999), Davidson (1980), Frankfurt (1988, 1999), Hornsby (1980, 1997), 
Korsgaard (1996), Velleman (1989, 2000), Watson (2004), and Wilson (1989). 
8 People who use this strategy include Bratman (1992, 2014), Gilbert (1989, 2014), Miller and Tuomela (1988), 
Searle (1990, 2010), Tuomela (1995, 2013), and Velleman (1997). For skeptical views, see Chant (2007) and 





controlled experimental research, we can move the debate forward by getting a more accurate 
description, and then testing our philosophical explanations against this more detailed picture of 
what happens when people act together. As I will discuss in Chapters 2-4, current theories fail to 
explain the empirical results of the research conducted by Javier and me in one way or another. 
Attending closely to how and why these accounts fail at their explanatory task and building from 
the rich conceptual innovations and distinctions they contain, I develop a distinctive philosophical 
account, which I argue provides the best explanation of how we act together in the sense of 
collaboration or partnership. 
The danger involved in enlisting the concept of intention for the explanation of collective 
action is that, for many,9 intentions are mental states, which leads to concerns that accepting 
collective intentions entails the existence of collective minds. There are several strategies for 
overcoming this worry. One strategy is to reconcile oneself to collective minds. Arguing this way, 
however, requires a view about what mental states are in general, and a detailed analysis of how 
groups can be organized to meet the conditions for constructing the right kinds of representations 
and information processing mechanisms10 or to complete tasks constitutive of mindhood.11 
Leaving aside an answer to this fascinating question for certain kinds of groups, I’m not going to 
offer an analysis that appeals to collective minds. 
Another strategy is to postulate a special way of having an intention, in the minds of 
individuals, that somehow implicates a collection of people.12 This view faces a choice: either 
these intentions are enough to explain collective action or they must be buttressed by external, 
                                                          
9 See for example, Davidson’s discussion of “pure intending” (1980), and much of the work that followed, including 
Bratman (1987, 1999) and Velleman (1989, 2000). For some accounts of intention as something other than a mental 
state, see Anscombe (2000), Thompson (2008), Wilson (1989). 
10 Huebner (2013) develops this line of argument. 
11 See, for quite different developments of this kind of view, Theiner et al. (2010) and List and Pettit (2011). 
12 This idea goes back to Sellers (1968, 1980). The most prominent modern proponents of it are Searle (1990, 1995, 





intersubjective relations between the participants. Accepting the first disjunct implies that 
collective actions can be coincidentally matching patterns of action, because there need not be any 
interaction between the intentions in the minds of the individuals.13 Accepting the second disjunct 
gives up on the project of explaining collective action purely in terms of collective intention 
understood as a mental state. The second chapter addresses the above-mentioned strategy in more 
detail, by way of a discussion of an account of how individual we-intentions interact with 
subpersonal cognitive processes. I argue that, even when combined with psychological research, 
analyzing collective intentions as individual psychological states cannot explain what happens 
when we act together in the fullest sense. 
A more promising strategy is instead to give up the claim that all intentions are strictly 
speaking mental. There are several variations of this strategy in the literature, but what they have 
in common is that collective intentions are complex states of affairs. Because the degree to which 
these states of affairs involve mental states is left open, there is room for significantly more or less 
connection to mental phenomena. On one end of the spectrum, Michael Bratman argues that shared 
intention involves individual intentions with special contents and complex interrelations between 
the participants.14 His view maintains a strong connection to facts about individual psychological 
states because shared intention is dependent on the presence of the relevant individual states 
throughout the collective action. I call such views “quasi-psychological.” On the other end, 
Margaret Gilbert argues that joint intention is radically independent of individual psychological 
states. Her ‘disjunction criterion’ maintains that it is not necessary for any of the participants to 
                                                          
13 This criticism of such views is found in Meijers (2003), Schmid (2009), Schmid and Schweikard (2013). 





have any particular individual psychological states concerning the collective action.15 Instead, 
collective intentions are triggered by prior acts, which she calls ‘expressions of readiness’, by each 
of the participants, and continue to exist until the action is completed or are explicitly rescinded. I 
call views like Gilbert’s “non-psychological.” The third chapter discusses quasi-psychological, 
while the fourth discusses non-psychological, views, coming down on the non-psychological side. 
Another difference between Bratman and Gilbert concerns the presence of a special status 
between participants in a collective action. Margaret Gilbert, for example, states that collective 
action is a normative phenomenon.16 A genuine case of acting together requires interpersonal 
commitments and so “obligations and entitlements – not necessarily moral obligations and rights 
– are inherent in acting together.”17 In contrast, Bratman argues that collective action essentially 
involves only some structure of psychological attitudes.18 It is therefore possible for there to be a 
collective intention to act without any genuine commitments, obligations, or entitlements. 
Chapters 3 and 4 also include a discussion of this issue, in which their differences are treated as a 
paradigm case of a more general disagreement between normativists and non-normativists about 
collective action, where normativists claim that collective actions essentially involve special 
normative relations between the participants, and non-normativists deny this claim.  
Based in part on the results of the research Javier Gomez-Lavin and I conducted, I argue 
that the normativists in general are correct, but that Gilbert’s specific view gets the normative 
relations wrong. There is, in collective actions, a special status possessed by all participants, which 
structures their deliberations about how to carry out the action, results in individual obligations to 
                                                          
15 Gilbert (2009, p. 171-173). Gilbert makes similar claims for other states, such as collective belief. For reasons to 
be skeptical of Gilbert’s claim that these states can be radically divorced from individual states, see Greenwood 
(2017). 
16 Other normativists include Facundo Alonso (2009), Abraham Roth (2004, 2014, 2016) and Anthonie Meijers 
(2003). 
17 Gilbert (2013, p.53). 





perform actions necessary to the completion of the collective action, and requires that, in order to 
leave the collective action, an individual make their withdrawal public. In short, there is an 
obligation of each either to execute the action or to notify the others they are leaving. This special 
status, which involves normative concepts like obligation and commitment, is present in all 
collective actions, including those that involve morally wrong collective actions. But, there is no 
obligation to seek the permission of the other participants in order to leave, as Gilbert’s view 
entails. 
My view, presented in the fifth chapter, builds from the ideas that collective intentions are 
not necessarily mental states, but are complex states of affairs, and that these states are not 
necessarily continuously realized in the minds of participants, but are triggered and then persist 
until they are rescinded. These foundations are controversial: Why think that intentions aren’t 
mental, or, at the very least, that they are not even composed of complex relations between mental 
states? 
A view that provides an answer to each part of the question is put forward by Velleman as 
an interpretation of Gilbert’s early view.19 According to this functional account, an intention is a 
representation with a particular content and causal role, namely a representation that tends to cause 
a behavior (the causal role) by representing itself as causing that behavior (the content). Because 
any representation with this role and content is an intention, non-mental representations are, at 
least, candidates for intention. And, some non-mental representations are intentions; specifically, 
some linguistic representations are intentions. Suppose you are considering going for a walk.20 
You are weighing the various reasons and are unsure about what to do. You then announce, “I am 
                                                          
19 His view is presented in “How to Share an Intention” (2015, pp. 187-210). He considers Gilbert (1990). Gilbert 
denies that this is an accurate interpretation (2013). 





going for a walk.” This introduces new considerations in favor of going for a walk. For example, 
if you desire not to speak falsely, you have a new reason to go for the walk. And notice, in this 
case, your utterance isn’t really a prediction or a report; you hadn’t really decided yet. Instead, you 
mean something like “I am hereby causing myself to go for a walk,” which has the right content 
and, if it tends to cause you to behave in the specified way,21 the right causal role. This has the 
consequence that, because they are sometime utterances, intentions are sometimes non-mental 
occurrences, rather than persisting states. Something like this is the case for collective intentions, 
too. Except for collective intention, we are jointly creating the requisite representation. We do this 
by each expressing conditional commitments that add up to a single categorical commitment, in 
the way we might go around the table each uttering a line that adds up to a single story. 
But Velleman only describes a single case, as his aim is to find a paradigm example as a 
possibility proof for shared intention.22 My project is to identify the basic features of this case and 
generalize them into a full account of collective intention, an account that connects the kind of 
things these intentions are and how they arise to the special normative standing they involve,  then 
use this account to explain the judgments about collective action given by the results of the 
experimental research. 
 Here’s a preview, filled out in chapter five, of how that account and explanation go. A 
collective intention is a collective commitment to act, which is a public representation that commits 
participants to a course of action. Collective intentions are initiated by communicative acts, under 
conditions of common knowledge, and exist until they are satisfied or rescinded. Each of these 
communicative acts is a conditional commitment, where the condition on the commitment is the 
                                                          
21 Finding the right account of the causal connection between intention and action is notoriously difficult, and I 
won’t attempt to do so here, although I will discuss the issue again in Chapter 1. 





conditional commitment of the others. Each of the individual intentions then represents itself as 
causally and logically dependent on the others. Once each has expressed such a conditional 
commitment, satisfying the conditions on the commitments of the others, they are categorically 
committed to a course of action. 
The benefits of this account are twofold. First, it does the best job of explaining our 
experimental research on acting together in the sense of collaboration or partnership. We can 
summarize the results of the research into three judgments: 
(i) There is an obligation to notify other participants when leaving the collective action;  
(ii) There is at least one normative relation in morally wrong cases; 
(iii) There is no obligation to seek permission from the other participants in order to leave 
a collective action.23 
Seeing collective intention as a jointly created, public representation, independent of the 
persisting psychological states of the individuals has the right metaphysical structure and 
normative entailments for explaining these judgments. Because collective intentions are initiated 
by occurrences rather than being realized by constant presences, they act indirectly on individuals. 
They are mediated by an individual’s beliefs or memories about the initial creation of the collective 
intention. A participant can then be party to a collective intention without having a mental, 
individual intention about participating in the collective action because their participation is 
confirmed by a speech act and not the persisting presence of a mental state. Just as collective 
intentions are initiated by communicative acts, they are also extinguished by them. Leaving a 
collective commitment involves a communicate act that indicates that the condition on the other 
participants’ conditional commitments is not satisfied, which explains (i). And, the utterance of a 
                                                          






conditional commitment in the presence of other conditional commitments creates the obligation 
to fulfill or rescind the commitment, regardless of the moral valence of the act in question, which 
explains (ii). Finally, once the obligation to notify the others has been fulfilled, there is no longer 
a collective intention, and so there is no obligation to seek the permission of the other participants 
to leave a collective action, which explains (iii). 
Committing themselves in this way creates a normative relation between the participants 
in the collective action that does not exist for external observers. The second benefit of this view 
is that it gives a plausible story for how this normative relation arises. In the final section of Chapter 
5, I argue that the special standing results because of the higher-order interdependence of each of 
the participant’s intentions on the intentions of the others. It is not just that my intention is 
dependent on yours, and your intention is dependent on mine, causally and logically,24 but that my 
intention is dependent on your intention being dependent on my intention, and so on. Higher-order 
interdependence is what separates collective actions from parallel action, coordination, 
cooperation, strategic interaction, and acting with a joint goal.25 There are many situations in which 
my intentions are dependent on what I take your intentions to be, and vice versa. Walking towards 
each other on the sidewalk, I’m going to intend to move to my right only if I take you to intend to 
move to your right. And you reason the same. But in only some of these cases is my intention 
dependent on your intention being dependent on mine. These are the cases in which we are 
collaborating. When acting together in the fullest sense, we are interdependent in a way that 
generates standing between us. It is because of our higher-order dependence on one another, 
created by communicative acts under conditions of common knowledge, that we can negotiate, 
                                                          
24 This is Bratman’s idea of ‘persistence interdependence’ (2014, p. 64-75).  






discuss, criticize, rebuke, and cajole in a way not available to outsiders. Higher-order 






Action and Intention, Individual and Collective 
Chapter 1  
 
 
It is sometimes assumed, in the philosophical literature, that there is an exclusive and exhaustive 
distinction between the things we do as individuals and the things we do together.1 This is a 
mistake. We coordinate our actions, we cooperate, and we share goals. All of these behaviors 
involve purposefully doing things together with others in some sense, but they are not cases of 
doing things with others in the fullest sense, in the sense of partnership or collaboration.  
I argue here that only acting together in the fullest sense involves collective intention. The 
chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss some issues around intention and action, taking 
philosophical debate on the individual case as my starting point. In this discussion, I adopt 
conceptions of intention and action meant to accommodate many particular views, though they 
will conflict with some. Second, applying the results from the discussion of the individual case, I 
consider various ways in which we can do something together, and argue that some require more 
than individual intentions, intersubjective attitudes, and shared goals. Finally, I highlight the 
distinctiveness of things we do together that involve collective intentions and propose that we call 
those things collective actions. 
                                                          
1 The main proponent of this view is Margaret Gilbert, who sets up the distinction as follows: “Examples of what I 
shall refer to as ‘acting together’ include dancing together, building a house together, and marching together against 
the enemy, where these are construed as something other than a matter of doing the same thing concurrently and in 
the same place” (2013, p. 23) and sees it as primary to the theoretical question at issue here: “The key question in 
the philosophy of collective action is simply…under what conditions are two or more people doing something 





§ 1.1 What It Is to Intend 
There is a commonly recognized and deeply felt distinction, in some ways similar to the distinction 
discussed in the opening paragraph, between something I do and something that happens to me. 
The former is an action, the latter a mere happening. I play an active part in my actions; they are 
happenings that I make happen. Actions belong to the people who perform them in a way that mere 
happenings don’t. Mere happenings just happen, they don’t belong to anyone.  
The standard way2 to explain this distinction is that an action is a behavior done for a 
reason, where this reason is also the cause of the behavior. Behaviors that are not actions are not 
done for reasons, for example spontaneous reactions, reflexes, tics, and other forms of automatic, 
inadvertent bodily movements. A benefit of understanding action this way is that the same overt 
bodily movement can be intentional or not, depending on its causal history. Say my arm rises and 
flips the light switch. If I want to turn on the light and believe that flipping the switch will turn on 
the light, and these two attitudes cause and justify the behavior, then I perform an action, namely 
turning on the light. I raise my arm and make it happen. If, on the other hand, I have no such belief 
or desire, but instead a spasm causes my arm to rise at the right speed and angle to flip the light 
switch, I do not perform any action, despite the sameness of bodily movement. Instead of making 
something happen, I am confronted with an unexpectedly bright room. 
Many think that the distinction between the things I do and the things that happen to me 
has something to do with intention. But where is intention in this story? It seems we have done 
away with it. All we have is a behavior that is caused and justified by a belief-desire pair. And 
seen from a certain angle, we have captured the intuitive distinction. The things that I can justify 
and are caused by my reasons are my actions. It is not clear what role is left for intention to play 
                                                          





here, at least if intention is understood as a distinct, irreducible state. We seem to have been able 
to explain all we wanted using only concepts of belief, desire, reason, and action.3  
Approaching the question the way we have so far involves treating action rather than 
intention as the fundamental notion. We began with an intuitive classification of behaviors and 
then tried to find the corresponding mental states involved in a certain kind of behavior.  There is 
some appeal to this approach. We have a strong intuitive grasp on what counts as an action and 
what doesn’t. It is not so clear that we have the same access to what goes on in people’s minds. 
And even if we do have some access, it is limited, and therefore, it may be better to stick to better 
understood mental states like beliefs and desires, instead of positing a new, less-well-understood 
state like intention. 
The need for a distinct, irreducible state of intention and the disadvantages of basing an 
analysis of intention on an analysis of intentional action are most clearly seen when considering 
prospective action. Instead of being primarily about what makes things I am doing intentional, 
intention is about things I am going to do. This is separable from anything I actually do because 
there are cases in which I intend to do something, even when I have not yet undertaken any steps 
towards it.4 All I have done is make up my mind to do it. This making up my mind is the forming 
of an intention. Since intentions are present even in cases where there is no action, our analysis of 
intention does not need to depend on an analysis of action. Although I discuss later how we can 
use the concept of intention to classify action, it is not principally a way to do this, because an 
                                                          
3 In an early paper, Davidson puts forward a view like this. He states: “The expression ‘the intention with which 
James went to church’ has taken the outward form of a description, but in fact it is syncategorematic and cannot be 
taken to refer to an entity, state, disposition, or event” (1980, p. 8). Given my discussion later of the relation between 
intentional action and the intention with which someone acts, I would like to further note that in the same paper 
Davidson denies that there is a “an event that is common and peculiar to all cases where a man intentionally raises 
his arm” (1980, p. 13). 
4 This is the subject of Davidson’s paper “Intending” (1980, Ch. 5). See also Hart’s notion of ‘bare intending’ 





intention is usually5 something that goes on in our minds that, when successful, has causal 
consequences. Whatever the relationship between action and intention is, it is important to figure 
out what is going on when we make up our mind to do something and how that effects our further 
reasoning, whether or not we end up following through. There is therefore no pressure to start with 
intentional action and work backwards to what causes and justifies it, as the standard story does. 
For the rest of this section then, I’ll focus on intention, leaving action until the next. 
Even if we accept that the project of explaining intention in terms of intentional action is 
misguided, because there are some intentions with no actions, more needs to be said to show that 
intention is a distinct state. There is still the possibility that future directed intentions are just 
combinations of beliefs and desires. For example, we might say that I intend to do something if 
instead of a desire for a particular, present action, I have a more encompassing evaluative judgment 
about a kind of action and some beliefs about the prospect of performing a particular action of that 
kind in the future.6  
The most powerful consideration in favor of an approach that treats intention as a distinct 
state is that doing so better explains our practical lives.7 The aspect of our practical lives intention 
explains is shown especially clearly in our ability to decide what to do, so let me begin by giving 
a brief characterization of deciding to do something. One thing proceeding this way foregrounds 
is that the beliefs and desires that motivate us to act or to evaluate future actions favorably do not 
reflect the way in which we commit ourselves to courses of action in the future. Once I’ve given 
                                                          
5 The reasons for this qualification are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
6 After presenting the standard view, Davidson came to recognize the importance of future intentions and attempted 
to extend his account to them using this strategy. In this later view, he accepts the idea of a distinct state of 
intending, which he argues is, roughly, an all-out evaluation that an action is desirable (1980, Ch.2 and Ch. 5). For 
an argument against the possibility of pure intention, see Wilson (1989, pp. 222-30). 





this characterization in terms of decisions and the commitments that arise from them, I’ll re-
introduce the concept of intention as the state that satisfies the functional characterization. 
Colloquially, deciding to do something is making up one’s mind to do it, or in other words, 
committing oneself to it. Practical decisions result in commitments to actions. Making up my mind 
to act settles whether I am going to act, in at least two senses, similar to those specified in the 
standard story in that one is about the world and one is about my mind.8 First, commitments to do 
something cause the behavior they specify, which is a condition about the world, and second, they 
end deliberation, that is they close the question in my mind. We make these commitments to 
ourselves precisely because we recognize that our motives may change. The motives we have now 
about future actions are not capable of determining future action, since there is a good chance they 
won’t be the motives we have when we act. And planning for our future is more than simply 
predicting what we are likely to believe and desire at that future time. We are not simply passive 
observers of our motivational states, forced into action when they change or forced to predict what 
they are going to be; we have the ability to settle now what we are going to do later, in a way that 
interacts with our downstream motivations. 
As a condition on our mind, this ability to make decisions about future actions plays an 
important role in our practical reasoning. There are many things I want to do, some of which aren’t 
compatible with each other. Organizing them into a coherent plan is a difficult task, one that would 
be impossible if I couldn’t make decisions and coordinate my actions. Closing the question in my 
mind means that the deliberative question about what to do is answered. Decisions are open to 
reconsideration, especially when new information arises, but to coordinate my plans about what I 
am going to do, they must be stable. Deciding to go to a friend’s birthday party, when that decision 
                                                          






is stable, allows me to make further decisions about whether to drive, take the train, call a cab, ask 
another friend for a ride, and so on. And, since I know that unless I change my mind I am going to 
the party, as the time approaches, there is pressure on me to make a decision about how to get 
there. Additionally, decisions about what to do require consistency. I can’t decide to go to my 
friend’s birthday party and go to a basketball game if they are at the same time. And if I remember 
that I bought tickets to the game, I have to make a decision about whether to sell the tickets or 
disappoint my friend. Once I decide one way or the other, I am forced to rule out options 
incompatible with that choice. Finally, the decisions that I make must be consistent with what I 
believe about the world. I can’t decide to go to my friend’s party if I believe that I won’t go even 
if I decide to. The role that decisions play in our practical reasoning involves a characteristic kind 
of stability, consistency, and coherency. 
As a condition on the world, settling what I am going to do must cause the eventual action, 
barring a change of mind. Commitments to act arising from previous decisions have a volitional 
component. It is not just that my commitments put pressure on me to reason in certain ways, when 
the time comes they also cause me to act. Making up my mind to do something means that, unless 
I have changed my mind, when it comes time to perform the action, I do, without need for further 
deliberation. But such a commitment doesn’t cause me to act mechanically, bypassing my rational 
agency and jeopardizing my future self’s autonomy. Its causal power is mediated by practical 
reason. Deciding to do something causes me to act in the future by giving my future self a reason 
to act, a reason I wouldn’t have had if I hadn’t so decided. 
We now have a functional characterization of committing ourselves to an action by 





An ordinary belief cannot play the action-guiding role of what issues from a decision to act.9 I can 
believe that I am not going to take out the garbage tomorrow morning because of my general 
history of forgetfulness, but that doesn’t amount to my deciding not to take out the trash. In fact, 
that belief may even lead to preventative pro-action, for example writing myself a note and sticking 
it to the door. Deciding to act is not rationally compatible with taking active steps against my 
performance of the action I decide to perform. And, a decision to act is not a desire to do some 
future act. A person may have a desire on which they are determined not to act. I can also desire 
to do things that I believe are incompatible. In the example above, I desire both to go to the 
basketball game and my friend’s birthday party. And desiring to do something doesn’t yet put any 
pressure on me to figure out how to do it. The mere desire to go to the basketball game doesn’t 
mean that I have to start figuring how to get there, since despite this desire, I might decide not to 
go. Finally, because of these features of ordinary belief and desire, no combination of them can 
account for the stability and consistency of decisions to act in our practical reasoning, nor their 
causal control of our behavior.10 
                                                          
9 I use the word ordinary because on some account of intention it is a special kind of belief, for example Velleman 
(1989). 
10 This paragraph is a summary of the functional characterization and associated norms given by Bratman (1987). In 
his later presentation (2014), Bratman clarifies that there are four distinct norms on intention rationality: 
consistency, agglomeration, means-end coherence, and stability. Consistency requires that intentions are internally 
consistent and consistent with one’s beliefs. Agglomeration requires that intentions be combinable and meet the 
consistency norm. Means-end coherence requires that intentions in favor of ends engage a demand to choose means, 
as that becomes required. Stability puts pressure on retaining intentions over time, although it does allow for 
reconsideration and revision. These norms are explanatory, in that they enter into explanations of the roles that 
intentions play in our practical lives because of their tacit acceptance by certain kinds of agents, which is reflected in 
the fact that those kinds of agents have a disposition to see divergence from them as a mistake. They are also 
normative, which is explained by the importance of acting in the way that their acceptance supports (2014, pp. 16-
18). My presentation collapses agglomeration into consistency, since agglomeration is consistency in the realization 
of intentions. It also takes a different approach to means-end coherence for reasons having to do with the distinction 
between intentions and goals, which I discuss in the next section. For a critique of the project of characterizing 





We now have a functional characterization of the state that is not reducible to action, belief 
or desire, and we may call the distinct state that plays these roles in our practical lives intention.11 
An intention is a commitment to act, and it is the characteristic, action-guiding product of a 
decision to do something. And notice that the two roles of intention – the causal and the mental – 
work together. Intentions cause action by representing themselves as causing that action.12 Think 
of what it takes for an intention to be satisfied. It is not only that the action happens, but also that 
the action is caused by way of that very intention. 
Let me clarify here that I do not mean to suggest that all intentions arise from decisions. 
Sometimes we find ourselves with an intention, find ourselves decided upon something without 
having deliberated. We can do things for reasons without explicitly weighing reasons. Nonetheless, 
some intentions arise from decisions and the characteristic product of a decision about what to do 
is an intention. And in the cases in which I find myself with an intention, I have settled the question 
about what I am going to do. There is no open question, so I don’t deliberate and I don’t need to. 
My mind is already made up. 
There are then at least two reasons to reject the standard account. First, starting from 
intentional action in order to explain intention is unable to account for the existence of intentions 
                                                          
11 This paragraph is a summary of the functional characterization and associated norms given by Bratman (1987). In 
his later presentation (2014), Bratman clarifies that there are four distinct norms on intention rationality: 
consistency, agglomeration, means-end coherence, and stability. Consistency requires that intentions are internally 
consistent and consistent with one’s beliefs. Agglomeration requires that intentions be combinable and meet the 
consistency norm. Means-end coherence requires that intentions in favor of ends engage a demand to choose means, 
as that becomes required. Stability puts pressure on retaining intentions over time, although it does allow for 
reconsideration and revision. These norms are explanatory, in that they enter into explanations of the roles that 
intentions play in our practical lives because of their tacit acceptance by certain kinds of agents, which is reflected in 
the fact that those kinds of agents have a disposition to see divergence from them as a mistake. They are also 
normative, which is explained by the importance of acting in the way that their acceptance supports (2014, pp. 16-
18). My presentation collapses agglomeration into consistency, since agglomeration is consistency in the realization 
of intentions. It also takes a different approach to means-end coherence for reasons having to do with the distinction 
between intentions and goals, which I discuss in the next section. For a critique of the project of characterizing 
mental states in terms of the normative commitments that apply to them, see Raz (2005) and Kolodny (2005, 2007). 





without intentional action. Second, the standard account is unable to account for the outcomes of 
decisions, which are commitments to future action, and the role that these states play as further 
inputs to our practical reasoning and causes of our behavior, at least in part because beliefs and 
desire do not provide the necessary stability, consistency, and causal control.  
Intentions are the states that play these characteristic roles.13 They are commitments to act 
that have the requisite stability and consistency. Commitments like these are sometimes formed 
by decisions. They are thus the outputs of practical reasoning, but they are also inputs to further 
practical reasoning, both about how they fit with our beliefs and other intentions and about how 
they are to be carried out. Having an intention to act is having made up your mind to act; it is 
having settled the question, in your mind and in the world, about what you are going to make 
happen.  
§ 1.2 Kinds of Action 
Let’s return to the relation between intention and action. We’ve now reversed course. Instead of 
explaining intention in terms of intentional action, I’ve given a characterization of intention, and 
now can explain intentional action in terms of intention.14 How does intention relate to the things 
I do intentionally, my intentional actions?  
A straightforward way of making the connection is to claim that intentional actions are 
behaviors executed on the basis of an intention. Intentional actions are simply the things I intend 
                                                          
13 This characterization of intention does not distinguish between several different views. Most importantly, 
although it follows Bratman in the presentation, it does not come down for or against his view of the details. For 
example, cognitivist views, which hold that intention is a special kind of belief (Velleman 1989), or at least involves 
belief in a fundamental way (Ross 2009), may also hold that intentions fill the functional role laid out above. Insofar 
as cognitivists understand the nature of intention in part by understanding the normative requirements on it, and 
those normative requirements match up to the ones I have given, I do not wish limit my discussion to one specific 
view or the other, in order to allow my account of collective intention to appeal to a broad range of views of 
individual intention. 





to do and do. If I flip the light switch intentionally, then I have an intention to flip the switch. On 
this view, intention is not primarily a way of classifying actions, but once we have an independent 
characterization of intention, we can use it to classify action. Call this the Simple View.15  
One problem for this view stems from the way I characterized intention as a commitment 
to act in the future. Surely there are cases of intentional action for which there is no prior plan. 
This problem is easily dealt with. Just as I can commit myself to act in the future, I can commit 
myself to act now. Call the latter a present-directed intention and the former a future-directed 
intention. Future-directed intentions, when successful, result in present-directed intentions when 
it comes time to perform the action. If all goes right, when the time comes, my intention to go to 
the game tonight becomes an intention to go to the game now. Present-directed intentions, 
however, do not require future-intentions. I can commit myself to doing something now without 
having any prior commitment to it. I will use ‘intention’ to refer to both present-directed and 
future-directed intentions, unless the context requires more clarity. 
A more serious objection admits that doing something intentionally involves a state of 
intention, but challenges the claim that the object of that intention must be the thing done 
intentionally. This objection is raised my Michael Bratman, and since it has significant 
consequences for the view of intention and action I adopt, and the way it applies to collective 
intention, I discuss it in detail. Bratman points out that sometimes it is rational to attempt to do 
two actions with the hope of doing one or the other, even when I know that I cannot do both. Here 
is an example he uses, slightly modified.16 Suppose that I want to go to law school in a particular 
town. There are only two law schools, A and B, and they coordinate admissions so that a student 
                                                          
15 This label comes from Bratman (1987, pp. 111-2).  
16 He suggests this example in (1987, fn 7, pg. 187) but uses a different example in the text. The example is filled 





can only get into one of the two, not both. I know about this admission policy, but it doesn’t bother 
me too much, since I don’t have a preference between them; I have a desire to get into A and an 
equally forceful desire to get into B. I prepare the best applications I can and send them off. If I 
get into A, it appears that I have done so intentionally. After all, I wanted to get in and tried my 
best to. Notice, though, that the same holds for B. If I get in to B, it appears that I did so 
intentionally. I had the same strength of desire, and tried just as hard. Because the Simple View 
says that the things I do intentionally are the things I intend to do, it entails that I intend to get into 
A and that I intend to get into B. But this conflicts with the characterization of intention I gave 
above. There I said that intentions require consistency; I cannot intend two things I know cannot 
be co-realized because I cannot settle on doing two inconsistent things. But in this case, I do just 
that. I intend to get into A and intend to get into B, even though I know that realizing both is 
impossible. And this doesn’t seem irrational. In fact, applying to both is clearly the rational thing 
to do. 
These considerations lead some, including Bratman, to reject the Simple View, but I don’t 
think that is necessary if we take seriously the distinction between intentions and goals. This 
distinction is well-known in the philosophical literature, and is strikingly drawn by Bratman 
himself in the paper in which these kinds of cases are developed.17 Confusion arises because in 
everyday language we sometimes use ‘intention’ for both.18 One way we see intention, which I 
discussed above, is as a commitment to a course of action, and the other way is as an outcome that 
an agent is motivated to bring about, and maybe takes some steps towards bringing about.19 This 
second sense is often associated with the phrase “intention with which” in the philosophical 
                                                          
17 Bratman (1987, Ch. 8.). 
18 For a discussion of the ambiguity of everyday language about intention, see Harman (1986, pp. 93-4). 





literature. So, we say, for example, that I intend to complete and hand in my application, and that 
I hand in my application with the intention of getting into law school. Notice, however, that only 
the former matches up with the characterization of intention as being about what I settle on or 
make up my mind to do. I can’t settle on getting into law school because it is not up to me. My 
acceptance into law school isn’t a decision I make; it is a decision the law school makes. All I can 
make up my mind to do is try, by completing my application and sending it in. My goal is to get 
into law school, but my intention, in the sense of what I settle on, is to complete and send in my 
application. Although in everyday contexts, we treat these as two different senses of the same 
word, they are two different things that, at least in theoretical contexts, we should keep apart. I 
therefore reserve the word ‘intention’ for the narrower sense of commitment to act and use the 
word ‘goal’ to refer to the weaker sense of aim or end. 
One way to spell out the distinction more fully is in terms of what goals and intentions are 
about, the character of the things they have as objects.20 Goals are often about outcomes that stretch 
beyond the direct behavior of an agent.21 They aim at things we would like to see, or a way we 
would like the world to be. We can think of them like motivating desires, they move us to take 
steps towards making the world a certain way.22 Intentions, by contrast, are about actions. They 
                                                          
20 This is not the only way of making the distinction. Bratman claims that intentions can also have broader outcomes 
as objects (1999, p. 115). Since Bratman does think that the distinction exists (1987, Ch. 8 and 9) and it fits better 
with the characterization of intention in the last section, I make the distinction this way. Further, I do not use this 
way of making the distinction in an argument against Bratman. 
21 Some people use ‘goal’ as the outcome itself, and then use ‘goal-state’ to refer to the motivating mental state of an 
agent that has that outcome as its object. I find it easier to use ‘goal’ to refer to the state of the agent and ‘outcome’ 
to refer to the state of affairs the agent aims at. I prefer this because it maintains an analogy between intention and 
goal, namely both are states of an agent or that agents are in. This has the advantage of making analogous 
expressions like “having a goal” and “having an intention,” rather than requiring such expression in the goal case to 
distinguish between the state of the agent and the state of affairs, but not in the intention case. More importantly, I 
think this brings out the dis-analogy between goal and intention based on their respective objects.  
22 Although I don’t provide an analysis of goals, we can think of them as a special case of desires, because two 
plausible conditions are that they actually motivate towards action, which not all desires do, and that, at least at 





are attitudes that resolve a deliberative question about what a person is going to do, and then get 
the person to do it. This point is sharply put by Annette Baier: 
I cannot intend the sun to stop, nor can I intend to turn the moon around to see its 
other face. Both of these, if I am ignorant or credulous or confident enough, can 
figure among my goals, among the things I am hoping and planning and working 
to bring off. The proper objects of intending, unlike the proper objects of aiming at, 
seem limited to my actions (not the sun’s)…A man’s reach may exceed his grasp, 
but his intentions surely must lie within it.23 
In short then, the distinction is based on the fact that actions, and not outcomes, are things we can 
settle on, things we can make up our minds about and make happen. That we can settle on our own 
actions is shown by how they are treated in our practical reasoning. Even though we are aware that 
circumstances may conspire to thwart our intentions, or we may simply forget, when we intend we 
are licensed to plan as if the action is going to happen. Since I have only the most fanciful doubts 
about whether I am going to mail in in my application, I can plan to stop at the sandwich shop next 
to the post office. My further practical reasoning is entitled to the premise that I am going to the 
post office, because my intentions reliably cause my actions, even if they occasionally fail.  
Goals motivate us, but they do not settle whether what they aim at is going to happen, either 
in the agent’s mind or in the world, because they aim at outcomes that are not up to the agent, by 
the agent’s own lights. As a result, goals do not play the same role in practical reasoning and do 
not have the same causal control. Having the goal of getting into law school does not mean I am 
going to, nor does it require that I view the issue as resolved. Say the law schools are in a new city, 
                                                          
23 (1970, p. 649). I would also like to note that I am here accepting only Baier’s point that an agent can form 
intentions only about things that are up to them, namely their own actions. I do not want to commit myself to her 





and I have no special control over the members of the admissions committee. There is no sense in 
starting to look for apartments near one university or the other, planning which coffee shops I am 
going to work at, or ordering furniture online after leaving the post office. Since getting into one 
law school or the other is only a goal, I am not entitled to use getting into either as a premise in 
my further practical reasoning. By contrast, intentions are attitudes that settle what is going to 
happen because they are about something an agent can settle on, in her mind24 and in the world. 
Things an agent can settle are things that are up to her,25 namely what she is going to do.  
We don’t normally make too much of this distinction because the concepts are closely 
related. If I intend to do something, I almost always have the goal of succeeding. But the distinction 
comes with a difference, because intentions require settling the deliberative question, while goals 
do not; the things I characterized as playing a vital role in our practical reasoning are subject to 
norms of consistency, with an agent’s belief set and with each other, because those norms are 
required to play the specified role. Goals are not subject to these norms. I can have two goals I 
know to be mutually inconsistent, in the sense that they are not co-realizable, take steps towards 
achieving both, and see which way the world turns out. This is why I have the goal of getting into 
law school A and the goal of getting into law school B, but not intentions with the same objects. I 
can’t do this for intention. I can’t settle on doing two things I know cannot both be realized.26 
                                                          
24 Settling in an agent’s mind entails that the agent believes she is going to act. Whether or not intention entails 
belief is a large debate, which I do not address. People who argue that intention does entail belief include Grice 
(1971), Harman (1976), Davis (1984), Velleman (1989), Ross (2009). Those who disagree include Davidson (1980), 
Bratman (1987). I highlight the issue here because it is the source of the difference between Bratman’s view and my 
view about the distinction between intentions and goals. Because Bratman denies that an intention entails a positive 
belief about future action, he does not draw the distinction in terms of settling, in the same sense of settling. Instead, 
he draws it in terms of the different rational requirements on intentions and goals, as I discuss. 
25 For an account of the “up to the agent’ness” of intention see Sellars (1980, p. 98). 
26 Note that using the notion of settling here requires no more than a norm about having inconsistent beliefs, since 





Notice also that I can have an intention with many different goals. I may intend to hand in my 
application with the goal of getting in, but I may just as well have the goal of placating my parents. 
Let’s return to the Simple View. Bratman’s argument against it treats both the things I do 
on the basis of goals and the things I do on the basis of intentions as things I do intentionally. The 
key move in the argument is to classify certain actions as intentional for which we cannot say that 
the agent has an intention to do that thing, because of the consistency requirement. So, for example, 
he says that “it seems natural” to classify actions like getting into law school as intentional.27 It 
seems natural for Bratman because I want to get in, I intend to try to get in, I do get in, in the 
course of trying to, and my getting in is dependent on my skill and effort.28 Agreeing that actions 
described in this way are intentional and that we can’t have intentions to do them, because of the 
consistency requirement, generates the premises needed to refute the Simple View. There are 
things I do intentionally that I do not have an intention to do, for example get into law school A. 
Here is where I depart, on the question of the Simple View, from Bratman. Bratman’s 
claims about which actions are intentional do, in some ways, match up to standard usage. But, as 
previously noted, standard usage of intention and its cognates is ambiguous between what I intend 
and the intention with which I do something, or in other words, my goal.29 I intend to hand in my 
application, and I hand in my application with the intention of getting in. It is clear that I hand in 
my application intentionally, but I deny that I get in intentionally. It is more perspicuous, in 
philosophical contexts, to use separate terms for cases of successfully executing an intention and 
for cases of successfully reaching a goal while executing an intention. I suggest that things we do 
                                                          
27 In this quote he is talking about a slightly different case, wearing down your running shoes while going for a run, 
but in the relevant respects it is the same, namely something we do intentionally without an intention to do it. The 
case that Bratman discusses the most is the video game example (1987, 113-114). But in fn. 7, p. 187, he suggests 
the law school example, and returns to it in later work (2014). 
28 These are Bratman’s tentatively proposed conditions in his analysis of an analogous case (1987, p. 121). 





that involve outcomes we aim at, but are not objects of intention, are done purposefully but not 
intentionally. 
Let me be explicit: this is in part terminological stipulation. I do not plan on presenting 
anything that amounts to an argument against Bratman’s classification, but I would like to note 
that he doesn’t present an argument for it either.30 This is not a criticism of Bratman; we are on 
footing with respect to the arbitrariness of our action-classification schemes. I also do not use my 
proposed classification in an argument against Bratman’s view of individual or shared intention. 
The disagreement here isn’t about concrete reality, nor about how things are ordinarily described. 
Law school type cases exist, and I am certain that most speakers would accept describing actions 
like “getting into law school” as intentional. But the ambiguity in ordinary usage masks the 
important difference between doing something on the basis of an intention and pursuing a goal. 
There is one sense in which handing in my application is something I make happen, but it is 
different from the sense in which getting into law school is something I make happen. These two 
senses capture different concepts. Some terminology is better than others, and where common 
usage is ambiguous we shouldn’t feel pressured to treat it as anything more than a defeasible 
starting point. For our purpose here, it is important to observe this distinction because I will go on 
to discuss intentions only in the stricter sense of commitments to act and intentional actions in the 
stricter sense of things done with an intention to do them. Further, there are theoretical 
                                                          
30 Bratman considers some objections to his argument against the Simple View, but not that the actions involved 
aren’t done intentionally, at least not in the text, as far as I can tell. He does briefly consider that suggestion in a 
footnote, responding to an example given by JL Austin. In Austin’s example, I insist on payment of a due debt from 
a creditor even though I know this will bankrupt him. Austin, whose intuitions I share, says about this case that “At 
no time did I intend to ruin him; it was never any part of my intention” (1970, pp. 278-9). Instead, according to 
Austin, I ruin him deliberately but not intentionally. I make a similar suggestion below in response to a more neutral 
case. In response to this example, Bratman says “But we have seen that though I did not intend to ruin him it might 
still be true that I ruined him intentionally. And this does seem to be a natural description of the case” (p. 188, fn. 
18). This is simply an appeal to the action classification scheme Bratman prefers, under which certain actions which 
are not intended are done intentionally. We have seen it only in the sense that Bratman asserts it, in response to other 





considerations in favor of a classification scheme for actions that separates things done 
intentionally from things done purposefully. One reason is that it flows from the account of 
intention given above. In that discussion, following Bratman, I discard the method of starting with 
action to give an account of intention, and replace it with the method of treating intention as 
fundamental and identifying it in part based on the role it plays in practical reasoning and in part 
on its causal role. Since we are treating intention as fundamental and we can straightforwardly use 
intention to give an account of intentional action, the only reason not to is that it clashes with 
standard usage.31 There is no need for a separate classification of certain actions as intentional, 
which we then need to match up to our independently developed account of intention. Instead, 
intentional actions are those actions an agent does with an intention to do them.32 This leads to the 
second reason, namely that dealing with this mismatch leads Bratman to develop a complicated 
and incomplete theoretical framework.33 It is simpler and clearer to have different terms for the 
things I do, when these things involve me to different degrees. And intentional actions involve me 
because they are actions I intend to perform, while purposeful actions involve me because they are 
in service of some goal that I have.34 
Take another case, that of things I know are going to happen in course of executing an 
intention, but are not the objects of intentions or goals I have. Here I think common usage is not 
just ambiguous but perhaps even on my side, if it is not completely indeterminate. Say I have a 
                                                          
31 As I go on to argue in Chapter 5, not all intentions are mental states, but even non-mental intentions guide our 
action by giving us reasons. 
32 For an alternative view, which doesn’t analyze intentions as distinct from intentional actions, see Anscombe 
(1963), Wilson (1989) and Thompson (2008) 
33 It is an elegant and ingenious solution to the problem Bratman is considering. But it is complicated, and self-
identified as such (1987, p. 124), because it involves novel concepts, which do not correspond to any pre-theoretical 
notion, like ‘motivational potential’ (1987, p. 119-126), and incomplete because it offers a rough specification of 
sufficient conditions for doing something intentionally, “without working out the details” (p. 1987, p. 121). 
34 Note that intentional actions are also purposeful. But some actions are purposeful without being intentional, for 
example ‘getting into law school’. And the same intentional action, say ‘handing in the application’, may be done 





nice leather basketball, which I use to play outside at the park.35 I know that playing on concrete 
wears down the leather, and despite my desire to preserve the ball, I use it anyway, because I prefer 
the feel of leather to rubber. Is wearing down the leather something I do intentionally? Given the 
definition of intention above, it is certainly not something I have an intention to do, and given the 
definition of goal, that outcome is not the object of a goal of mine either. Wearing down the leather 
is not something I decide to do; it is not something I am motivated towards at all. I am not disposed 
to find means to doing it, I don’t rule out options that don’t include it, and it does not guide my 
behavior while playing. It is not clear whether we normally classify such actions as intentional.36 
But Bratman does, as long as I consciously note that I am wearing down the leather while playing 
and that this fact has some significance to me.37 This set of conditions is much less plausible than 
the last case. Whether or not “I’m doing A intentionally” entails “I intend to A,” it seems to me 
that it does entail “I want to A” and “I’m trying to A.”38 I find it hard to doubt the following 
conditional: If A is an intentional action, then at some point, the agent wanted to A, tried to A, or 
intended to A. It is one thing to deny the last of these entailments, but Bratman’s view of incidental 
action requires denying all three. I suggest that instead of wearing down the leather intentionally 
or purposefully, I am wearing down the leather consciously. It is not an accident. I can foresee it, 
and I do it anyway. But because it is not something that features in the right way in my practical 
reasoning, namely I do not have an intention or goal concerning it, my action is not intentional, 
nor is it purposeful. This has the same simplicity as the suggestion above for the goal case, and it 
is not subject to the same complaint that it departs from our everyday understanding. 
                                                          
35 This example is adapted from one Bratman uses (1987, p. 125). 
36 Experimental work has been conducted on this issue by Joshua Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2006). That work suggests 
that our judgments about whether a “side-effect” action is intentional depend on its moral valence, which is not 
useful here, except to show that common usage is at best ambiguous. 
37  (1987, p. 123). 






 The view suggested above is not about what counts as action, but instead about kinds of 
action. This point is obscured by the framing of the picture as I have presented it so far, and dealing 
with it requires returning to the nature of action. We began the first section with the thought that 
an action of mine is something I make happen, something I do. What this obscures is that the things 
I do come apart from the things I actively do. In some sense, reflex bodily responses like sneezes 
and coughs are things that I do. They aren’t my actions, not because I don’t do them, but because 
I am also somehow passive with respect to their doing.39 Further, activity in the sense of 
subconscious teleological guidance also falls short of action. Consider the case, discussed by David 
Velleman, of subconscious beliefs and desires leading to highly specific and in some sense 
purposive bodily movements.40 Velleman recounts a story told by Freud in Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life. In that story, Freud’s sister insinuates that she is going to buy him a new inkstand. 
Some time later that day, after forgetting about the remark, Freud clumsily knocks the inkstand off 
his desk, breaking it. Freud’s own analysis of the case, which Velleman endorses, is that knocking 
the inkstand off the desk is perhaps not so clumsy, since it is a suitable means to a desired end, 
speeding up his sister’s purchase. This is something Freud does in pursuit of an end, and it is 
caused by a belief-desire pair, yet, contra the standard view, there is something defective about it. 
It is not genuine action. 
What feature does Freud knocking over his inkstand lack that keeps it from being a genuine 
action? The answer comes from the intuitive idea that actions belong to their agents. It is not just 
that they aim at something, but that they are controlled by someone. They are the result of a 
                                                          
39 This point is developed forcefully in Frankfurt (1988). 
40 (2015, pp. 12-13). I have said that goals are agential, which is to say that they are attitudes of an agent and have 
suggested that goal-directed action is purposeful action, but, as this example shows, there may be sub-agential 
purposes. Since what results from these sub agential purposes does not result in action at all, I don’t think this 





particular kind of relation between the agent and the action while the action is happening.  We can 
think of this relation as control or guidance.41 And it is a kind of control that is attributable at the 
agential level, which means that it is conscious, at least, and therefore not the kind of control that 
we would attribute to a sub-agential bodily mechanism. If the course of a behavior is subject to 
adjustments that compensate for things that would otherwise interfere with its completion, that 
behavior is controlled. If the adjustments are under the conscious control of an agent, then the 
behavior is an action, an action that belongs to that agent. And this conscious control is exactly 
what is missing from the Freud case. Knocking over the inkstand is not under his control in the 
right way. He isn’t consciously controlling it; the behavior doesn’t belong to him. It seems 
plausible to me that this sense of guidance or control is required for action, and so I accept the 
view that these kinds of cases fall short. 
However, the examples discussed in relation to the Simple View are not like Freud 
knocking over his inkstand. They are undoubtedly cases of action. I am consciously aware of my 
goals in the law school case, and consciously aware of the consequences, which I think about while 
playing, in the basketball case. But, as Harry Frankfurt points out, not all actions are intentional: 
The term ‘intentional action’ may be used, or rather mis-used, simply to convey 
that an action is necessarily a movement whose course is under an agent’s guidance. 
When it is used in this way, the term in pleonastic. In a more appropriate usage, it 
refers to actions which are undertaken more or less deliberately or self-consciously 
– that is, to actions which the agent intends to perform.42 
Frankfurt here accepts a version of the Simple View; intentional actions are actions done by an 
agent who has an intention to do them. He also persuasively argues that some behaviors are under 
                                                          
41 This way of conceiving the issue comes from Frankfurt (1988, Ch. 6) 





an agent’s control and so are actions, but do not amount to intentional action. We can add to 
Frankfurt’s comment the idea that what an agent intends is different from what goals the agent has 
and what the agent is consciously aware of while performing an action. Taking these three cases 
gives us three kinds of action: intentional action, purposeful action, and conscious action. I hand 
in my application intentionally, I get into law school purposefully, and I wear down the leather of 
my basketball consciously.  
What we started out looking for is the difference between what I make happen and what 
happens to me. All of these things, handing in my application, getting into law school, wearing 
down the leather, are things I make happen, in the way necessary for them to be actions of mine.43 
What differentiates these kinds of action is the level of involvement of the agent. An agent settles 
on what she does intentionally, she aims at what she does purposefully, and she is aware of what 
she does consciously. As I explain above, intentions, goals, and objects of awareness each have a 
different functional characterization based on the roles they play in our practical reasoning, the 
rational requirements on them, and the way that they cause us to act. Each of these captures a 
distinct regularity subject to a functional characterization of the role the attitude plays in practical 
reasoning. My claim is that the most perspicuous way of classifying the different things I make 
happen is according to this degree of involvement, which rescues the Simple View and explains 
my focus on intentional action. Intentional action is the fullest exercise of human agency. My 
intentional actions are the behaviors I deliberate about, settle on, and commit myself to. I have a 
certain control over them. They are up to me; I am in a position to decide on them. But also, they 
have a certain control over me. I have to make sure that the things I commit myself to are consistent 
                                                          
43 Wearing down the leather on the ball is also a result of an action of mine, but it is not only that. Because I am 
aware of it, consider the reasons against it, and decide to do it anyway, it is also my action.  That is not the case for 





with each other and the things I believe. When they aren’t I have to change my mind. This level 
of involvement isn’t present for what I aim at or what I am aware of. 
The situation is remarkably similar for things we make happen and things that happen to 
us. Sometimes we settle on something together, sometimes we aim at something together, and 
sometimes we are simply aware of each other.44 Settling on something together involves a kind of 
control or guidance, attributable to us and distinct from aiming at together and from awareness of 
each other. Extending and applying these distinctions to the collective case clears up some 
confusion about what it means to do something together, and sets the stage for an account of doing 
something together, in the fullest sense. 
 
§ 1.3  Contrast Cases 
The distinction between the things I do and the things we do is usually made using contrast cases.45 
Contrast cases introduce one set of behaviors, and then describe them in two, contrasting ways. In 
the first way, they are simply individual actions. In the second way, they are something done 
together. To take the most famous example, John Searle asks us to imagine a number of individuals 
scattered about in a park.46 Suddenly it starts to rain, and each person runs to a centrally located 
shelter. There is some base level of coordination, as people avoid running into one another, but 
running to the shelter is not, in the sought-after sense, something that the picnickers do together. 
By contrast, imagine a second scenario with the same individuals executing the exact same bodily 
movements, but as members of a dance troupe performing a piece in the park. In these two cases, 
                                                          
44 I am using the verb “aim” here specifically for goals, so that I can specify what the agents are doing according to 
the classification scheme I am proposing. I do not intend this as an analysis of the verb “aim” in general. 
45 The label, in this area, is from Bratman (2013, pp. 9-10). There are many examples in the literature with a variety 
of actions, for example riding a bike (Gilbert 1990, 2013), painting a house (Bratman 1992, 2014), or going to the 
zoo (Schweikard and Schmid, 2013), as well as the commodity trader example from the introduction. 





there is no outward physical difference, and there is no difference in the summation of individual 
behavior. However, for the dancers, adding up the individual movements leaves something out, 
namely the fact that they performed a particular piece. The dancers do something together, whereas 
the picnickers do not. 
 The point of such examples is to bring into focus the difficulty of specifying exactly what 
makes the second case contrast with the first case. This bears a striking resemblance to examples 
like flipping the light switch. From an external perspective the behaviors are indistinguishable in 
themselves. In the individual action case, the issue is what separates my making the switch flip 
from the fact that the switch flipped, my turning on the light from being confronted by a bright 
room. Here it is what separates our running to the shelter together, from each of us running to the 
shelter, individually. But in neither do the overt bodily movements of those involved tell us 
whether we are looking at an action. In section one, we arrived at an attitude, intention, with a 
characterization, a state in virtue of which an agent settles what she is going to do and to which 
certain norms apply. Here the open question is whether that attitude plus some extra features is 
sufficient to explain the individual-together contrast or whether we need a new attitude, perhaps 
modelled on the individual one, to get at what is distinctive about this contrast. 
 What are some of these extra features that serve as possible explanations of the contrast? 
A first thought is that the collective case involves a common effect. That is, we can claim that 
something is a collective action if it is describable as something that several agents did or 
produced.47 This is not the claim that what the participants did couldn’t have been done by an 
individual. Some things may be impossible for an individual to do, like sing a duet, but many 
things we do together are not like this. You alone may have been able to move the sofa we move 
                                                          
47 Ludwig develops an idea like this. Starting from a Davidsonian perspective, he claims that “A joint action is an 





together. But what matters is that several agents did contribute to something that looks like it can 
be described in action terms, for example ‘we avoided a collision’. This faces the obvious problem 
that many common effects caused by multiple agents aren’t actions at all. Take a somewhat morbid 
example discussed by Elisabeth Pacherie.48 Suppose five people are stuck in an elevator long 
enough to die of asphyxiation, and had fewer people been in the elevator they would have had 
enough oxygen to survive until help came. Their dying is the common effect of their breathing, 
but it is not something they do together in the relevant sense.  
The elevator example shows that common effect is not enough; something needs to be 
added. One issue with the elevator case is that the individual behaviors are not actions. While at 
times, perhaps during yoga, breathing is aimed at or even reflected upon, it might be the case that 
the intuitiveness of the example depends on the idea that it is not usually. Maybe what is required 
is a condition that the individual behaviors themselves are intentional actions. But this is 
insufficient as well. The summation of the effects of the intentional actions of the individuals 
running to the shelter bring about many changes in the environment, some of which they may be 
incapable of on their own. They trample grass, alter the course of falling raindrops, and change the 
composition of the air under the shelter. If, improbably, there are enough individuals and they run 
in a certain pattern, they may even create a path.49 But, while the individual behaviors are actions, 
the parallel behavior is not. 
The intuitive force of the judgment that creating a path or breathing all the oxygen in the 
elevator is not something the individuals do together comes from the fact that the common effect 
                                                          
48 (2011, p. 175) 
49 For example, in ‘stigmergic path formation’ independently acting agents create these kinds of common effects by 
following traces left on the environment by previous agents. In these cases, actions build on each other and result in 
the spontaneous emergence of a common path, often in ways that are surprisingly beneficial. A classic real-world 
example is the system of paths formed between university buildings on many campuses. For a philosophical 
discussion of this issue in a different context, see Goldstone and Roberts (2006), Goldstone and Gureckis (2009), 





is not under the control or guidance of the individuals. The individual actions they undertake are 
under their control, and taken together, they may create a path, but creating a path with the others 
is not something the individuals intend to do, aim at, or are even aware of. Just as what separates 
action from non-action in the individual case is the control of the agent, what separates doing 
something individually from doing something together is the way it is guided by the agents who 
do it. The participants do not modulate their behavior in response to obstacles that get in the way 
of the common effect, in the way that they do, as individuals, for getting to the shelter. Because 
the creation of the creation of the path is not subject to conscious adjustments by the individual 
participants, who are in a position to compensate for things that would otherwise interfere with 
completing the path, it is not an action. In other words, in order for ‘creating the path’ to be an 
action, it must be the case that when the individuals are confronted with some obstacle to 
completing the path, they change their behavior in order to make sure the path is created. Creating 
a path is like being confronted with a bright room, not like turning on the light. It is not something 
the individuals do together, it is not an action of theirs, because it is not guided by them in the right 
way. 
 
§ 1.4 Doing Things Together 
What is it then to do something together, in a minimal sense? Taking a hint from the previous 
discussion, let’s start with the idea that there may be several different degrees of our involvement 
in the things we do together, and that doing something together involves, at least, being aware of 
something or aiming at something together, and at most intending something together.  
 Being aware of something together is an unwieldy idea, clearly including much more than 





our actions and that they are the result of the actions of two or more individuals, it captures a 
valuable kind of social reasoning. This kind of reasoning involves seeing other individuals as 
agents and including that recognition in the individual’s deliberation about what to do. Take the 
case of avoiding a collision. Trying to avoid a collision with an oncoming rock rolling down a hill 
is a matter of calculating and then avoiding its trajectory. Trying to avoid a collision with another 
agent is a matter of working out enough of their beliefs, desires, goals, and intentions to generate 
expectations about what they are going to do, while recognizing that the other agent is doing the 
same for you, and adjusting your expectations of their behavior based on what you take their 
expectations of your behavior to be, given that they are adjusting their expectations of your 
behavior based on that they take your expectations of their behavior to be, and so on. As anyone 
who has side-stepped a few times to avoid an oncoming person can attest, avoiding a collision is 
often much more difficult with another agent. 
There is an intuitive sense in which avoiding a collision is something we do. The sense this 
captures, I think, is what game theorists refer to as a Nash equilibrium.50 A Nash equilibrium is an 
outcome that results from strategic reasoning on the part of the individuals involved. A set of 
strategies ends up in a Nash equilibrium if and only if given the strategies of the others, no player 
could improve the result for herself by changing her strategy. When this is conceived of as a model 
of human interaction, each individual chooses a strategy of action in pursuit of those things she 
prefers in light of her beliefs about what the other is going to do, where she knows that what the 
other does depends on what the other thinks she will do. 
We arrive at a Nash Equilibrium through coordination brought about by a recognition of 
the dependence of the outcome on what the other player does, as well as a convergence of belief 
                                                          





on what the equilibrium strategies of the others are. Say we aim to avoid each other while walking 
opposite directions on a sidewalk. It doesn’t matter to you or me which side I walk on or which 
side you walk on. All that matters to each of us is that we don’t walk into each other, and this 
preference is common knowledge. Suppose it is often the case where we live that people regularly 
pass by each other on the right. Moving to my right is then the most salient choice, because I 
believe you are aware of the regularity and that you believe that I am aware of this regularity, even 
though there has never been a public declaration that this is so. This mutual recognition of 
preference and convergence of belief is enough to get us to coordinate our actions. Coordinating 
our actions by recognizing the dependency of the outcome on the choices of the other agents with 
whom we are interacting, and then reasoning about what choices they will make in light of their 
beliefs and preferences, captures a sense of doing something together with others because it 
captures an important kind of interdependence and awareness of that interdependence. 
The interdependence of action and intention and the dependence of the outcome on each 
licenses referring to that outcome as a ‘collective outcome’. It is more than the summation of 
individual behavior, in other words more than merely a ‘common effect’, since the behavior of the 
individuals involved is intentional. And it is more than the summation of non-strategic individual 
action, since the actors are aware of each other as contributors to the eventual outcome and aware 
that their own actions and intentions are dependent on that fact. In this sense, it is something we 
do together, because it is something over which we, distributively, have a degree of control or 
exercise some guidance. Had I done otherwise the collective outcome would be different, same for 
you, and we are both aware of this fact and the collective outcome we will likely end up with, 





if others run in certain pattern, expect that others will run in those patterns, then choose their own 
route based on these expectations, creating a path is something they do, in some sense. 
But, the sense in which is it something they do is minimal. Reaching an equilibrium 
outcome involves only mutually consistent individual intentions with an awareness on the part of 
each of the intentions of the others. It need not involve aiming at the outcome itself, as the outcome 
may simply be a side-effect of the individual’s choices, nor does it involve anything approaching 
partnership or collaboration. A sense of partnership or collaboration requires at least a disposition 
to persist if difficulty arises, be flexible regarding one’s role, and help the other parties. It is 
because it involves these three things that I claim acting together in partnership or collaboration 
acting together in the fullest sense.   As such, it requires more than predicting what others will do, 
it involves actively engaging with them in characteristic ways, to be spelled out in more detail 
later. And this is not required for Nash equilibria. 
Consider the case of the Hawk/Dove game.51 For a concrete example of a situation that this 
game models, think of two people coming into conflict over a valuable resource, in a situation with 
no external rewards or punishments. Doves avoid conflict, offering to share the resource and 
backing down if the other tries to take it all. Hawks seek conflict, demanding the whole resource 
and fighting for it if the other doesn’t back down. When two Hawks meet, conflict results and we 
assume the conflict has some equally distributed cost. When a Hawk meets a Dove, the Dove 
retreats and the Hawk gets the full resource. When two Doves meet, they share the resource 
equally.  In this game, the payoff matrix for two agents is structured as follows: 
                                                          
51 This game was originally developed to explain animal conflict (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973), and is one of the 
foundational games in evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982). It is discussed in the context of collective 
action by Gold and Sugden (2007). They argue that collective intentions cannot be distinguished from the mutually 
consistent intentions in Nash equilibria. Bratman forcefully criticizes this thesis (2014, p. 95-6). Since I think 






  Player 2 
  Hawk Dove 
     Player 1 Hawk -2, -2 2, 0 
 Dove 0, 2 1, 1 
Figure 1: Payoff Matrix for Hawk/Dove 
 
There are two pure Nash equilibria in this game, (hawk, dove) and (dove, hawk). These 
combinations of strategies are Nash equilibria because neither player can improve her payoff by 
unilaterally changing strategy. They arrive at the equilibrium based on their own evaluations of 
the possible outcomes and expectations about what the other play is going to do. A nice intuitive 
test for a Nash Equilibrium is to answer the question: if a player knew the choice of the other, 
would they change their own choice? If no player would, then we have a Nash Equilibrium. In this 
game, both players plainly benefit if they can avoid mutual hawkishness, and so there are gains for 
a kind of coordination. If one player knows the other is going to play hawk, they are better off 
playing dove. And if one player knows the other is going to play dove, they are better off playing 
hawk. So, (hawk, hawk) and (dove, dove) aren’t stable. 
In order to end up anywhere, we need to say more about how the players converge. Let’s 
stipulate, for the sake of the example, that in this community there is a regularity that the individual 
in the position of Player 2 gives way and plays dove. In this case, they arrive at (hawk, dove). They 
are at a Nash Equilibrium, since given knowledge about what the other players chooses neither 
would change their own choice, but they still radically fail to collaborate. Neither player is flexible 
about playing dove; they each strongly prefer to play hawk as long as the other plays dove, which 





through difficulty. The first time the individual in the position of Player 2 has the chance to switch 
roles and change the outcome to (dove, hawk) they will, perhaps even in doing so involves deceit, 
manipulation, or sabotage. 
A Nash equilibrium involves a collective outcome, but only as a side-effect. The outcome 
is something the agents are aware of, but it results from individual reasoning about the value of 
outcomes and the likely behavior of others. The individuals do not need to aim at the collective 
outcome nor collaborate to do anything together.52 And further, the structure of these games 
highlights that the participants are not predisposed to help, be flexible about their roles, or persist 
through difficulty. As such, while it may capture the most minimal sense of doing something 
together, it fails to shed light on the fullest sense of acting together. Call this kind of thing we do 
together strategic interaction. 
Some philosophers who recognize that strategic action falls short of acting together in the 
fullest sense still wish to maintain the importance of a similar kind of social reasoning. These 
philosophers treat equilibrium as the basic idea, and add additional conditions to what counts as a 
collective outcome, which is reached on the basis of cooperation.53 So, for example, David 
Gauthier argues that collective outcomes are those that are ‘Pareto maximal’ or at least ‘Pareto 
superior’ to an equilibrium.54 An outcome is Pareto superior to another if it increases the payoff 
for at least one person without decreasing the payoff for anyone. An outcome is Pareto maximal if 
there is no outcome Pareto superior to it. Achieving a collective outcome on this definition involves 
the individuals choosing an outcome that brings about a better payoff for a least one and at least 
                                                          
52 This of course doesn’t rule out that in some instances we do aim at a collective outcome. In the cases I have in 
mind, however, there is no collective outcome at which they aim. Each aims to avoid the other and is aware of what 
will likely happen, but there is no one thing at which they aim. 
53 Bratman gives a different, competing analysis of cooperation, but since for Bratman, cooperative activities are a 
subset of collective intentional activities, his account does not cause an issue for the discussion here. See, Bratman 
(1992). 





as good an outcome for everyone else, relative to an equilibrium. The clearest example of this 
comes from the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which partially explains its fame. The payoff structure for 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is: 
  Player 2 
  Cooperate Defect 
Player 1 Cooperate 2, 2 0, 3 
 Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
Figure 2: Payoff Matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Here the only Nash equilibrium is (defect, defect). Defect is a dominant strategy: no matter what 
the other player’s strategy is, each player receives a higher payoff by playing Defect. But there is 
a Pareto superior outcome, namely (cooperate, cooperate). Each player is better off with the 
(cooperate, cooperate) outcome than they are with the equilibrium outcome. Although it is 
important not to equate cooperation with an outcome in one game, in part because cooperation 
covers more than is representable in a single, abstract, mathematical model, these are the kinds of 
structures of choice that some have in mind as instances of cooperation.55 The general intuitive 
idea that lies behind this theoretical work is that cooperation involves several individuals choosing 
actions that, based on strategic reasoning about the other individuals, they predict will lead to an 
                                                          
55 For an example of a theorist who uses Prisoner’s Dilemma as the primary context for studying cooperation, see 
Axelrod (2006, Ch. 1). Brain Skyrms presents a persuasive argument that this emphasis is a mistake, at least for 
understanding things like social contracts, and we would do better to focus on the Stag Hunt, a game whose name 
and structure is based on a story told by Rousseau in A Discourse on Inequality (2004, Ch. 1). Skyrms’s reason, 
namely that in the Stag Hunt the cooperative outcome is also an equilibrium, demonstrates this point nicely by 
showing how cooperation does not always have the risks and costs that choosing the cooperative strategy does in the 





outcome that results in mutual advantage, despite each bearing some potential individual cost for 
that choice.56 
 What distinguishes this kind of case from the Hawk/Dove case is that it involves 
individuals specifically aiming at a particular outcome, namely the collective one. This is more 
than choosing an individual strategy with the awareness that the strategy choices of others will 
affect the outcome and are affected by the strategy choices of each. It is more because it adds 
resources to identify something towards which the strategies of all aim. Gauthier states this 
explicitly: “Since the product of a set of strategies, one for each interacting person, is an outcome, 
we may also say that in cooperative interaction the object of agreement is an outcome, which then 
determines each person’s strategy.”57  This gives us a potential definition of collective action: 
when a mutually advantageous outcome is chosen consciously by individual agents aware of that 
the choices of others are required to reach that outcome.  
Let me note that this approach is not circular. One might worry that by identifying an 
outcome as collective we are begging the question whether bringing it about is a collective action. 
But this is not so, since we are also giving an independent method for determining whether an 
outcome is a ‘collective outcome’ using the notion of mutual advantage. There is, however, another 
problem. This definition doesn’t meet the challenge posed by contrast cases. But before I present 
that argument, I would like to generalize the outcome approach. 
Approaches focusing on rational cooperation are instructive because they lead us from 
merely strategic interaction with awareness of others to a collection of individuals sharing a goal, 
but they are a special case. They are a special case purposefully since they are concerned with 
explaining the rationality of cooperation, under a certain understanding of rationality. But 
                                                          
56 This is familiar from the contractarian approach to ethics, see especially Gauthier (1986) and Rawls (1999).  





individuals often have shared goals that are not cooperative, and not a rational outcome, perhaps 
on any plausible definition of rationality. Since this analysis of cooperation is quite narrow, it is 
important that we consider sharing goals more generally. 
On one kind of general view, if some collection of people shares a goal, then the outcome 
that satisfies one person’s goal is the same as the outcome that satisfies each of their goals and 
each person recognizes that bringing about the outcome that satisfies their goal involves some 
action on the part of the rest. A shared goal is a set of goals with the same content held distributively 
by a number of agents. Agents who share a goal and work towards bringing it about certainly do 
something together, but I argue, they need not do so in the fullest sense. On this view, people can 
share a goal without a disposition to persist through difficulty, be flexible regarding their roles, or 
help the other parties when needed. However, I do not mean that they cannot share a goal with 
these dispositions. People may collaboratively decide on a shared goal, which they then pursue by 
acting collectively. But when they do choose and pursue a shared goal in this way, they are acting 
together in a more demanding sense, a sense which I spell out below. We can see how it is possible 
to act with a shared goal without acting together in the sense of collaboration by considering a 
final contrast case. We need a new case, since the people scattered in the park do not share a goal. 
However, we can turn to another case developed by Searle.58 
Imagine, however improbably, a group of benevolent and idealistic but naïve students at 
business school. They are, misleadingly, taught that Adam Smith’s theories about economics show 
that helping humanity is best achieved by pursuing one’s own self-interest. Since they are 
benevolent, they share the goal of helping humanity. That is, each is motivated to bring about an 
outcome in which the welfare of human beings is greater than its current level and each recognizes 






that achieving this requires the actions of the other students. Further, since each knows that the 
others were educated in the same way, each believes that each of the others will pursue her self-
interest and recognizes that helping humanity requires that each do so. In this case, they are not 
helping humanity together in the fullest sense, and why would they? They are under the impression 
that collaborating to do good will only make matters worse. This belief ensures that there are only 
individual intentions; each only controls her own behavior, each settles only what is up to her, 
even if they share the goal that each person’s self-interest is exclusively pursued by that person. 
The shared goal remains only something that they aim to bring out; it is not something that is up 
to them. And the actions of each are none of the others’ business.  
This case suggests that, despite sharing a goal, the business students are not engaged in a 
genuine collective action. Acting together in the sense of collaborating is explicitly ruled out by 
their beliefs as being incompatible with their goals. Now imagine, for contrast, that they meet on 
the last day of school and in the ensuing discussion they slightly modify their beliefs, so that it is 
consistent with their goals to form a pact, in which they agree to help humanity together, by way 
of each pursuing their own self-interest. Again, in both cases, the subsequent behavior of the 
business students is the same. And yet, the sense in which they are doing something together in 
the first case is different from the sense in which they are doing something together in the second.  
Contrast cases such as these, in which the no agreement case involves a shared goal, present 
a problem for the collective outcome theorist. The problem is this. Take a collective outcome, 
given any definition of collective outcome, and any set of actions that lead to that collective 
outcome. Whether those agents perform those actions does not determine whether the agents are 
doing something together in the fullest sense. It is always possible to imagine two separate 





these two descriptions of the behavior is possible is that, as the business school example shows, 
even in the closest case, when all the individuals involved share a goal, each may pursue the 
collective outcome with the understanding that her action is individual, thereby explicitly rejecting 
the claim that they are collaborating. We should take their word for it. 
 
§ 1.5 Collective Intention and Action 
The lesson of these contrast cases is that nothing about the action itself tells us whether it is done 
together in the fullest sense and that the mistake, as in the individual case, lies in starting with the 
action and then working back to the beliefs and desires of the agents involved. Physical behavior 
and an outcome are not enough. These two pieces can only explain doing something with others 
in the sense of coordinating individuals’ intentions around a shared goal, potentially by agents who 
explicitly deny that they are acting together in the fullest sense. I here argue that collective 
intention captures the idea of doing something together in the fullest sense. Something that plays 
the roles of intention, as spelled out earlier in the individual case, but now for collections of 
individuals acting together, provides the stability and consistency required for the highest degree 
of involvement in and the fullest control over what we do together. 
Let us return to business school case to highlight the contrast and see how something can 
settle an issue for us. After forming the pact, the students still have the shared goal of helping 
humanity, but there is more. The agreement settles a deliberative question about what they, 
together in the fullest sense, are going to do, both in their minds and in the world. Giving a more 
general account of how individuals jointly settle a deliberative question is a large topic, and 
providing an answer is the task of the later chapters, but for now, treating agreement as one way 





goal and acting together in the sense of collaboration. As it settles the question in their mind, the 
agreement makes a difference for the rational requirements on their practical reasoning. In our 
story, the business students have two shared goals: that humanity be helped and that each student’s 
interests are pursued by that student. Say, for the sake of the example, that these two things are 
potentially up to them, collectively. Before being made aware of the mistake involved in their 
education, namely the idea that these two outcomes are compatible, they may settle on both. Once 
the business students have been made aware of this mistake, however, they may still rationally 
have the shared goal of helping humanity and the shared goal of each person’s self-interest being 
exclusively pursued. But, since the two outcomes are incompatible, and they are now aware of 
this, they cannot rationally settle on both. The contrast then is this: on being made aware of the 
incompatibility of the two outcomes, nothing needs to be changed in the no agreement case, each 
can continue to go about their business, but in the agreement case, they are rationally required to 
update the agreement. Insofar as the agreement is supposed to settle the question, once it is clear 
that the question can’t be settled in the way specified by the agreement, they need to reconsider. 
As it settles the question in fact, if it is effective, the agreement causes the issue to turn out 
one way rather than the other. Once updated to avoid the initial incompatibility, the pact states that 
the individuals are going to perform the actions it specifies because they have agreed to. There are 
agreements that are broken before they are satisfied or forgotten or simply never fulfilled, just as 
in the case of defective individual intentions. But the agreement represents itself as causing the 
course of action it outlines, and when successful, does cause it. 
Without yet committing myself to any specific account, the agreement case involves a 
collective intention, given the definition of intention above. There is a state (or combination of 





actually does so, settling the matter in fact. As such it is subject to the rational requirements and 
causal condition characteristic of intention. The pact is, or expresses, a commitment to a course of 
action that is stable and consistent, that plays the appropriate functional roles in guiding practical 
reasoning and causing behavior, but now across individuals instead of within one individual over 
time. There is no such state present in the no-agreement case. There are only the more or less well-
coordinated individual intentions. Having well-coordinated individual commitments, even those 
that result in cooperative outcomes, does not amount to what is distinctive about acting together 
in the sense of collaboration. In the case of collaboration, we jointly settle a deliberative question 
that is up to us. That is what gives the cases their contrast. 
I propose a collective version of the simple view. A collective action is something we do 
together with a collective intention. Instead of starting with the action or outcome, as the collective 
outcome theorists do, and working back to intention, we can take the characterization of collective 
intention and use it to understand action. Acting together in the sense of collaboration involves a 
collective intention and is therefore a collective action. To complete the taxonomy, call acting 
together with a shared goal social action. 
There are then at least three different kinds of things we do together. Sometimes we act 
together strategically, sometimes we act together socially, and sometimes we act together 
collectively. All of these cases involve the control over what we do in a way which makes them 
things we do together. They are things we make happen, not things that happen to us, but in 
different definable and regular ways. We are aware of each other and our interdependence in 
strategic action. I know that your actions are dependent on mine, and so I can change the outcome 
we arrive at by changing my action, and I know that you can do the same. We distributively aim 





guiding and controlling our individual actions in order to coordinate, and in certain cases, 
cooperate. And the fact that we all know that arriving at this outcome requires our coordination or 
cooperation guides our choice of individual action, or strategy. We collectively intend a course of 
action in collective action. We deliberate about, settle on, or commit ourselves to what we are 
going to do, which means that only in the collective case do we exercise full joint control or 
discretion over a single deliberative issue. That is what makes it acting together in the fullest sense. 
These considerations give us a picture of what collective intention does, how it is different 
from sharing a goal, and the role it serves in a particular categorization of the things we do together. 
But it leaves open what collective intentions are, how they are formed and rescinded, whether they 
involve obligations and entitlements, how they fulfill their roles in practical reasoning and in the 
world, and how they relate to individual mental states. These are the topics of the next three 








   Psychological Views 
Chapter 2  
 
 
Of the people who are convinced that explaining collective action requires collective intention, 
some deny that there is anything particularly complicated or even unitary about collective 
intentions. For these people, while a collective intention is not reducible to a combination of strictly 
individual intentions, it is something in the mind of each individual performing a collective action. 
To separate them from individual intentions, they do have a special form. This form implicates a 
“we,” but it is a “we” that may or may not exist. Call these views “psychological views” because 
according to them collective intentions are psychological states of potentially isolated individuals. 
Psychological views are tempting because they involve the fewest theoretical 
complications. I address the most prominent version of a psychological view, put forward by John 
Searle, and highlight its shortcomings, namely that it fails to account for the causal and cognitive 
interdependence between participants in a collective action. I think these shortcomings speak 
decisively, but not all are convinced. Recognizing the limits of psychological views but holding 
on to their promise leads Deborah Tollefsen and Rick Dale to buttress Searle’s view with important 
work on low-level coupling, synchronization, entrainment and perception-action matching from 
social psychology, which they bundle together under the label ‘alignment’.1 In doing so, however, 
they present a view that is inconsistent with Searle’s and not able to account for contrast cases.2 
                                                          
1 Tollefsen and Dale (2012) and Tollefsen et al. (2013). 






Showing where and why they go wrong helps clarify the relation between philosophical and 
psychological work on collective action and is suggestive for future empirical research. It also 
suggests that it is unlikely that any such additions are going to rescue psychological views, and so 
we have reason to turn to more complicated or less parsimonious views of collective intention in 
order to explain collective action. 
 
§ 2.1 Searle’s Account 
Searle claims that we have a form of intentionality that is not reducible to individual intentions 
and associated beliefs and desires.3 The ability to have this form of intentionality is a biological 
capacity, shared by humans and several other species.4 We are simply the kinds of things that have 
mental states of an irreducibly collective kind and, as such are formulated in the first-person plural 
rather than first-person singular. Searle therefore calls them “we-intentions.” 
We-intentions explain the distinction between contrast cases. What separates the dancers 
from the picnickers is that each of the dancers has an intention of the form, “We are running to the 
shelter,” while each of the picnickers has an intention of the form “I am running to the shelter.” 5  
We have intentions of this kind when a collective of which we think we are a part performs a 
collective activity. The reason that this doesn’t reduce to an individual intention to do my part, 
Searle thinks, is that we-intentions imply a sense of collectivity that is not present in individual 
intentions. It is part of a we-intention that it involves working together with the others, in his terms 
“cooperation”: “…the mere presence of I-intentions to achieve a goal that happens to be believed 
to be the same goal as that of other members of a group does not entail the presence of an intention 
                                                          
3 (1990, p. 402). 
4 (2010, p. 46-50). 





to cooperate to achieve that goal.”6 According to Searle, no combination of individual intentional 
states can capture this sense of acting together, the sense close to what I have been calling acting 
together in partnership or collaboration that distinguishes contrast cases. 
 This irreducibility raises a potential problem for Searle. It comes close to committing him 
to something metaphysically suspect. Here is how he states the worry:7 
…if you think that collective intentionality is irreducible, you seem to be forced to 
postulate some sort of collective mental entity, some overarching Hegelian World 
Spirit, some we that floats around mysteriously above us individuals and of which 
we as individuals are just expressions. 
Fear of “Hegelian World Spirits” leads Searle to place two conceptual conditions on a theory of 
collective intentionality:8 
Constraint 1: It must be consistent with the fact that society consists of nothing but 
individuals. Since society consists entirely of individuals, there cannot be a group 
mind or group consciousness. All consciousness is in individual minds, in 
individual brains. 
Constraint 2: It must be consistent with the fact that the structure of any individual’s 
intentionality has to be independent of the fact of whether or not he is getting things 
right, whether or not he is radically mistaken about what is actually occurring. And 
this constraint applies as much to collective intentionality as it does to individual 
intentionality. One way to put this constraint is to say that the account must be 
                                                          
6 (1990, p. 406). This is a very different sense of “cooperation” than the one discussed in the last chapter. On 
cooperation, he says “…two prizefighters, as well as opposing litigants in a court case, and even two faculty 
members trading insults at a cocktail party, are all engaged in cooperative collective behavior at a higher level, 
within which the antagonistic hostile behavior can take place” (1990, p. 24). 
7 (1998, p. 118). 





consistent with the fact that all intentionality, whether collective or individual could 
be had by a brain in a vat or by a set of brains in vats. 
And herein lies the problem. It appears we have a dilemma: either the “we” is reducible or we are 
forced to violate these constraints. 
 But, according to Searle, the dilemma is based on two misunderstandings. While it is true 
that my mental life takes place within my head, it doesn’t follow that all my mental states need to 
be expressed in the first person singular. We can avoid positing a world spirit by instead treating 
this first-person plural kind of intention as primitive. This does involve some metaphysical excess, 
since it specifies a new kind of mental state,9 but it avoids the greater excesses of Hegelianism. 
Each dancer has a token we-intention and it is in the brain of that individual, so there is no need to 
postulate a collective entity that actually has an intention.  
Furthermore, the reference to the “we” in the intention doesn’t commit us to the existence 
of any group, much less any group with a mind or consciousness. We-intentions only make 
“purported reference” because having a we-intention does not entail that anyone else shares that 
we-intention. Here is how Searle puts it: “The existence of collective intentionality does not imply 
the existence of human collectives actually satisfying the content of that intentionality.”10  When 
that is the case, I am simply radically mistaken about what is going on. I take myself to be doing 
something as part of our doing something, but we aren’t doing anything. There is no “we.” This is 
truly a radical mistake because it is not just about a false belief.  It does require a false belief, but 
it goes farther. I am not just wrong about the outside world, I am wrong about what I am doing. 
                                                          
9 Christopher Kutz takes issue with even this modest excess, since, he claims, it “…invites charges of proliferating 
intentional kinds, charges that methodological parsimony encourages us to try to avoid” (2000, p. 3). 
10 (1997, p. 450). This statement is slightly misleading, since Searle doesn’t think the “collectivity” is in the content 
of the intention. He states that collective intentions only require us “to postulate that mental states can make 
reference to collectives where the reference to the collective lies outside the bracket that specifies the propositional 





Even further, the existence or non-existence of the collective changes nothing about what is going 
on in my mind. To emphasize, for Searle having a genuine we-intention is consistent with being a 
brain in a vat. 
  When we-intentions are successful, however, there is a “we” and the we-intentions cause 
the activity. But since there is no collective agent to do the causing, the we-intentions must cause 
the action by way of the intentions of the individual. Searle calls this specification of the individual 
intentions the “further intentional content” of we-intentions, and this further content makes it the 
case that each agent intends a particular act to be his or her contribution to the collective action. 
So, we have to detour through Searle’s view of individual intention. 
 Searle’s view of individual intentional action is largely in accord with the discussion of 
intention and action in the first chapter. On his picture of intentional action, it has two components, 
a “physical” component, the behavior itself, and a “mental” component, the intention.11 The 
intention causes the behavior by representing the behavior and representing itself as causing the 
behavior. So, for example, when I intend to raise my arm, I succeed in carrying out my intention 
only if I do raise my arm and it is this very intention that causes my arm to go up. Intentions are, 
according to Searle, causally self-referential. Some individual actions and intentions are slightly 
more complex, because they involve a “by-means-of” relation. So, for example, I fire the gun by 
means of pulling the trigger. This is more complex than simply raising my arm, because it involves 
two things, the pulling of the trigger and the firing of the gun. I still only have one intention, but 
its content is that it causes a complex event consisting of pulling the trigger which in turn causes 
the firing of the gun.  
                                                          





We-intentions are like these more complicated individual intentions in that they also 
involve the by-means-of relation, but now the means are the individual actions. Two or more 
people perform a collective action by means of each of them performing their parts. It is important 
to note that, for Searle, it is incorrect to say of the participants that they have two intentions, 
individual and collective, and are performing two actions, their part and the collective action. 
Instead, the relation between individual and collective is part-whole. The individual actions are 
part of the whole collective action, just as the individual intentions are part of the whole collective 
intention. The only difference between the complex individual case and the collective case is the 
kind of intention involved.  
One upshot of this is that in collective actions the individual intentions of the participants 
are derived from the collective intentions, which makes it clear why any attempt to explain 
collective intentions in terms of individual intentions is misguided. Such attempts get the relation 
backwards.  
The final part of Searle’s account is his view of how collective intentions relate to the rest 
of our mental lives. Intentions do not function on their own. They require some fundamental 
abilities and an understanding of a host of basic things about the world. Take the intention to run 
towards the shelter. In order to execute it, I need to be able to move my body in particular ways, 
track that movement, be sure that there is actually ground between me and the shelter, and so on. 
This leads Searle to claim that intentions require a complicated network of presuppositions, 
capacities, and dispositions, mental and physical things that do not rise to the level of beliefs or 
skills. Searle calls this the Background. Part of our capacity to execute collective intentions 
specifically is our background ability to recognize others as potential partners in action. As I would 





whose actions are in some ways dependent on mine or whose goals align with mine, but as potential 
collaborators, as people with whom I can jointly settle a practical matter about what we are going 
to do. Thankfully, this capacity is also an in-built biological primitive, according to Searle. 
 
§ 2.2 Problems with Searle’s Account 
The problem with Searle’s view is that there is nothing collective about we-intentions.12 It is an 
explicit part of his view that a we-intention is not an intention of the group, since having a we-
intention doesn’t require that there is a group. But what we are looking to explain is what happens 
when two or more people act together in the fullest sense. And two or more people acting together 
in the fullest sense is something only two or more people can do. No individual can act together, 
no matter what we-intentions they have. So, we need more than just we-intentions to explain this. 
At the very least, we need shared we-intentions,13 which we can understand as a collection of 
people who each have tokens of the same type of we-intention. This seems to be what Searle has 
in mind for successful cases. He says that when I have a we-intention I take it to be the case that I 
am not simply acting alone.14 And when I have an intention to do something with you and “…if in 
fact I am succeeding in cooperating with you, then what is in your head will also be of the form 
we intend.”15 So, when we are in fact acting together our we-intentions are shared in the sense that 
we each have one of the same type. But Searle doesn’t say what this amounts to, beyond this brief 
reconstruction. Everything Searle says about sharing we-intentions is consistent with our we-
                                                          
12 Versions of this argument are found in Bratman (1993), Velleman (1997), Gilbert (2000), Meijers (2003), and 
Schmid (2009). Each of these versions differs in framing but contains the same fundamental criticism: Searle’s view 
isn’t really a view of shared or collective intention at all. 
13 Tuomela develops a view like this (2005). 
14 (1990, p. 407). 





intentions simply happening to coincide.16 And mere coincidence of we-intentions fails to capture 
the collectivity involved in collective actions. 
 The reason there is more than concomitance to collectivity comes from the nature of 
intentions, as spelled out in the first chapter and in Searle’s own view of individual intention. As 
intentions, collective intentions settle what we are going to do and represent themselves to us as 
settling what we are going to do. We-intentions don’t settle anything. Settling the matter requires 
interdependence between the individuals performing the collective action, with respect to both 
their actions and intentional states. It is this interdependence that explains how the participants 
have joint control over what they do. Its exact nature is the topic of the next three chapters, but for 
our purposes here, we can specify two ways Searle’s coincidence view fails to capture it, which 
correspond to the two ways that intentions must settle a deliberative question about what to do.17 
 The first kind of interdependence involves a causal responsiveness between the attitudes 
of the participants. This causal responsiveness is required to settle what participants in a collective 
action actually do, how they divide up the tasks involved in the collective action based on the 
particular intentions of the others to do their parts. Take two people, Arthur and Beatrice, playing 
on the same team in a game of two on two basketball. Their actions are responsive to each other 
in many subtle and intricate ways throughout the game, explored in the next section, but so are 
their intentions to do their part. Say they want to run a screen and roll.18 Just as Arthur’s action of 
setting the screen is responsive to Beatrice’s of using the screen, Arthur’s intention to set the screen 
                                                          
16 This line of critique is pursued to absurdity by Schmid (2003). 
17 The idea of intentions as settling deliberative questions is discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. They also 
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must be responsive to Beatrice’s intention to use the screen. If they have a collective intention to 
run this play, both their actions and intentions are dependent on one another.  For example, if 
Beatrice intends to set the screen, rather than use it, Arthur won’t intend to set the screen himself, 
but rather he will intend to use it. So, Arthur intends to set the screen only if Beatrice intends to 
use it, and Beatrice intends to use it only if Arthur intends to set it. In addition to each other’s 
activities, the participants in a collective action must pay close attention to each other’s intentions, 
because their intentions to do their parts are dependent on each other.19  
Searle’s coincidence view fails to capture the causal interdependence between the 
intentions of participants that guide how the collective action is carried out, and this leaves 
collective intentions incapable of fulfilling the causal condition on intention. On Searle’s view, 
since there is no collective, the causal power of collective intentions goes through the individual 
intentions of participants. But, he only countenances “vertical” by-means-of relations between the 
individual intentions and collective intention of a single individual. This misses, and his constraint 
2 in fact rules out, the “horizontal” relations between the individual intentions of the participants. 
These horizontal relations, in the form of causal interdependence, are crucial to the execution of 
collective intentions, because they guide the way individuals form and maintain the individual 
intentions to do their parts. This leaves the Searle’s view without a story for how collective 
intentions fulfill their causal role. 
The second issue concerns how we-intentions represent themselves to us as settling what 
we are going to do. On Searle’s view, it is unclear how they could. Since we can have we-intentions 
without a “we” is seems like I can’t take my we-intention to settle anything, and neither can anyone 
else. Again, Searle forecloses any potential solution that appeals to the assumption that the 






intentions are in fact shared, which we are now making, because he denies that common knowledge 
or mutual belief is necessary for collective intention; that is, he denies that there is any necessary 
cognitive interdependence. He claims that mutual belief is not necessary for collective intentions 
because it does not “…add up to a sense of collectivity.”20 To be fair, this claim comes in the 
context of denying that a reductive account of we-intention in terms of individual intentions is 
possible, a denial we should accept. But, agreeing with Searle’s argument against reductive views 
only commits us to the view that mutual beliefs about individual intentions are not sufficient for 
shared we-intentions. It doesn’t require that we accept his additional claim that they aren’t 
necessary. And, if we want collective intention to represent itself as settling the matter for the 
participants, we shouldn’t. In order to fulfill the mental condition on collective intention, we need 
to posit mutual beliefs between the participants at least to the effect that there are other participants 
and that they have tokens of the same type of intention. Only with these additions can any 
individual participant take the shared we-intentions to settle what they are going to do. 
At least this minimal sense of interdependence involving causal and cognitive components 
is required to capture the idea that collective intentions jointly settle what the participants are going 
to do and represent themselves as doing so.21 Since Searle’s view of we-intentions radically fails 
to satisfy his own conditions on intentions, it seems like it should be rejected. 
 
§ 2.3 Enter Alignment 
Before we reject it though, we should consider an attempt to remove the coincidence from Searle’s 
view. Responding to these difficulties on behalf of Searle, Deborah Tollefsen and Rick Dale 
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introduce the concept of an alignment system, based primarily on linguistic and psychological 
research on conversation and interpersonal interaction.22 They think alignment can be combined 
with Searle’s theory in order to overcome these problems. In this section, I show how they are 
mistaken. The nature of their mistake suggests that not just Searle’s theory but psychological views 
in general should be rejected.23 In the next section, I turn to Tollefsen and Dale’s broader project 
and develop some implications for incorporating empirical research into an account of collective 
action. 
 An alignment system is a loosely connected set of cognitive processes that facilitate social 
interactions. ‘Alignment’ refers to the dynamic matching or coordination of the behavior or 
cognitive states of two or more people over time, for example, in their gestures, gaze, attention, 
word choice or posture. The basic idea is that individuals engaged in shared behavior may become 
subpersonally aligned across a variety of bodily and cognitive levels, the three main ones being 
perceptuomotor, attentional, and psycholinguistic. In other words, their bodily movements may 
become synchronized, their eye movements coordinated, and their speech patterns more similar.24  
 ‘Alignment’ is best thought of as a general term for a variety of psychological phenomena 
including entrainment, synchrony, mutual adaptation, and perception-action matching. The study 
of these phenomena encompasses a wide range of methodological and theoretical approaches in 
social psychology and cognitive science.25 Tollefsen and Dale abstract from many of these 
differences, and I follow them in this respect. The empirical research they report includes, for 
example, studies in which the eye movements of people looking at a painting dynamically couple 
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if the participants share a certain level of mutual understanding, the phases of people swinging 
their legs or rocking together in rocking chairs synchronize, or the pattern of tapping on a table 
becomes aligned.26  
This research suggests that alignment has two features important for our purposes. First, it 
is responsive to higher-level cognitive states such as belief and intention, but it can also give rise 
to cognitive states via bottom-up processing.27 This multi-level interaction also occurs within an 
alignment system itself, so that behavioral alignment leads to attentional and linguistic alignment, 
and vice versa. As Tollefsen et al. state, “Behavioral alignment seems to give rise to alignment in 
conversation, which, in turn, gives rise to a mutual understanding and deeper understanding of one 
another, which amounts to an alignment of overall interactive comprehension.”28 Second, the 
degree of alignment influences the success of many interpersonal processes, such as learning, 
information exchange, and communication. According to this research, interaction between 
individuals over time can be greatly facilitated by low-level cognitive processes as well as higher-
level plans. 
Aligning with others in synchronized movements such as dancing and marching can both 
improve perceptual and motor ability during interactive tasks and enhance the general rapport and 
pro-social behavior of the participants.29 It is important to emphasize that this also holds for cases 
in which the behavior is complementary rather than matching.30 One study found that when two 
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the bottom of the system upwards, we have bottom-up processing. For a nice discussion and critical perspective on 
bottom-up views of cognition, see Fodor (1983). 
28 (2013, p. 52). 
29 Tollefsen et al. (2013). 





people perform a precision task activity involving different roles, they tend to form a 
complementary perception-action system that lowers the complexity of their task performance.31 
Combining these features makes it clear that alignment processes contribute to the 
successful completion of collaborative tasks, and perhaps collective actions. Building on this 
research, Tollefsen and Dale aim to show that “alignment is crucial to understanding collective 
actions and should be integrated with philosophical approaches.”32 They claim that not just 
Searle’s theory but philosophical theories of collective action in general have several flaws that 
limit their ability to explain the initiation, execution, and maintenance of collective actions. By 
attending to the role alignment systems play in coordination, we can integrate this empirical 
research with the philosophical theories to overcome these limitations. 
In particular, they think that alignment can play several roles in a defense of Searle’s 
theory. First, alignment fills out the concept of the Background. Tollefsen and Dale argue that 
“One way to conceive of this set of capacities, however, is to understand them as structures or 
features of an alignment system.”33 The first benefit of understanding alignment in these terms 
then is that it takes a vague “primitive” sense of the other and replaces it with a detailed and 
relatively well-understood set of cognitive processes, for which there is significant empirical 
evidence. With respect to collective intentions, features of the alignment system fulfill the 
explanatory role of the Background well, by explaining the structure that is in place for the 
formation and continuation of we-intentions. In relation to Searle’s example of the dance troupe, 
they see the relationship as follows: 34 
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The ballet troupe’s higher-order we-intentions will inform their lower level processes and 
explains how their perceptual and motor systems can function together to achieve their goal. 
Similarly, the presence of an alignment system explains how we-intentions can be formed 
on the fly, so to speak, without prior planning or agreements.   
More importantly, Tollefsen and Dale think that alignment explains the way in which we-
intentions in individual minds lead to unified agency; in other words, alignment explains the causal 
and cognitive interdependence between participants in a collective action. It provides the missing 
“horizontal relations.” The reason alignment can play this role is that it is a kind of causal 
interdependence. According to Tollefsen et al., alignment systems are “multi-component” systems 
that essentially involve “continual mutual adaptation” and the “coupling of cognitive agents,” 
where coupling is defined as a particularly intimate causal relation.35 The claim is that with this 
addition, Searle’s view is no longer forced to rely on a fortuitous coincidence of we-intentions. It 
is no coincidence that the participants have the we-intentions they have because their we-intentions 
arise from and are maintained by the alignment system of which each of the participants is a part. 
The alignment system is what makes the we-intentions shared; it’s what facilitates the coordination 
of minds and bodies over time required to fulfil the causal condition.  According to Tollefsen and 
Dale, this allows Searle’s account to avoid the first criticism developed in the last section. 
The innovation here is that, unlike explicitly causally interdependent intentions or 
cognitively interdependent features like mutual belief, alignment systems do so without requiring 
an explicit structure of interdependent intentional attitudes. This fits nicely with Searle’s view, 
since he denies any interdependence between the we-intentions themselves or any other explicit 
cognitive attitudes of the participants. Further, Tollefsen and Dale think this is an advantage since 
                                                          





they take explicitly cognitively interdependent intentions to be too demanding for many kinds of 
agents who can perform collective actions.36 Our intuitions differ, and I return to this in the next 
section, but let me note here that this also precludes aligned we-intentions from satisfying the 
mental component of intention. Being subagential, alignment does not require that the individuals 
are aware that they are aligned, and doesn’t require any belief that they are aligned, even though 
it does require that there are others. If the individuals don’t believe they are aligned, they are in no 
better position to take the issue of what they are going to do to be settled than the radically mistaken 
individual with an isolated we-intention. 
One might think, since all of this is part of the Background, it doesn’t directly conflict with 
other parts of Searle’s view, such as the constraints on intentionality. But that is not the case. Searle 
is explicit that his constraints apply equally to the Background. He states, “That I have a certain 
set of Intentional states and that I have a Background do not logically require that I be in fact in 
certain relations to the world around me.”37 Because alignment does logically require relations to 
the external world, it is not a viable way of filling out the concept of the Background. Alignment 
is something that essentially involves multiple agents, the relations between them, and particular 
environmental factors, since it just is dynamic change over time based on mutual adaptation. A set 
of brains in vats cannot form an alignment system.  
Further, according to Tollefsen and Dale, alignment is necessary for the formation of a we-
intention. They state, for example, that “the alignment system provides a necessary structure in 
which we-intentions can be formed and maintained.”38  This is in tension with Searle’s categorical 
exclusion of the necessity of any external relation for we-intentions. Searle is committed to the 
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view that it is not just a logical possibility but also a natural possibility that an individual could 
have a we-intention and yet be mistaken about the presence of any other individual. Searle holds 
that it is possible not just for brains-in-vats but also for creatures like us that are subject to natural 
laws like ours to have collective intentions in complete isolation. In contrast, Tollefsen and Dale 
are committed to the view that the connection between alignment and we-intention is a matter of 
natural necessity. Thus, the story that Tollefsen and Dale tell about how we-intentions arise 
conflicts with Searle’s individualism and internalism about we-intentions. We can run the 
following argument to that conclusion, interpreting necessity here as natural necessity. For Searle, 
no external relations are necessary for the formation of a we-intention. For Tollefsen and Dale, 
alignment is necessary for the formation of a we-intention. Alignment is an external relation. 
Therefore, Tollefsen and Dale’s account is not consistent with Searle’s. Since alignment 
presupposes two or more agents, and is, according to Tollefsen and Dale, naturally necessary for 
the formation of a we-intention, Tollefsen and Dale’s account conflicts with Searle’s on the issue 
of the formation of we-intentions. 
 
§ 2.4 Definitions of Collective Action in Psychological Research 
Tollefsen and Dale’s confusion about Searle stems from a deeper and more pervasive one about 
the nature of collective action itself, which is evidenced by an equivocation in their operant 
definition of collective action. On one hand, when they are discussing the importance of alignment, 
they are sympathetic to a “minimalist” definition, on which collective intention is not required for 
collective action. On the other hand, when they are discussing the philosophical theories,39 they 
                                                          





work with a “maximalist” one, on which collective intention is required for collective action.40 In 
this section, I highlight this ambiguity by discussing the role that Tollefsen and Dale spell out for 
alignment systems in collective action. I then turn to the broader consequences of similar 
conceptual confusion in the empirical literature and spell out some benefits of finding a way to 
incorporate alignment into a philosophical theory of collective action. 
As we have seen, in the positive view of the relationship between collective intention and 
alignment Tollefsen and Dale put forward, they argue that alignment necessarily underwrites all 
collective action. As a result, while collective intentions41 have an important role in collective 
action, they are not alone sufficient. They make this explicit by stating “We-intentions may be 
necessary for collective action, but as we have argued, they are not sufficient”42 and “Deep 
commitments are clearly not sufficient for joint agency.”43 They are willing to extend this thesis, 
in a limited fashion, to the claim that collective intention may not be necessary for collective action. 
They discuss cases of the collective behavior of animals in which “surface synchrony may be all 
there is to animal joint action.”44 These doubts about the necessity of collective intentions are 
strengthened by their discussion of an “illusion of the we-will,” which highlights their concern that 
if collective intentions are generated through alignment induced by laboratory settings, they cannot 
be genuine intentions since “the we-will is an effect rather than a cause of the activity.”45 From 
this they claim that it is possible to argue that more complex collective behaviors may be brought 
about by preintentional processes, making recourse to higher-order cognitive processes 
explanatorily superfluous and possibly epiphenomenal. This suggests that directly referring to 
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intentional concepts in our account of collective action is mistaken since collective intentions are 
potentially neither necessary nor sufficient for collective action.  
On the other hand, Tollefsen and Dale’s project is ultimately to incorporate their concept 
of alignment into philosophical views of collective action. This is clear both from their discussion 
of Searle and their explicit aims. They suggest that using empirical research on alignment as a 
mechanism of cohesion between individuals is necessary to overcome deficiencies in the ability 
of philosophical theories to explain how collective actions are initiated, implemented, and 
executed. For this project to be coherent, we must adopt a maximalist definition of collective 
action. This follows because the philosophical theories of collective action they discuss are aimed 
at explaining the difference between contrast cases, which, as discussed in the first chapter, require 
collectively intentional notions. Tollefsen and Dale are explicit about this too. They introduce the 
concept of collective action with the dancer/picnicker contrast case from Searle, and they state, for 
example, that “we agree that a theory of joint action needs to appeal to mental states like intentions, 
and we are persuaded by the arguments that these intentions should be ‘shared’ in some manner.”46 
These projects are not consistent. Explaining contrast cases is not compatible with treating 
alignment as necessary or sufficient for collective action. Alignment is not necessary for collective 
action since many collective actions do not require the spatial proximity necessary for bodily 
coupling or the regularity of interaction necessary for linguistic alignment. We can easily imagine 
cases where collective actions are initiated, and perhaps even carried out, by a few texts or an 
exchange of emails. Alignment is not sufficient for collective action because it cannot differentiate 
between individual coordinated behavior and genuine collective action. Aligning with someone is 
not a matter of aiming to do so. Sometimes the participants are not aware that they are bodily or 
                                                          





linguistically entwined and in fact, in some studies alignment occurs even when the participants 
are told to ignore each other’s actions. Frequently, the participants are not doing anything together 
beyond doing the same thing at the same time.47 
The reason that Tollefsen and Dale adopt inconsistent aims is that much psychological and 
some philosophical research does not fully observe the distinction between shared goals and 
collective intentions and, at times, any distinction between parallel action and collective action. 
For example, in a review article of psychological literature on joint action, Sebanz et al. offer the 
following definition: “Joint action can be regarded as any form of social interaction whereby two 
or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the 
environment.”48 Knoblich et al., in which the et al. includes philosopher Stephen Butterfill, define 
joint action as follows: “When two or more people coordinate their actions in space and time to 
produce a joint outcome, they perform a joint action.”49 These definitions suggest that there may 
be a disconnect between the psychological research and the philosophical research discussed by 
Tollefsen and Dale, a disconnect that would have consequences for this dissertation, since it aims 
at making a contribution to that philosophical literature. The focus on coordinated behavior rather 
than intention, in my terms, has the potential to flatten the distinction drawn between parallel and 
collective action. Further, depending on how we read “coordinate,” “joint outcome,” and “to bring 
about a change,” they may require a shared goal, but they do not require a collective intention, in 
the sense spelled out in Chapter 1. Without that concept of collective intention, the distinctions 
between strategic, social, and collective action collapse 
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If it is true that the psychological research is just about something else, there is little reason 
to discuss it further here. Psychologists are simply working with a different, broader concept, 
perhaps one that combines some of my categories on pragmatically justifiable grounds. Although 
it may not give a full picture of the psychological research, the examples discussed in the two 
review articles referenced above seem to recommend re-thinking this suggestion. Examples of 
collective action from these sources include performing a symphony, lifting a log, executing a 
“fast pass” in a basketball game, and so on, examples that involve acting together, not in a minimal 
sense, but in the sense of partnership or collaboration.50 The philosophical literature explicitly 
discussed by the authors of the review articles appears to recommend rethinking the above 
suggestion too, insofar as those articles as an epistemically valuable guide to this specialized area 
of research. For example, Knoblich et al. write “Early approaches to joint action originate in 
philosophers’ interest in the nature of joint intentionality,” and go on to discuss the work of Gilbert, 
Bratman, Tuomela, and others.51  
Similarity of source and subject matter hints at reasons to seek a reconciliation between the 
psychological research and the philosophical literature discussed in the review articles. I propose 
two such reasons: (i) considering the conceptual structure used by empirical researchers helps to 
fill out the distinction between the various things we do together, for example coordination and 
collective action, giving us a better characterization of what coordination is, and (ii) working out 
how empirical research on joint action may be integrated into philosophical theories give us a test 
for plausibility for these theories, based on an explanation of how proposed philosophical concepts 
like collective intention are initiated and maintained and how they match up to the psychological 
reality of doing things together. Spelling out this reconciliation is the topic of the next section. 
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§ 2.5 Reconciling Philosophical and Psychological Views 
Despite my criticisms, I think that we can see how this reconciliation between this specialized area 
of psychological research and the philosophical research that informs the two review articles is 
possible by returning to Tollefsen and Dale. Although their attempt to combine alignment with 
Searle’s account fails, because of the solipsistic nature of psychological views of collective 
intention, the concept of an alignment system is a novel addition to the literature on collective 
action, and it may be consistent with a different theory of collective intention. Further, they are 
correct to suggest that the concept of an alignment system may serve several purposes in such a 
theory. They emphasize that collective action is sometimes a dynamic, self-organizing process that 
involves various sub-processes that contribute to its initiation, maintenance and success. They also 
spell out how this dynamic development works in great detail, elaborate on the types of lower-
level cognitive processes that lead to alignment between individuals, introduce potentially 
important concepts such as shared motor intentions, and clarify their relation to higher-level 
cognitive states. It appears that they have developed a consequential area of overlap between 
lower-level cognitive processes and collective intentions, and they suggest several potent areas 
where the use of empirical research on the coupling of lower-level cognitive processes could be 
highly valuable for theories of collective action.  
The central insight that guides much of Tollefsen and Dale’s critique of the existing 
literature is that some collective actions may be traceable to a subpersonal level; sometimes we 
simply “fall into” them. It is not always clear that the moment at which interactive behavior 
becomes collective action is present in the conscious awareness of the participants. Consider, for 





crash victim is trapped under the car, begins running beside the other bystanders towards the 
victim, and exclaims, “I’m going to try to lift the car off him.” She looks around at the other 
bystanders, who return the look and look at one another, and then they all reach down to grab a 
part of the car to lift. In this case, each bystander, by responding to the look and initiating action, 
indicates that they will help the victim by lifting the car. At some point in this story, their running 
besides each towards the car becomes the collective action of lifting the car, but it is implausible 
to describe the lifting of the car as the result of a prior plan or an explicit agreement.  
We may label these cases of collective action that do not involve explicit agreement or a 
prior plan ‘spontaneous collective actions’. They form a familiar and important class of collective 
actions. Think of the way that many conversations arise, not from any plan, previous deliberation, 
or familiarity with each other but from features of the circumstance in which the participants find 
themselves, or the way in which the participants subconsciously react to those features and each 
other. These cases go beyond alignment systems, but as I go on to argue, alignment systems may 
have an interesting explanatory role in some of them. This kind of collective action highlights a 
general feature that all accounts of collective action must have; an account of collective action 
must explain the transition from a random collection to collective agency, however that is 
construed. In cases with prior plans or explicit agreement this task is not as difficult. But the most 
difficult cases lie at the lower bound where the behaviors of each are interactive but the presence 
of a collective intention is in question. 
We can now turn to the value of alignment. Features of relevant expressive behavior that 
lead to collective action may be partially explained by the subpersonal bodily, linguistic and 
attentional alignment. For example, Tollefsen and Dale consider studies that show that many of 





posture, verbal cues, and various other levels of linguistic organization, from diction to sentence 
structure.52 They also discuss the role of priming in alignment, which predicts that the cognitive 
accessibility of many behaviors, such as a chosen sentence structure, is induced by hearing another 
person use it, and thereby increasing the probability of producing a similar behavior oneself.  
This account of the role of gaze, posture, and other such processes in alignment provides 
detailed mechanisms that consciously and subconsciously introduce a collection of people to each 
other as possible participants in a collective action. By increasing cognitive accessibility, pro-
social tendencies, and feelings of rapport and familiarity, alignment processes provide a 
background on which the initiation becomes more likely. Further, as Michael and Pacherie have 
argued,53 alignment reduces uncertainty about the representations and behavior of others and 
thereby increases predictability, which helps establish a minimal form of social orientation that 
may in certain cases induce a process that leads to collective action. 
The claim is not that alignment is all there is to the initiation of collective action, nor that 
alignment alone is sufficient for such an initiation. Initiating a collective action involves some act 
on the part of a person indicating that she is ready to participate in the collective action, specified 
in more detail later, while alignment is often unintentional. Alignment may feature in the causal 
story about the production of collective action, but it is not the initiation of collective action itself. 
Understanding the lower-level processes in this way specifies a different role for alignment 
and collective intention in collective action from the one preferred by Tollefsen and Dale in their 
minimalist discussion, but it is an important role nonetheless. Consider a case, which Tollefsen 
and Dale discuss, of ‘joint following’, in which subtle directional cues cause two or more people 
to wander in a direction that neither intended, ending up somewhere they are surprised to be, 
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simply by “following” each other.54 This involves many surface-level coupling processes and leads 
to an apparently collective outcome, but it is not a case of collective action, because it is not a case 
of doing something together with someone else in the sense elaborated in the previous chapter. 
Going to wherever they end up is not something they are aware they are doing, aim at, or intend, 
as is shown by the fact that when they realize where they are they are, they are surprised. The joint 
following mechanism is simply an explanation of their individual coordinated behavior. But think 
of the way that these subpersonal processes underlie things that are instances of acting together 
going on at the same time, such as the conversation in which they are engrossed. Acting together 
in that way is facilitated by the lower-level processes that lead them astray in a different way. 
What we should take from such phenomena is that because the story of subpersonal 
processes leading to an alignment system does not adequately differentiate between collective 
action and individual coordinated behavior, we need something more than a concept of alignment 
derived from preintentional processes to delineate genuine collective action. Alignment systems 
are incapable of adequately accounting for our familiar conception of collective action. But in 
order to have a full understanding of how we act together, we need to understand underlying 
psychological processes that introduce us to one another as potential co-actors, increase the 
likelihood of our achieving shared goals, and lead to pro-social attitudes that generate the 
conditions for successfully acting together. 
Contra Tollefsen and Dale, understanding the relationship this way does not cause any 
problems either for philosophical or psychological views of collective action or for their 
integration. Basic forms of coordinated behavior such as alignment often precede collective action, 
but that behavior is not a collective action until there is a collective intention, on my view. 
                                                          





Tollefsen and Dale consider a version of this argument and reject it on the basis that it injudiciously 
restricts the concept of collective action and limits the potential for empirical research to inform 
philosophical accounts. They state that: 55 
one might argue that unless or until a collective intention (or shared intention) in in 
place, there is no joint action and so the mechanisms which initiate joint action and 
give rise to shared intention are not, themselves, important for a theory of joint 
action. 
Arguing this way is a problem, according Tollefsen and Dale, because it suggests the following 
reasoning: “provided high-level conditions are met (appropriate shared intentions, etc.), it is 
irrelevant what specific cognitive processing phenomena give way to them.”56 This reasoning 
process in turn makes empirical research into the initiation, implementation, and execution of 
collective action unimportant for a philosophical theory of collective action. More generally, 
Tollefsen and Dale claim that “Philosophical accounts tend to focus on collective actions that come 
about by a conscious and planned manner, and many of them attempt to provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for collective action (or shared intention) and hence rule out the possibility 
of collective action arising in different and less cognitively complex ways.”57 
These are worthwhile though misguided concerns. There is a large spectrum of 
coordination, cooperation, and complexity in the collective behavior of individuals. Allowing 
collective action to arise from coordinated behavior, as opposed to requiring explicit planning, 
seems to blur the lines between collective action and other forms of interactive behavior. Further, 
collective action does appear to be able to arise spontaneously, and be initiated in several different 
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ways, as in the car crash case. If we are to respect this aspect of collective action, we cannot go so 
far as to require explicit representation of the collective itself, the collective goal, aim, or plan, and 
each individual role, by each participant as a precursor to the initiation of that action. We must 
allow for the fact that at times there is a realization of the possibility of a collective action rather 
than a prior plan, and then show how that is consistent with the idea of collective intention. In 
Chapter 5, while presenting my view of collective intention, I consider how my view can account 
for this. 
An important take-away from Tollefsen and Dale’s discussion is that no amount of 
complexity of coordination can account for a collective intention. This is another similarity 
between individual and collective action. Frankfurt, responding to the view that complexity of 
movement is indicative of individual action, points out that while:58 
the complicated movements of a pianist’s hands and fingers…compellingly suggest 
that they are not mere happenings…Sometimes…complexity may quite as 
compellingly suggest the likelihood of mere bodily movement. The thrashings 
about of a person’s body during an epileptic seizure, for example, are very 
complicated movements. But their complexity is of a kind which makes it appear 
unlikely to us that the person is performing an action. 
The same is true of complexity of coordination in the collective case. Strangers avoiding each 
other while walking down 5th Avenue on Christmas Eve coordinate their behavior in complex ways 
and yet are not acting together in the fullest sense. Two people arm-wrestling do not coordinate 
their behavior to nearly the same degree, and yet they are. What distinguishes the action from 
behavior in the individual case and parallel action from strategic, social, or collective action in the 
                                                          





collective cases is the kind of involvement of the agents, and in neither is complexity, either of 
movement or coordination, the right kind of involvement. 
Additionally, a rich understanding of the different things we do together can help generate 
meaningful and testable empirical hypotheses. Many of the coordination processes involved in 
alignment systems are inducible independently of collective action, as well as being a part of some 
collective actions. Some studies they cite specifically test the difference between conscious and 
subconscious coordination by comparing participants who are told to coordinate with participants 
who are not.59 Others test coordination as part of a collective action by varying the degree of 
difficulty of the action.60 It is clear that sometimes coordination happens in a planned manner and 
sometimes simply emerges, and that both of these kinds of coordination occur in collective 
actions.61 In addition to providing a clearer conceptual framework for experiments like these, the 
distinctions drawn in the first chapter may be used to develop experiments that explore the 
differences between emergent and planned coordination in each of strategic, social, and collective 
action. Distinguishing between ways we act together presents an opportunity to study a wider 
variety of conditions under which coordination occurs. 
Tollefsen and Dale are correct that a philosophical theory that ruled out the usefulness of 
empirical research on coordination into the generation, implementation, and execution of 
collective action would be incomplete and mistaken. However, as I show later, looking for the 
conditions that delineate collective action does not entail ignoring the ways in which empirical 
research can inform an account of collective action. These projects can and should proceed in 
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tandem. Empirical research is especially relevant for finding the mechanisms that explain how 
collective actions are initiated and how they are executed. Including a clear explanation of the 
relationship between these mechanisms and collective intention is important for a full account of 
collective action. Such an account must provide space for the psychological precursors of 
collective action. 
Alignment and collective intention are complementary, both in our collective actions and 
in our theories of collective action. Collective intentions guide people through the execution of 
collective action, but they do not explain all the features that initiate and contribute to the success 
of the action. Some of those features include the bodily coupling, synchronization, entrainment, 
and perception-action matching which reduce uncertainty between participants and allow them to 
predict and spontaneously respond to one another’s actions. That capacity is usefully captured by 
the concept of alignment. But alignment doesn’t capture how people involved in a collective action 
respond to the intentions of one another, the causal interdependence of collective intention, nor the 
cognitive interdependence that allows reflection on individual tasks, division of labor, and so on. 
Alignment doesn’t capture the way participants are fully involved in making things happen 
together. By incorporating the idea of alignment, in its proper place, into an account of collective 
action, we are able to account for the spontaneous initiation and the psychological mechanisms 
involved in the successful completion of collective action, and therefore have some insight into 









§ 2.6 Conclusion 
What this empirical research cannot do is save psychological views. The combination of 
theoretical commitments that result in the possibility of brains-in-vats with we-intentions and that 
deny the necessity of any mutual belief or common knowledge precludes any appeal to the very 
mechanisms that could answer the challenges posed by causal and cognitive interdependence. 
Collective intentions that don’t require any collective are not capable of settling anything, either 
in the minds of the participants or in the world. As such, psychological views, including Searle’s, 
should be rejected.  
Empirical psychological research on various lower-level processes that arise between 
people in interactive behavior, however, should be considered and incorporated in the theory we 
end up with. Alignment systems are important for that theory because they help us better 
understand important features of collective action, such as their initiation, maintenance, and 
successful execution. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to overemphasize their role. They are 
no replacement for the kinds of higher-order states discussed by philosophers. Only things we do 
with genuinely collective intentions are collective actions, cases of acting together in the fullest 
sense. Failing to observe this fact results in confusion about the nature of collective action, both 
by obscuring the relation between psychological and philosophical research and by resulting in 








Chapter 3  
 
 
In order to countenance the fact that genuinely collective intentions necessarily involve 
interrelations between the participants, while maintaining that forming a collective intention does 
not require creating a new subject of experience, we have to accept that collective intentions are 
not mental states, strictly speaking. They are not states of a singular, unified mind, of an individual 
or group, but instead complex states of affairs involving multiple minds.  
There are two relevant ways to maintain this position, which differ in the strength of 
connection they maintain between individual psychological states and collective intentions. Quasi-
psychological views require that collective intentions are constituted by or realized in the 
individual intentions of the participants. Non-psychological views deny this. Complicating 
matters, there is another, orthogonal distinction between normativist and non-normativist views. 
Normativist views hold that collective intentions essentially involve normative relations, such as 
obligations, rights, and entitlements, although these relations are non-moral. Non-normativist 
views deny the first claim.1 Of all the possible configurations, I discuss the three most plausible 
options: quasi-psychological and normative, quasi-psychological and non-normative, and non-
psychological and normative. This chapter presents and evaluates the two kinds of quasi-
psychological views; the next chapter does the same for a non-psychological view. 
                                                          






 Quasi-psychological views are initially plausible and conceptually coherent. They reject 
the identification of collective intentions with individually held intentions, avoiding the problems 
of psychological views, and yet they maintain a strong connection between individual intentions 
and collective intentions, since, according to them, collective intentions are constituted by 
combinations of individual intentions.2 Nonetheless, in this chapter, I suggest that we reject them 
on the ground that quasi-psychological collective intentions fail to do the job they are introduced 
to do, namely explain collective actions. I begin by introducing and justifying some experimental 
research soliciting common intuitions acting together in collaboration or partnership, and then 
reporting the results. In order to streamline the presentation, I extrapolate some general claims 
from a series of experiments, while discussing the most pertinent studies in more depth. Detailed 
information about the data, design, and statistical analysis of the studies is contained in the 
appendix to the chapter in which they appear. In this chapter, I consider the “Walking Case,” 
reporting its design and methods, and then discussing the results. I take it that this study gives 
prima facie evidence for an obligation to notify in cases of collective action. Following a common 
practice in the literature, I assume that the ability to explain these features of collaboratively acting 
together in an intuitive sense speaks in favor of an account of collective intention. I show first how 
a quasi-psychological, non-normative view fails to explain the obligation to notify and then how a 
normativist, quasi-psychological view fails. The specific views I consider have problems 
explaining the experimental result in question, but ultimately, I argue that it is because of the 
metaphysical commitments of quasi-psychological views that they fail in general. In short, quasi-
psychological views get the persistence conditions on collective intentions wrong. If we think 
collective intentions are extinguished when quasi-psychological views say they are, then they 
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cannot explain at least one important feature of collective action. So, we must turn to non-
psychological views, which give a different metaphysical picture. 
 
§ 3.1 Experimental Research: Justification and Results 
In collaborative research, Javier Gomez-Lavin and I have developed an experimental paradigm 
that explores and interrogates the descriptive and observational components of the philosophical 
work aimed at explaining collective action.3 It is a familiar practice in this literature to employ 
thought experiments about cases of acting together to elicit intuitions meant to support a particular 
view. Margaret Gilbert, for example, is explicit about her methodology of examining our intuitions 
about quotidian cases of acting together. She proposes that we should start our investigations “with 
observations on the way people think and talk about shared intention in everyday life.”4 And when 
making key claims about the nature of collective action, she argues that her “warrant for the 
description [of our common understanding of collective action] is informal observation including 
self-observation.”5 Most philosophers working on collective intention and action are content to 
leave their observations here.6 Our purpose in employing the methods of experimental philosophy 
is to make more precise these observations about the correct description of these kinds of cases.  
Our research models this familiar methodology by asking participants about their 
behavioral responses in cases of parallel action, coordination, cooperation, and collective action, 
in order to test participant’s ability to pick out cases of acting together, their judgments about 
degrees of togetherness, and their understanding of the source and power of the commitments 
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6 See, for example, Bratman: “I do think that the model I am sketching broadly coheres with pre-analytic talk of 
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involved in the action. So, for example, we developed several studies that place participants in one 
of three conditions that manipulate the strength of evidence that the characters are acting together. 
Each condition contains a vignette, based on the thought experiments in the philosophical 
literature, with similar behavior, say walking side-by-side, but increasing signals that the 
characters are acting together by varying the behavioral cues. Our treatments then ask the 
participants to rate the “togetherness” of the characters, or whether certain behaviors, such as 
calling out when one character unexpectedly leaves, are appropriate. 
Investigating intuitions in this way has at least three benefits. First, subjecting the 
foundational premises in these arguments to experimental testing strengthens the evidentiary value 
of the thought experiments that motivate philosophical interest in the phenomenon in question. 
Second, strengthening this evidentiary basis allows for a more satisfying response to skeptical 
challenges about the distinctions drawn in the philosophical literature from other disciplines. 
Third, and most relevant here, arriving at a more detailed picture of our everyday understanding 
of collective action provides clues about the suitability of various philosophical theories of 
collective intention. 
In this chapter and the next, I discuss the each of the studies that supports the following 
judgments. Since the experimental research on this topic is in early stages, this list shouldn’t be 
seen as definitive. Instead, these are best seen as motivated assumptions about our everyday 
understanding of acting together with others. The results of the studies conducted so far suggest 
that common intuitions about acting together in a strong sense accept three judgments.:  
(i) exiting a collective action involves an obligation to make that exit public7,  
(ii) this obligation is present in “morally wrong” cases of collective action, and  
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(iii) exiting the collective does not involve an obligation to seek the permission of the 
co-actors. 
The key assumption I make, which I share with those who employ the strategy described above,8 
is that the ability to explain these judgments about collective action is a reason to favor one view 
of collective intention over another.  
Judgment (i) features in the following arguments against quasi-psychological views. 
Judgment (ii) provides support for Gilbert’s non-psychological view, and judgment (iii) features 
in the argument against Gilbert’s view in the next chapter. When the judgments arise, I discuss 
how we came to them in more detail, leaving the full detail to the appendices. 
 
§ 3.2 Quasi-Psychological, Non-Normative Views 
The most prominent version of a quasi-psychological view of collective intention belongs to 
Michael Bratman. In this section, I present his view. Given the apparently normative nature of (i), 
it may seem like non-normativist views are non-starters. But, in the following section, I point out 
how Bratman’s view is carefully constructed so as to be able to provide an explanation of this 
judgment without building normativity into the analysis. Nonetheless, I claim that the explanation 
his view is capable of providing gets the nature of the normativity in collective action wrong, 
because it either fails to identify or mis-identifies who is let down when someone exits the 
collective action. 
 For Bratman, “…a shared intention consists in a public, interlocking web of appropriate 
intentions of the individuals.”9 We can specify the components of this web by looking at the roles 
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shared intentions play in our lives and then finding the combination of individual intentions and 
interrelations that plays those roles in the world.  Shared intentions have at least three roles, which 
are similar to the roles intentions play in coordinating individual agency over time but serve instead 
to coordinate across individuals.10 Say you and I share an intention to dance a tango. The first role 
of this shared intention is to get us to coordinate our actions in pursuit of a shared goal.11 If you 
start performing the steps, I will too. The second is to get us to coordinate our plans in such a way 
that they do not openly conflict. If I plan to dance to a specific song, I will check with you to see 
whether you have a song preference, and if so which one. The third is to form a background 
framework for our bargaining and decision-making about how to carry out the action. Say we 
would prefer to dance to different songs. In that case, we have to figure out some way of deciding 
between them or finding a compromise decision, and this happens within the context of the shared 
intention. An important point about forming a background framework for bargaining is that it 
involves bargaining about the way in which we are going to execute the collective action, not about 
whether we will execute the collective action. Having a shared intention unifies us in the ways 
required to track the goal of our shared action. 
 What web of individual intentions can play these roles? For the simple case of a group 
composed of you and me with respect to a joint activity J, here is Bratman’s proposal:12  
We intend to J if and only if 
1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J, 
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2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1(a), 1(b), and meshing 
subplans of 1(a) and 1(b); you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 
1(a), 1(b), and meshing subplans of 1(a) and 1(b), 
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge. 
Let’s untangle the web. (1) requires that each participant has a “participatory intention” concerning 
the shared activity.13 This “ensure[s] that the participants in a shared intention to J each are, in a 
way, committed to the J-ing,” with all the rational constraints of consistency and coherence, 
familiar from the discussion in Chapter 1, that comes with it.14  
(2) specifies two requirements. First, our intentions are nested, which entails that we see 
each other as intentional agents. I intend in part because you intend, I intend for my intention in 
(1) to be successful and I intend for your intention in (1) to be successful. Thus, the content of the 
intention of each includes a reference to the role of the intention of the other. In Bratman’s 
terminology, the intentions of each “semantically interlock.”15 This requirement gets around the 
“Mafia case.”16 Suppose we are members of competing Mafia families. We each intend that we go 
to New York, satisfying (1), but we each intend to do so by kidnapping the other and putting them 
in the trunk of our respective cars. In that case, I don’t intend that we go to New York because of 
your intention, and I certainly don’t intend for your intention to be successful. In fact, I intend to 
circumvent your intention. Because in the Mafia case we fail to satisfy (2), we don’t share an 
intention, despite each of us having an intention that we go to New York. Second, our subplans 
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do not require that the individuals intend to achieve the end, but only believe that they are in fact contributing to the 
end. Bratman’s participatory intentions require individuals to intend to achieve the end, in order to engage the norms 
of consistency and coherence. 
14 Bratman (1999, p. 121). 
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must mesh. Subplans, according to Bratman, are the lower level parts of our intentions that concern 
things like means and preliminary steps. They are about working out how we will carry out our 
intentions. To say that these subplans must mesh is to say that we can’t ignore or subvert each 
other’s subplans, and that our subplans can’t actively clash. As Bratman puts it, our subplans mesh 
as long as “it is possible that all these sub-plans taken together be successfully executed.”17 Since 
we coordinate our planning to track the goal of our intention, we coordinate our subplans about 
how we are going to achieve our goal. But, while we can’t ignore or subvert each other’s subplans, 
our subplans do not have to match exactly. You might have subplans that I do not know or care 
about, and vice versa. As part of our tangoing, one of my subplans might involve wearing a 
particular pair of lucky shoes, and one of yours might involve a lucky color. As long as my plans 
don’t depend on what color you wear, and your plans don’t depend on what shoes I wear, our 
subplans mesh, since they can be co-realized, even if they don’t match. 
(3) puts all of this “out in the open.” According to Bratman, there needs to be “public access 
to the fact of the shared intention.”18 And we can capture this publicness using the idea of common 
knowledge.19 
The specified web of attitudes creates a shared practical commitment between the involved 
parties, and this shared practical commitment puts rational pressure on the parties in a way that 
guides practical reasoning and action in accordance with the three characteristic roles of shared 
intention. The source of the rational pressure is the set of norms associated with intention discussed 
in Chapter 1. Take my intention that we J. Means-end coherence demands that the intention leads 
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me to formulate plans that specify how we are going to J. Consistency demands that I drop plans 
that I believe are inconsistent with our J-ing. And since I intend that your intention that we J is 
successful, these norms demand that my intentions about means and beliefs about other plans are 
consistent with yours. All of this is the same for you. As a result, the complex of attitudes specified 
in (1)-(3) in conjunction with the standard norms of intentions account for the coordination of 
planning and action and the framework for bargaining that characterize the roles for which we are 
seeking an account. 
 
§ 3.3 The Walking Case: The Obligation to Notify 
Bratman’s is clearly a quasi-psychological view, and it is just as clearly non-normative. Recall 
from the introduction that the non-normativist claims are that collective intentions do not 
necessarily involve normative relations and that any appearance of them does not result from 
collective intention itself, but rather from general moral considerations. Bratman acknowledges 
that “mutual obligations and entitlements are extremely common in cases of modest sociality” but 
he is “not convinced that such obligations are essential to modest sociality” and is convinced “that 
these will normally be familiar kinds of moral obligation – in particular, moral obligations 
associated with assurance, reliance, promises, and the like.”20  
The case for non-normativism, as Bratman presents it, is reliant on examples of collective 
action that do not involve interpersonal obligations. Bratman calls these cases of “modest 
sociality.” Here is one Bratman takes to be a counterexample to the normativist thesis:21 
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Suppose you and I are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. We spot each 
other on 65th Street, and we briefly walk together, chatting, until, as it happens, you 
peel off at 59th Street. We do not merely walk individually along the same stretch 
of street and at the same time. Rather, we intentionally walk together for this brief 
time, and we briefly have a shared intention to walk together. Nevertheless, it seems 
strained to insist, baring the introduction of further features to the story, that either 
has an obligation to the other… 
Margaret Gilbert, a leading normativist, tells a very similar story but draws a radically different 
conclusion: 
Suppose that Heinrich and Andrea are going for a walk together…Suppose now 
that Heinrich suddenly claps his hand to his brow, says “Oh No!” and, without 
further ado, starts walking rapidly away from Andrea. Andrea may not be 
disappointed that he has gone. Barring special background understandings, 
however, she will understand that – to put it somewhat abstractly – the manner of 
his going involved a mistake. It is a mistake by virtue of the fact that they were 
walking together…Given that this is so, Andrea evidently understands that by 
virtue of their walking together she has a right of some kind to Heinrich’s 
continuing to walk alongside her…together with the standing to issue related 
rebukes and demands.22 
From comparable stories about going for a walk, Bratman and Gilbert come to opposite views 
about fundamental aspects of acting together in the sense of partnership or collaboration. For 
Bratman, the fact that minimal cases of acting together are possible even when it seems strained 
                                                          





to attribute obligations and entitlements to the participants show that there are at least some 
collective actions without normative relations. For Gilbert, the fact that even in such cases there 
are normative relations suggests that normative relations are essential to collective action. 
 We tested these intuitions in several related experiments with a variety of collective 
actions, including walking together. We also tested various normative relations, including 
obligations, rights, and entitlements. I introduce the most relevant version here, which is the 
“obligation to notify” measure in the walking together case. It is the most relevant because by 
focusing specifically on the example Bratman provides we get the most information about whether 
normative relations are present in cases of modest sociality, as he conceives of them. 
171 American adults (46% self-identified as female) were recruited online via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Twelve additional participants were excluded from analyses for failing to 
complete the study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, producing a 
3x1 between-subjects design.  
Our conditions vary the strength of behavioral signals and cues between two people that 
are walking together, based on Bratman’s thought experiment (q.v., Appendix A for the full 
prompts). We took some behavioral cues away from Bratman’s story to create a control condition, 
which is the “No Collective Action” condition. Here participants read a word prompt where two 
people are independently walking down 5th Avenue and, starting at 65th street, they walk beside 
each other, until, as it happens, one of them peels off at 59th street. We used Bratman’s thought 
experiment as the “Low Collective Action” condition, without introducing any further features. In 
this condition, they walk together the same distance, but they ‘spot one another’ at 65th street and 
then briefly walk together, chatting, until one of them peels off at 59th street. We then added some 





each other and chatting, they laugh and maintain their pace. Fifty-three participants were assigned 
to our control condition, with fifty-nine individuals assigned to both our low and high collective 
action conditions. 
After reading the prompts, participants were directed to answer two dependent measures 
displayed in random order: 
1. Togetherness Measure: ‘To what extent were the two people acting together’ anchored at 
0 (‘Not at all’) and 6 (‘Totally working together’). 
2. Notification Measure: ‘Should the person who peels off notify the other that they’re 
leaving,’ anchored at 0 (‘No obligation at all to notify’) and 6 (‘Total obligation to notify’). 
Our hypothesis was that participants’ ratings on the obligation measure will increase from the 
control condition to the collective action conditions, suggesting the presence of an “obligation to 
notify” in a case of modest sociality. 
Confirming our hypothesis, participants tracked increasing evidence of collective action 
between control and both collective action conditions23 Participants’ scores for our notification 
measure were significantly higher in both of our collective action conditions than in our control 
condition, showing an effect across our conditions H(2) = 77.98, p < .001.24 
Here’s a box and whisker plot of the results. In a box and whisker plot, the edges of the 
box portray the upper and lower quartiles, the “whiskers,” the two lines that extend outside the 
box, depict the highest and lowest responses, the horizontal line represents the median, the “x” 
shows the mean, and points are the outliers. 
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  = .45, significant corrected pairwise comparisons p < .001, r ≥ .7. Again, scores between our two collective 






Figure 3: Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across our three conditions in 
the Walking Case. 
 The results of this experiment clearly indicate that as our participants judgments of 
togetherness increased, so did their judgments that there is at least one obligation between actors 
involved in a collective action. No theorist I am aware of thinks that actors in collective actions 
must explicitly believe that there are commitments and entitlements between them. But many, 
including Bratman and Gilbert, at least implicitly accept the idea that a descriptive and 
observational methodology about the actions and psychological states of individuals can reveal 
whether there are such commitments, even if individuals may be mistaken in specific cases. This 
is something we attempt to maintain by asking our participants about their responses to certain 
kinds of behaviors, rather than explicitly about the presence of rights and obligations. Testing the 
acceptability of walking away reveals the implicit understanding of the normative relations in 
collective action rather than explicit beliefs about rights or obligations. 
 If these behavioral cues do track implicit understandings of normative relations, our 





that there was both an obligation to notify and a right to rebuke.25 As Bratman’s argument in part 
relies on there being cases of modest sociality that involve collective intentions but no distinctive 
normative relations, the fact that one of his primary examples does involve normative relations 
suggests that his model of collective action is mistaken on this point. But it is only a suggestion. 
What we have shown is only that some non-normativist thought experiments do not generate the 
intuitions that they are supposed to, according to one non-normativist. And, at the moment, there 
is no empirical evidence about cases that have been shown to support a non-normativist view. So, 
although it is clear that our results do not definitively prove that no such cases exist, we have 
reason to operate under the hypothesis that acting together in the sense of what I have called 
collaboration involves an obligation to notify your fellow actors before leaving. 
 
§ 3.4 Bratman’s Potential Responses 
Can Bratman’s view deal with the presence of such an obligation to notify? On his behalf, one 
might argue that our participants’ judgments are in fact about the rational requirements of shared 
practical commitments. In that case, the “obligation” to notify is really a rational requirement based 
on the norms that govern intentions. One of the requirements does stand out as a potential source 
for this “obligation,” namely the norm of stability, which says that, while subject to 
reconsideration, intentions should be stable over time. And, in some places, this is what Bratman 
suggests for similar situations.26 He argues that there is rational and social pressure towards 
stability that demands that participating agents do not too easily abandon their participatory 
intentions for two reasons. One is that reconsideration of a previously formed intention can have 
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significant costs. The other, which is especially relevant here, is that it undermines coordination. 
An agent who too easily reconsiders her prior intentions will be a less reliable partner in social 
coordination, and so, because people avoid partnering with unreliable partners, will end up with 
less opportunities to reap the benefits of that coordination. On this view, when an agent does too 
easily abandon a participatory intention, she is being unreasonable. And so, the story might go, 
our participants’ reactions are actually tracking the unreasonableness of the person for recklessly 
abandoning their intention, as represented by leaving without saying anything. The person leaving 
should notify the other person because of the costs associated with not doing so, and so as not to 
undermine their own possibilities for future social coordination. 
 This story doesn’t work for two reasons. First, it doesn’t explain why you owe someone 
else something. The leaver doesn’t just have an obligation simpliciter; the leaver is obligated to 
the leavee. The obligation to notify is directed;27 the demands of rationality on intention are not. 
On Bratman’s view of rationality, the norms that regulate intention also regulate our behavior 
because we are planning agents. Planning agents, unlike agents governed merely by beliefs and 
desires, are capable of forming intentions. Consequently, they both follow the norms of intention 
and, if they reflect upon them, come to recognize their normative significance. Briefly, we have 
reason to follow these norms because we have reason to value our ability to govern our own lives 
and following the norms of intention allows us to do so. The normative significance of following 
these norms comes from their ability to support a substantive value, self-governance. But this value 
is inherently self-regarding. It doesn’t explain any normative relation to another agent. It can’t 
explain why the leaver owes the levee anything. At best, it could explain why planning agents owe 
it to themselves to have stable intentions, if we assume that agents capable of being self-governing 
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planning agents have an obligation to be self-governing planning agents. Even this, though, does 
injustice to the way Bratman talks about the value of self-governance and the norms of intention, 
since it suggests a specific, self-directed obligation rather than a general demand of rationality.28 
Whichever way it is framed, self-governance is not capable of generating the obligation to notify 
in the walking case. A related, perhaps less unfair to Bratman and more intuitive way to think 
about it is this: once the person leaves, who is let down? On Bratman’s picture, being unreasonable 
is a way of letting yourself down, by not adhering to norms you (perhaps tacitly) accept. But, that 
is not what is going on with the obligation to notify. If you walk away without notifying your 
walking partner, you are not letting yourself down, you’re letting your partner down. 
Second, Bratman’s unreasonableness answer requires that the participatory intention is 
dropped recklessly or without the proper process of reconsideration. But this isn’t specified by the 
story. The leaver may have reconsidered his participatory intention and come to the conclusion to 
drop it through rational deliberation. It may be entirely reasonable for the leaver to leave. In that 
case, the leaver satisfies the demands of the norm of stability; there is nothing unreasonable about 
the leaver’s decision to drop his intention. Nonetheless, absent special, mitigating circumstances, 
without notifying the leavee, the leaver still lets him down. Given that in the vignette nothing about 
the leaver’s practical reasoning is mentioned, there is no motivation to assume that the judgments 
of the participants in our studies about the obligation the leaver violates are based on a further 
judgment that the leaver’s participatory intention is irrationally discarded. 
 Another potential Bratmanian response focuses on his idea that obligations, of a moral 
kind, are often present in cases of collective action, even though they aren’t necessary. The reason 
                                                          






to think this is that the etiology or maintenance of a collective intention commonly involves an 
obligation-generating process, the exchange of mutual assurances: 
When you and I have a shared intention to sing the duet, it is likely I will have 
purposively led you to expect that I will participate if you do; that you will have 
purposively led me to an analogous expectation; and that each of us want such 
grounds for such expectations. Such purposive creation of expectations, in such a 
context, normally grounds an obligation to act as one has indicated.29 
According to Thomas Scanlon, on whose work Bratman is here relying, voluntarily and 
intentionally leading someone else to expect that you will perform some action is assuring them 
you will perform that action.30 And assuring someone that you will perform an action, for example 
by explicitly promising,31 generates an obligation to perform that action. Since acting together in 
the sense of collaboration or partnership is a context in which we often voluntarily and 
intentionally induce expectations in others about our own behavior, it is a context in which there 
are frequently moral obligations. 
Scanlon specifies the conditions under which assurance generate obligations and the 
content of those obligations in what he calls Principle F: 
If (1) A voluntarily and intentionally leads B to expect that A will do X (unless B 
consents to A’s not doing so); (2) A knows that B wants to be assured of this; (3) A 
acts with the aim of providing this assurance, and has good reason to believe that 
                                                          
29 (1999, 135). Note that this is related to the norm of stability, but now is the sense of being able to rely or count on 
the other. 
30 This is a highly simplified statement of Scanlon’s use of assurance. For detail on the further distinctions and 
refinements Scanlon develops, see (1998, 302ff). 
31 One of Scanlon’s points is that promises are a special case of more general obligation-generating exchanges, in 
the sense that “the wrong of breaking a promise” is an instance “of a more general family of moral wrongs which are 
concerned…with what we owe to other people when we have led them to form expectations about our future 





he or she has done so; (4) B knows that A has the beliefs and intentions just 
described; (5) A intends for B to know this, and knows that B does know it; and (6) 
B knows that A has this knowledge and intent; then, in the absence of special 
justification, A must do X unless B consents to X’s not being done. 
Bratman holds that this principle, in conjunction with the fact that mutual assurances are often 
present in the formation or maintenance of shared intentions, explains why moral obligations are 
“normal” in collective actions.32 And there is a straightforward reason why these obligations are 
normal. When acting with others, we want to be sure that the expectations we form about what 
everyone involved is going to do are actually going to be fulfilled.33 Adhering to Principle F is a 
way to satisfy this desire. 
The interesting thing for our purposes is the way that Scanlon’s principle might generate 
an obligation to notify. In fact, it generates much more. Most plausibly, in cases of collective 
action, the value of the variable X will not be ‘notifying the person before leaving’. If we’re 
collaborating on a project, and I voluntarily and intentionally induce an expectation in you that I 
will do something, that thing is not likely to be any particular way of exiting the project, but rather, 
the individual actions assigned to me after a process of negotiating roles. While certainly 
sometimes present, it is not a general feature of collective actions that they involve a voluntarily 
and intentional exchange of mutual assurances about exit conditions. Instead, X will normally be 
something like “doing my part” because that is what I want to assure you I will do. So, it is not a 
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33 Scanlon divides this into two different values, one of which focuses on the costs of relying on another’s behavior 
based on intentionally and voluntarily created expectations, and then having those expectations disappointed. 
Scanlon calls these ‘reliance losses’, and they cover things like time, energy, resources, and missed opportunities. 
Scanlon sees the avoidance of reliance losses as a value that provides a genuine source of support for Principle F. 
Another focuses on this desire directly, that is we just do have and value this desire. This accounts for cases in which 
there are no reliance losses from someone failing to fulfill a promise, and yet, we still think the promisee has some 





promising strategy to see the obligation to notify as itself the thing that is mutually assured. We 
simply do not normally assure others about the exit conditions of the collective actions we 
participate in with them, and we certainly don’t need to do so in order to act together with them. 
But that seems fine for Bratman, since it isn’t the point of his proposal anyway. 
Instead, the exit conditions are given by the principle itself. Let’s take X to be the intuitive 
notion of “doing one’s part” of a collective action.34 One of the key features of Principle F is 
consent, featuring both in the first condition and the consequent. A is obligated to X, unless he 
receives B’s consent not to. So, if A changes his mind about X-ing, after leading B to expect that 
he will X, A is forced to seek B’s permission. To faultlessly get out of doing his part, A must receive 
B’s permission. So, if Principle F is what governs the normativity of collective action, A and B are 
acting together in the fullest sense, and A wants to get out of the action (and therefore out of doing 
his part), A has an obligation to seek permission from B in order to leave the action, because he 
has to be released from the obligation to do his part.  
The obligation to seek the other participants’ permission is much more demanding than the 
obligation to notify. I deal with it in the next chapter with respect to Gilbert’s view, but let me state 
the point intuitively here. The obligation to seek permission is much too strong. There are cases of 
acting together in the sense of partnership or collaboration that do not require seeking the 
permission of the other participants to leave, as is suggested by the experimental research I present 
in the next chapter. 
Bratman is very much aware of cases of collective action that do not involve an obligation 
to seek permission, cases in which expectations are not purposely created. His mistake is to think 
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that in these cases there are no obligations at all. They are his cases of “modest sociality,” which 
involve small-scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations, 
and most importantly, in the absence of obligation-generating processes that would result in mutual 
obligations of performance.35 This is the reason Bratman thinks mutual obligations are often 
present in collective action, but not necessary. They can’t be necessary because modest sociality 
involves genuine collective intention, but no mutual obligation. Mutual obligations are present 
only when something like Principle F is in play, but not otherwise.36 And, the walking case is 
Bratman’s primary example of modest sociality. 
So, the second Bratmanian strategy also fails to explain the putative obligation to notify in 
the walking case.37 Since the walking case is a case of modest sociality, there is no intentional and 
voluntary creation of expectations. This seems like the right analysis of our vignettes. No mutual 
assurances are exchanged, and so there are no moral obligations such as the obligation to seek 
permission to leave. But, because Principle F doesn’t apply, and there is no other source of 
obligation in the vignettes, it is unclear on Bratman’s picture how the obligation to notify arises in 
the low and high collective action cases. The problem for Bratman is that he leaves himself only 
two options: either moral principles are in play, in which case different, stronger obligations are 
involved, or they are not, as in cases of modest sociality, and there are no obligations. In neither 
                                                          
35 Bratman (2009). 
36 Bratman leaves open the possibility that there may be other obligation-generating principles involved in cases to 
which Principle F doesn’t apply, but doesn’t go into detail about which ones or how they apply (1999, p. 140). He 
does, however, mention two, both of which are from Scanlon, and neither of which apply to the walking case. The 
first is the “Principle of Due Care”: One must exercise due care not to lead others to form reasonable but false 
expectations about what one will do when there is reason to believe that they would suffer significant loss as a result 
of relying on those expectations (1990, p. 204). This doesn’t apply to the walking case because there is no reason for 
the leaver to believe that the leavee would suffer significant loss as a result of being left behind. The second is the 
“Principle of Loss Prevention”: If one has intentionally or negligently led someone to expect that one will follow a 
certain course of action x, and one has reason to believe that that person will suffer significant loss as a result of this 
expectation if one does not follow x, then one must take reasonable steps to prevent that loss (1990, p. 204). Again, 
this doesn’t apply to the walking case, because the leaver has no reason to believe that the leavee will suffer a 
significant loss as a result of having his expectation that the leaver will x disappointed. 





case is there is a mechanism that explains the obligation to notify in the two collective action 
conditions in the walking cases we studied. 
The prospects for a suitable explanation of the obligation to notify by a non-normativist, 
quasi-psychological view do not look promising. So, let’s turn to normativist views to see whether 
they can offer a better explanation. 
 
§ 3.5 Quasi-psychological, Normative Views 
Abraham Roth’s view of collective intention qualifies as a quasi-psychological, normative view, 
as defined here. He maintains the idea that each participant in a shared activity is committed to 
that activity in the sense of commitment associated with intention, approximately as given in 
Chapter 1.38 When two people share an intention, they necessarily each have a personal 
participatory intention: “an intention expressed with a plural grammatical subject must be 
distributive so that it expresses a participatory commitment.”39. A shared intention to walk together 
is not compatible with an individual intention not to. This isn’t a straightforward appeal to 
individualism, which denies that it is in principle possible for a group to have an intention over 
and above the level of the individual. Rather not having the individual intention corresponding to 
the shared intention violates the consistency and coherence constraints on intention. The idea is 
that there is a rational tension between being party to a collective intention to do something and 
having an individual intention that would preclude doing that thing. We’ll come back to this in the 
next chapter, but for now, let’s accept this claim. This commitment makes Roth’s a quasi-
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psychological view. The shared intention depends for its existence on the participatory intentions 
of the participants. 
What distinguishes Roth’s view from Bratman’s is that he also thinks this psychological 
structure is inherently normative, and normative in a non-moral sense. The intuitions in support of 
this claim are based on the walking case, which, as noted above, is originally presented by Gilbert, 
and which is wholeheartedly adopted by Roth. They share much in the characterization of the 
normativity of collective action. I introduce the claims they share here, and then I discuss what is 
distinctive to Roth. 
In the version of Gilbert’s example Roth discusses, Jack and Sue are going for a walk, when 
Jack starts to pull ahead, walking too quickly for Sue to keep up. Of Sue’s possible responses, 
Gilbert says the following: 
[W]e can imagine Sue taking action in various ways. She might call out, “Jack!” 
with a degree of impatience. She might catch up with him and then say, somewhat 
critically, “You are going to have to slow down! I can’t keep up with you.” In both 
of these cases she rebukes Jack, albeit mildly. She might not do this, of course, but 
it seems that, again failing special circumstances, her doing so would be in order. 
In other words, it seems that in the circumstances Sue is entitled to rebuke Jack. 
We would expect both Jack and Sue to understand that she has this entitlement. 
Gilbert continues on to what this means for Jack: 
The existence of this entitlement suggests that Jack has, in effect, an obligation to 
notice and to act (an obligation Sue has also) …We would expect those out on a 
walk together to realize that they have these obligations, and the rights, just noted.40 
                                                          






For Gilbert, these rights and obligations are directed. They are not unitary relations involving one 
agent, the agent with the obligation. Instead, here at least, they are two place relations, involving 
both parties. Jack doesn’t just have an obligation to slow down; he has an obligation to Sue to slow 
down.  
Consider the difference between Sue’s relation to Jack and that of a third party, Janice. 
Janice isn’t participating in the walk, but she knows that Jack and Sue are. It may be acceptable 
for Janice to let Jack know that he is going too fast for Sue to keep up. She may point out that in 
order to carry out the collective intention, he has to slow down. It is even reasonable for her to 
hold negative attitudes towards those who are too self-absorbed to pay proper attention to their 
walking partners. But there is an important difference between Janice’s and Sue’s behavior 
towards Jack. Janice is either informing Jack of what prudence requires of him — that is, if he 
intends to walk with Sue, slowing down is the means of doing so and walking at his current pace 
is not — or Janice is informing him of his normative commitments. He has a commitment to Sue, 
but he may have forgotten, be otherwise unaware of it, or be unaware that his current behavior is 
violating it. Sue, on the other hand, is not merely telling Jack what prudence requires of him, nor 
merely informing him about his pre-existing commitments. Sue is exercising the standing given to 
her by that commitment; she has a special entitlement to criticize Jack, a special status that Janice 
doesn’t have. 
Roth endorses this picture, with a rhetorically-motivated change from obligation to 
commitment, and clarifies this special entitlement: 
Sue’s criticism should be seen as part of the shared endeavor. Criticism from 





as a whole, such third party criticism in not a part of the exercise of shared agency. 
So if Sue is in this special position to criticize Jack, this suggests that a distinctive 
form of commitment is a basis for her criticism, one that does not serve as a prima 
facie ground for nonparticipants to object to Jack.41 
Roth calls these contralateral commitments, and argues that they are special and executive. To be 
special is to hold only between participants in the collective action. To be executive is to treat any 
criticism the commitment licenses as part of the activity itself.42 Neither of these things apply to 
Janice’s comments. 
Roth maintains both claims (normativity and quasi-psychological) by denying another, 
standard one, namely that agents can be motivated in their deliberation and action only by 
individually-held psychological states. Instead, shared intention is based on practical intimacy, 
which is a relation between individuals that makes it possible “for one individual to take up and 
act on an intention formed by another without re-issuing the latter’s intention.”43 In other words, 
if A is aware of B’s intention that A perform action x, and practical intimacy exists between A and 
B, then A can “act directly” on B’s intention that A x. Importantly, when A x’s, she does so 
intentionally. There is no “action at a distance.” The intention must be communicated from B to A 
so that A has knowledge or is aware of the intention. And in acting on B’s intention for A to x, A 
also intends to x. But, because the intention to x isn’t arrived at by a piece of practical reasoning 
on A’s part, it isn’t her intention. Acting directly on an intention means not having to re-issue an 
intention. In the normal case, if someone asks me to do something, I think about it, and if I decide 
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As such, it is part of the activity in the same way that the individual actions they each perform in the execution of 
the collective action are part of the activity. 
43 (2004, p. 383). See also, (2014, p. 642): “your intention figures in my practical thought in the way that my own 





to, I form my own intention to do that thing. That is re-issuing the intention. But when practical 
intimacy exists between us, I don’t have to re-issue your intention, I can act on it by preserving 
and executing it.44  
The difference between re-issuing and preserving, on the one hand, and executing, on the 
other, comes down to the role of deliberation. When re-issuing an intention, an agent consider 
reasons for and against forming the intention, engages in her own process of deliberation, and then 
either forms her own intention or doesn’t. When preserving and executing an intention, an agent 
does not reason with respect to it; she doesn’t deliberate. When practical intimacy holds, B’s 
intention has the same practical authority over A’s behavior and practical reasoning that her own 
intentions do. The idea is that when I have an intention, the time for deliberation is past. I’ve 
already decided, and if I want to change my mind, I have to reconsider, and this is constrained by 
the norm of stability. So, B’s intention is not merely one reason in favor of A’s x-ing, nor is it a 
decisive reason. Weighing reasons is deliberating, and A’s mind is already made up to do what B 
intends. If the intention is changed, it is through a process of reconsidering something already 
settled on, not deliberating about what to settle on. But, B retains a special authority over the 
intention to x. When A is acting on B’s intention, B can correct A’s behavior, clarify the intention 
when necessary, and so on. A, on the other hand, has no such authority over B’s intentions. 
According to Roth, practical intimacy captures what is going on with contralateral 
commitments.45 One agent has a contralateral commitment to another if and only if the following 
conditions are met: 
(i) B has the authority to settle what it is that A will do with respect to the 
matter of whether to F, and A has the corresponding entitlement to B’s 
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intention as a practical conclusion. Moreover, this authority is exercised, 
and B intends for A to F; 
(ii) This intention is communicated to A; 
(iii) B’s authority is not blocked, superseded, suspended, or nullified, so that A 
is in a position to act directly on the intention for him to F, without re-issuing 
it.46 
Contralateral commitments are the plural analogue of the individual commitments an agent has to 
herself when she forms an intention about her own action. When an agent decides what to do, she 
creates an ipsilateral commitment, for example to take the means necessary for executing the 
action or to rule out conflicting courses of action. Similarly, in cases of practical intimacy, where 
B has an intention that A acts upon, this intention generates commitments for B, but this time, 
since A possesses the intention, it generates contralateral commitment, commitments the executor 
(A) has to the owner (B) of the intention. 
We now have the beginnings of an explanation for what is going on in collective action. 
Jack and Sue then have the commitments they do because of practical intimacy holding between 
them, which is just a matter of having and communicating, and then preserving and executing, the 
right intentions. Sue has the intention that Jack walk with her. Jack is acting directly on that 
intention, and so, Sue, as the “owner” of the intention, has some license to direct Jack’s carrying 
out of the action. And Jack is committed to Sue to follow through on the intention in the way Sue 
specifies. If he doesn’t, he lets her down. Further, Sue has a reciprocal commitment to Jack. Even 
though Jack is not the “owner” of the intention, he is bypassing the normal exercise of his rational 
agency in adopting it. In other words, he has an entitlement to Sue’s intention as a practical 
                                                          





commitment about what to do that matches his entitlement to his own personal intentions.47 
Because Jack is in some ways bypassing the normal exercise of his intentional agency, Sue has 
special responsibilities not to undermine the practical conclusions to which Jack is entitled, for 
example by acting in ways that preclude his carrying out of her intention. Jack’s commitment to 
Sue and Sue’s commitment to Jack are then both special, since they hold as a result of the practical 
intimacy between them, which does not exist for third parties like Janice, and executive, since any 
criticism they make of each other is part of their carrying out of her intention. 
With this account, Roth maintains both quasi-psychological and normative claims. 
‘Sharing an intention’ is a matter of the right individual intentions and the right relations being in 
place. It also inherently involves normative relations, and, Roth claims, these normative relations 
are unlike moral obligation because they are special and executive.48 
 
§ 3.6 The Failure of Quasi-Psychological Views 
I’ll begin this section by arguing against Roth’s version of a quasi-psychological, normative view 
in particular, and end by showing how quasi-psychological views fail in general. 
 A decisive argument against Roth’s view is that practical intimacy isn’t sufficient for 
collective action. All three of Roth’s conditions are satisfied in cases of authority relations that do 
not entail, and are perhaps even incompatible with, acting together in the sense of collaboration. 
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collective action (2004, p. 365-369). In general with respect to moral obligations, he argues: “Characterizing Jack’s 
commitments-to-Sue simply as a form of moral obligation does not, at least on the face of it, address the special and 
executive nature of contralateral commitment…Moral obligations must be able to serve as a basis for third-party 
critique and, if necessary, intervention…The specialness of the [contralateral] commitment…lies precisely with 
something about its not being available to third parties” (p. 364-5). However, Roth doesn’t say any more about how 
these obligations differ from the special moral obligations posited by certain moral theories, for example care ethics. 
While it is the case that Roth’s definitions of special and executive limit such obligations to collective action, he 





Suppose that B and A are in an asymmetric power relation, perhaps B is A’s commanding officer 
and orders him to clean the latrines. A case like this can fulfill Roth’s conditions for contralateral 
commitment: B has the authority to settle what A does in the cleaning; A is entitled to B’s intention 
as a practical conclusion; B communicates her intention to A; B’s authority is not blocked, 
superseded, suspended, or nullified; finally, A is in a position to act directly on the intention for 
him to clean the latrines. He had better, in fact. And he had better without deliberating about it, 
and sometimes even if he has good reasons not to. Acting together involves jointly settling on a 
course of action, not one person settling for the other what he is going to do. Neither B nor A 
regard the issue of the latrine cleaning as being jointly settled. Both know B settles it. Roth’s 
conditions are thus consistent with an authority relation that is itself inconsistent with acting 
together in the sense of collaboration. 
 A possible response for Roth is that practical intimacy must be symmetric, that is practical 
intimacy requires that both A and B have the authority to form intentions for the other. Roth 
himself rules out this possibility, for good reason. This response suggests that A’s intention is 
distinct from B’s, and so their respective commitments are independent of one another. And, for 
Roth, “that doesn’t seem right for shared agency.”49  But even if the proposal could be made to 
work, it wouldn’t help with this problem. There is no reason to think this symmetric version of 
practical intimacy would involve collaboration. Roth’s conditions are consistent with the 
possibility that each participant is acting on one of the other participant’s intentions as a result of 
psychological manipulation or coercion. Each might be trying to pre-emptively form intentions for 
the other to act on before the other can form intentions they act on, in order to influence the carrying 
                                                          





out of the action. This kind of relation is equally inconsistent with the idea of jointly settling on a 
course of action required for collective action. 
 While I find this argument against Roth’s view convincing, it doesn’t generalize to other 
quasi-psychological views. It requires the specific claims about the nature of practical intimacy 
and contralateral commitments, which quasi-psychologists may reject. However, if we temporarily 
grant Roth the claims about contralateral commitments and consider how they could account for 
the obligation we are here focusing on, the obligation to notify, we can identify the general feature 
of quasi-psychological views that make them deficient as accounts of collective action. So, say 
that contralateral commitments do govern collective action, can they account for the obligation to 
notify? 
They cannot. Let’s go back to the cases to see why. There is an important difference 
between Heinrich and Andrea’s walk, used to inform our experimental research, and Jack and 
Sue’s walk, the earlier walking example of Gilbert’s that Roth uses. The importance difference is 
this: Heinrich suddenly walks away from the activity, ending it, but Jack doesn’t. He is still in the 
middle of the walk; he’s just doing it wrong. Jack and Sue both still have participatory intentions 
toward their action, and, according to Roth, it is the relation between some of these intentions that 
generates the normative relations between them. These relations govern the way the collective 
action should be carried out, given that everyone still intends to complete the collective action. But 
that is not the case for Heinrich. Heinrich has already decided that he isn’t going to complete the 
action. And since he no longer has a participatory intention, it is unclear what could ground his 
obligation, on Roth’s view. 
The problem is particularly stark for Roth, because of the way he conceives of the relation 





intention has an interpersonal commitment because she is individually, psychologically 
committed. He requires that the participant have a participatory commitment because that is the 
link between the intentions transferred between participants through practical intimacy and their 
actions. Jack preserves and executes Sue’s intention in part because he has a participatory intention 
towards the action, satisfying Roth’s conditions (i)-(iii). But, being committed, in the sense of 
having a participatory intention, which is the sense Roth is invoking, is open to reconsideration. 
The norm of stability tells us not to reconsider recklessly, but, as we have seen, sometimes there 
is good reason to reconsider. What happens when Jack reconsiders, changes his mind, and no 
longer has that participatory intention?  
The first thing that happens is that Jack is free to make Sue’s intention that he x the object 
of his own rational faculties, an object of deliberation. Reflecting on Sue’s intention once he no 
longer intends to go for a walk may lead Jack, through rational steps, to conclude that he should 
drop Sue’s intention that he walk with her. And this is open to him, because as soon as he starts to 
deliberate about Sue’s intention, practical intimacy is broken. As long as Jack is acting on Sue’s 
intention, she has some authority over how he carries it out, but, unlike the commanding officer, 
she doesn’t have any authority over whether Jack acts on it. His participatory intention is up to 
him because his use of his own deliberative faculties is up to him. And so, whether practical 
intimacy exists between them is up to him as well. 
Since practical intimacy is dependent on Jack’s participatory intention in this way, 
contralateral commitments can’t explain the obligation to notify. Jack’s obligation to notify comes 
into effect only once he no longer has his participatory intention. While Jack still intends to 
participate, there is no question whether he is obligated to notify; he’s not going anywhere, so 





intention. And, as we have seen, once Jack drops his participatory intention, there need not be any 
practical intimacy, which means there is no contralateral commitment. So, while contralateral 
commitments can explain Jack’s obligation to walk at a reasonable pace as long as he has a 
participatory intention, they cannot explain his (or Heinrich’s) obligation to notify after he has 
decided he’s done with the walk.  
What’s required to explain the obligation to notify are normative commitments that outlive 
the participant’s psychological commitments, but this is ruled out by the structure of Roth’s view. 
For him, the presence of the normative commitments is dependent on the presence of the 
psychological ones. People are only contralaterally committed if there is practical intimacy 
between them, and there is practical intimacy between them only if they have the appropriate 
participatory intentions.  
This point generalizes to all quasi-psychological views, including Bratman’s, because it is 
based on their metaphysical commitments. On these views, collective intentions are realized in or 
constituted by the individual participatory intentions. As they are combinations of individual 
mental states, collective intentions are dependent on all of those individual states being present. 
Once one of the participants drops their participatory intention, one of the necessary individual 
states is gone, and so there is no collective intention.  And this is exactly the circumstance in which 
the obligation to notify comes into effect. A participant only has an obligation to notify once she 
has dropped her individual participatory intention, however that is construed. Before that, there 
is nothing to notify; she’s still planning on playing her part. On quasi-psychological views, the 
collective intention stops existing just as the obligation to notify becomes relevant. 
Quasi-psychological views are therefore inadequate. The purpose for which collective 





one part of collective action is the obligation to notify. But as we have seen, quasi-psychological 
collective intentions are unable to provide an explanation of the obligation to notify; when the 
obligation to notify arises, they’re not around to do the explaining. So, they do not provide a full 
explanation of collective action. They fail to explain at least one feature of collective action, and 
their metaphysical commitments preclude them from being able to do so. Quasi-psychologists 
must then either drop the claim that collective intention fully explains collective action or develop 
an independent view of the source of this obligation. 
 
§ 3.7 Conclusion 
Experimental research on the walking case gives us initial reason to treat the obligation to notify 
as part of collective action. Doing so results in difficulties for quasi-psychological views. For non-
normative versions, like Michael Bratman’s, the difficulties start with finding a moral principle 
that satisfies two constraints. First, since it appears that the obligation to notify is present even in 
minimal cases, such a principle would have to apply to all cases of collective action. But, second, 
it would have to do so without generating obligations that are too strong. At the moment, Bratman 
is forced to deny that the principles he considers apply to minimal cases, because they generate 
obligations that are not always present in collective action. And so, to explain the obligation to 
notify, he needs a new principle. Even normative versions face particular problems capturing the 
normativity specific to collective action. For Roth, this manifests itself as an unwanted conflation 
of the normative relations involved between participants in a collective action with the authority 
relations between people in highly unequal positions in a hierarchy. However, the general problem 
for quasi-psychological views stems from their metaphysical rather than their normative 





persists as the result of a collective intention when a co-actor lacks a participatory intention, 
because lacking participatory intentions, on their view, entails that there is no collective intention.  
Quasi-psychological collective intentions can’t explain the obligation to notify, because when the 
obligation to notify needs to be discharged, they no longer exist. This is significant problem for 
normativist versions of the view, since they are committed to the claim that such intentions do 
generate the normativity in collective action. For non-normativist versions, the criticism is less 
damaging, but it does put pressure on them to give an account of the source of this obligation. 
 At the moment, given the state of the empirical research, it appears that a theory that 
provides an explanation of the obligation to notify gives a better explanation of collective action 
than a theory that doesn’t. This leaves such a theory the following choice: either introduce some 
other features of acting together or some general principles that explain the obligation to notify, 
both in collective action and perhaps in other social situations, or show how collective intentions 
themselves involve the obligation to notify. I would like to pursue the second option. What we 
need, for this option to work, is a view of collective intention on which the persistence conditions 






Appendix: Details of Obligation to Notify Study 
 
Summary Table Explanation 
For the following tables, z-scores and p-values were derived from Dunn-Bonferroni adjusted tests 
between conditions where Kruskal-Wallis tests showed a significant difference between our 
independent groups. Those p-values and z-scores derived from Mann-Whitney tests and not 
corrected for multiple comparisons are denoted by the symbol ‘†’. All z-scores are reported as 
absolute values. Lastly, ‘*’ represent unadjusted Dunn’s p values, which were reported only when 
adjusted values would not provide much information (e.g., the number of comparisons would 
result in a value greater than 1). 
Effect sizes reported in the chapter were estimated with the following methods: r values 
were ascertained by dividing the standardized Dunn-Bonferroni test statistic (z-score) by the 
square root of the total sample size of the groups being compared. Effect sizes, rm, not corrected 
for multiple comparisons, where Kruskal-Wallis tests did not show an overall difference across 
groups, were taken from the standardized z-score from Mann-Whitney U tests and again divided 
by the square root of the total sample size of groups being compared. Lastly, epsilon-squared effect 
sizes for Kruskal-Wallis tests, E
2
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Dependent Measures Control vs. Low 
Collectivet Action 
Control vs. High 
Collective Action 
Low Collective 
Action vs. High 
Collective Action 
Togetherness z = 5.151;  
p < .001 
z = 6.616;  
p < .001 
z = 1.506;  
p = .061† 
Notification Measure z = 7.428;  
p < .001 
z = 7.972;  
p < .001 
z = .559;  
p = .576* 
 
Vignettes 
No Collective Action Condition 
Two people are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. Starting at 65th street, they walk 
beside each other, until, as it happens, one of them peels off at 59th street. 
Low Collective Action Condition 
Two people are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. They spot each other at 65th street, 
and they briefly walk together, chatting, until, as it happens, one of them peels off at 59th street. 
High Collective Action Condition 
Two people are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. They spot each other at 65th street, 
and they walk together, chatting, laughing and maintaining their pace, until, as it happens, one of 






      Non-Psychological Views 
Chapter 4  
 
Instead of understanding collective intentions as either psychological states or as dependent on 
individual intentions, we can understand them as normative states,1 perhaps with distinctive 
psychological consequences. In fact, it looks like we should, given the current empirical evidence 
regarding our conception of properties of collective action presented in the last chapter; only by 
understanding them this way can we explain the persistence of the obligation to notify after an 
individual change of mind about participation. 
 But how is this normative state formed? What are its properties? Am I obligated only to 
notify, or do I have to do more? Do I have to do my part? Maybe leaving a collective action requires 
the permission of the others. There are some cases in which merely notifying seems insufficient. 
Are those cases standard, or do they involve further elements that introduce new obligations?  Does 
it reduce to a more familiar normative phenomenon, namely, promises? Perhaps just as important, 
why see this state as an intention? That is, how can this state fulfill the functional role we have 
specified for intention without being a psychological state? 
 Answering these questions amounts to presenting a non-psychological, normativist view. 
This chapter considers and rejects the most prominent, and I think only, instance of this kind of 
view in the literature, developed by Margaret Gilbert. After presenting her view, I show what it 
gets right: it can explain the obligation to notify and the normative relations present in cases of 
                                                          
1 By normative state, I mean a state of affairs in which a normative relation exists between two or more people. A 
classic example is promising. When one person promises something to another, there is a normative relation 
between them, and according to the usage I am proposing, they are in a normative state. Another example, which I 





“morally wrong” collective action. It therefore accounts for the first two judgments suggested by 
empirical research, presented in the last chapter and re-stated in this one. Gilbert’s view fails 
because it gets the third empirical judgment wrong. It is not a general feature of collective action 
that we need to seek the permission of other participants to leave that action.2 And so, Gilbert’s 
version of a non-psychological, normativist view should be rejected. 
Although I take the first reason to reject Gilbert’s view — namely that it doesn’t explain 
our empirical research — to be sufficient, Gilbert’s view has problems for a second and third 
reason. I raise these issues not to provide further arguments against Gilbert, but because they 
provide desiderata for a plausible non-psychological, normativist view. The second issue with 
Gilbert’s account is that it doesn’t explain why we should think the normative state she gives an 
account of is an intention in the first place, because it is unclear how her collective intentions fulfill 
intention’s characteristic roles. The question raised by this criticism is: if we divorce collective 
intention from individual psychological states so thoroughly, how can it cause action by 
individuals? These first two reasons for rejecting Gilbert’s view have an interesting relationship. 
The second is perhaps more fundamental, because it questions whether Gilbert is even talking 
about intention. But because Gilbert’s approach places emphasis on explaining everyday 
conceptions of collectivity, she doesn’t see it as a serious issue, even though she does respond to 
it. And so, the first is perhaps more important, because it involves a failure of Gilbert’s view on its 
own terms; her view doesn’t explain our everyday sense of collective action. The third concern 
with Gilbert’s presentation is that she doesn’t provide a story about why the specific acts involved 
                                                          
2 As I argue later, both in §5 of this chapter and in Chapter 5, there can be further obligations in collective actions, 
based on other obligation-generating processes such as promising or moral principles concerning due care for others, 





in creating a collective intention are obligation-generating. I take it that a normativist view should 
provide such a story. 
 The important difference between this chapter and the preceding two is that the objections 
raised here do not generalize to all non-psychological views, even though they do generate 
desiderata for them. A different view of the formation of collective intention, which allows for a 
different understanding of the resulting normative properties of that state, is possible, as is an 
explanation of the results of our empirical research, how that state fulfils the roles of collective 
intention previously discussed, and why the process of forming a collective intention is obligation-
generating. I present such a view in the next chapter. 
 
§ 4.1 Non-Psychological, Normativist Views 
The fundamental concept in Gilbert’s account of collective intention and action is joint 
commitment.3 Our collectively intending something is a matter of being jointly committed to doing 
that thing: 
Persons X and Y collectively intend to perform action A if and only if they are 
jointly committed to intend as a body to do A.4 
And Gilbert is a proponent of the simple view of collective action, so we are collectively doing 
something when we collectively intend to do it: 
                                                          
3 Gilbert uses the concept of joint commitment in explanations of other psychological predicates for groups, such as 
collective belief, collective goal, collective guilt, and so on, as well as features of the social world farther removed 
from psychological predicates, such as social convention and political obligation. I will not comment on any of these 
other applications of joint commitment. See Gilbert (1989, 2013) for more on this approach. 





Persons X and Y are collectively doing A if and only if they collectively intend to 
do A…, and each is effectively acting, in light of the associated joint commitment, 
so as to bring about the fulfillment of this intention.5 
These two quotes give us the basic structure of Gilbert’s view, although not much of an 
explanation: joint commitments are primitive and provide the foundation for collective intentions, 
and collective intentions explain collective actions. 
 Let’s start at the bottom, after a quick terminological note. Gilbert uses “joint commitment 
to intend,” “collective intention,” and “shared intention” interchangeably. I follow Gilbert in that 
usage. In my exposition, I try to respect the structure of Gilbert’s view by using “joint 
commitment” in the cases where the claim I am making holds for all joint commitment phenomena, 
and “joint commitment to intend,” “collective intention,” or “shared intention” when the claim I 
am making holds only in the specific case of acting together. According to Gilbert, there are two 
kinds of commitments: personal and joint. Consistent with the discussion of intention in Chapter 
1, personal commitments are generated by things like individual decisions and plans, but not 
inclinations and desires. If I decide to go to a friend’s party tonight, I am committed to going, 
whether I tell anybody about my decision or not. But if I only want to go, I am not committed to 
going. The key features of individual commitments for Gilbert are, first, that individuals can create 
commitments at will.6 Had I decided to go to a basketball game instead of my friend’s party, I 
would be committed to going the game, not the party. Second, since an individual can create 
commitments at will, she can also rescind them at will. Because I created it, I am in a position to 
change it; all I have to do is change my mind. In fact, that is what it is to be personally committed. 
                                                          
5 (2013, p. 89). I changed the original variables of the agents, A and B, to X and Y, to avoid confusion. 





An individual is “subject to a personal commitment if and only if he is the sole author of a 
commitment and has the authority to unilaterally to rescind it.”7 
 Joint commitments, by contrast, are necessarily commitments involving two or more 
people. And more, they are not reducible to or concatenations of personal commitments. Say we 
are jointly committed. It is not that I am committed and you are committed. Instead, the joint 
commitment is a commitment of ours, that is, you and I as a team or unit.8 One way Gilbert 
expresses this is that joint commitments are simple rather than composite: “A joint commitment is 
not a complex of personal commitments, nor does a joint commitment have parts in the way such 
a complex does,”9 instead joint commitments are “simple rather than composite.”10 Despite our 
lack of personal commitment, we are still subjects of the joint commitment in the sense that it is a 
state that we are in. 
 We enter into a joint commitment by each issuing a matching “expression of readiness” 
under conditions of common knowledge.11 Gilbert also takes this notion to be primitive:  
It is not clear that there is any very helpful way of breaking down the notion of 
expressing ones’s readiness to be jointly committed. It could be said that one makes 
it clear that all is in order as far as one’s own will is concerned for the creation of 
the relevant joint commitment.12 
However, we can say some general things about the ways that they can occur. Based on the 
examples Gilbert gives, there seem to be range of possibilities from explicit to implicit. Her 
                                                          
7 (2000, p. 52). 
8 In earlier work, for example (1989), Gilbert used the term “plural subject” to capture this intuitive idea of our 
being a unit. She has since stopped using it, on the grounds that it has led to misunderstandings as “subject” is often 
associated with subjectivity or consciousness, and that is not what she has in mind (2013, p. 9). 
9 (2013, p. 32). 
10 (2000, p. 53). 
11  (Gilbert 2013, pp. 26-30) 





examples of explicit expressions of readiness concerning collective actions involve something like 
agreement, in an everyday intuitive sense.13 So, I can ask “Hey, do you want to go to the game 
tomorrow” and if you reply “Yes,” we have each issued matching expressions of readiness and are 
jointly committed to going to the game. But explicit expressions of readiness do not require prior 
planning. They can also be exchanged in the spur of the moment, for example when asking 
someone to dance to a song already playing. Her examples of implicit expressions of readiness do 
not involve direct or even verbal communication at all. Gilbert specifies that individuals may “fall 
into” a joint commitment, in that the expressions of readiness can be manifested in action, 
developed over time, and independent of the direct awareness of the participants.14 A key feature 
of expressions of readiness is that they involve all the participants. Joint commitments are 
commitment of all, and so they must be created by all. 
 Just as joint commitments require the will of all in order to be brought into existence, they 
require the will of all in order to be rescinded. No participant in a joint commitment has the power 
to end the joint commitment simply by changing her mind. Ending a joint commitment to intend 
involves either successfully executing the behavior it specifies or getting each of the participants 
to express their readiness to end it. This is expressed succinctly in her “concurrence criterion”: 
“absent special background understandings, the concurrence of all parties is required in order that 
a given shared intention be changed or rescinded, or that a given party be released from 
participating in it.”15 This ensures that co-actors cannot unilaterally leave a joint commitment. 
Attempting to do so is not ending the joint commitment, but violating it. 
                                                          
13 Gilbert emphasizes that expression of readiness is the prior and more general concept, in part so that she can 
account for agreement in terms of joint commitment (2013). 
14 (2006, pp. 139-140). 





 What makes Gilbert a normativist is that joint commitments to intend necessarily involve 
interpersonal obligations and entitlements and these obligations are non-moral. In her words, 
“obligations and correlative rights inhere in any joint commitment.”16 In other words, the process 
by which joint commitments are created is also an obligation-generating process. And when the 
joint commitment is to intend, this gives us her “obligation criteria”: “each party to a shared 
intention is obligated to each to act as appropriate to the shared intention in conjunction with the 
rest.”17 Acting as appropriate to the shared intention involves attempting to promote the fulfilment 
of the shared intention, not acting contrary to it, and being subject to rebuke for failing to fulfill 
these obligations. Also important is the fact that obligations of joint commitment are directed 
obligations. Having one implies that “one is obligated ‘to’ a particular person or persons, as well 
as obligated ‘to do’ something or other.”18 
 Gilbert separates the obligations of joint commitment from moral obligation: “Clearly, 
moral requirements and the directed obligations of joint commitment differ radically in 
character.”19 She gives several arguments for this claim,20 but I think the strongest one for 
collective intention is that these obligations are present in cases of morally wrong collective actions 
— that is, even when the participants are morally obligated not to perform that action. She tells 
the story of Ulrich and Vance, who share an intention to do something evil but nonetheless are 
obligated to each other to perform the “actions that conform to the constitutive joint commitment, 
though neither (I shall assume) ought to conform to it all things considered.”21 And it is 
inconsistent with the idea of moral obligation that one could be obligated to conform to the 
                                                          
16 (2013 p. 49-50). 
17 (2009, p. 175). 
18 Gilbert (2000, p. 104). 
19 (2009, p. 184). 
20 See for example Gilbert (2006, pp. 159-60) for an argument based on “context-sensitivity” and Gilbert (2000, Ch. 
4) for an argument based on “internality.”  





constitutive joint commitment when that joint commitment is to intend to perform an action the 
individuals are morally obligated not to perform. So, if one is genuinely obligated in some way to 
the other participants to perform actions in accordance with a morally wrong collective action, 
then those obligations cannot be moral. 
 What makes Gilbert’s view non-psychological is that joint commitments to intend are not 
dependent on individual participatory intentions. They do not consist of nor are they realized in a 
particular combination of individual psychological states. This is implicit in both her views about 
the formation and rescission of joint commitments to intend.  On her view, collective intentions 
are formed by expressions of readiness, which do not require that the individual expressing their 
readiness have any particular psychological state or combination of states in order to result in a 
joint commitment. And joint commitments end only with the assent of all. So, it is logically 
possible that there is a genuine collective intention whose participants have all individually 
changed their mind about continuing — that is, they have dropped their participatory intentions — 
but have simply not yet communicated that fact to each other. Her “disjunction criterion” makes 
this explicit: “it is not necessarily the case that for every shared intention…there be correlative 
personal intentions”.22 For example, say you and I express our readiness to hike to the top of a 
mountain, forming a joint commitment to intend to do so. Half-way up I decide the top is too far, 
and I no longer intend to go all the way. But I see that you are going strong. So, I wait to tell you 
about my change of heart until you start to slow down, because I think that increases my chances 
                                                          
22 (2009, p. 172). Gilbert’s use of “correlative personal intentions” may not explicitly match my use of “participatory 
intention.” In chapter 3, I claim that “I intend that we J” expresses a participatory intention. Gilbert has doubts since 
“a Bratmanian intention that we J does not entail an intention to do one’s best to achieve our J-ing.” I think Bratman 
does think that his intentions have the entailments Gilbert doubts, see fn.10 in Chapter 3. In any case, this doesn’t 
affect the argument here, since Gilbert continues “he [Bratman] still requires too much in the way of correlative 





of you agreeing to cut our hike short. According to Gilbert, in the time after I change my mind, 
but before I tell you about it, we still share an intention to hike to the top of the mountain.23 
 So, Gilbert’s view is an instance of a normativist, non-psychological view. According to 
her, when we are acting together in the sense of collaboration or partnership, we are jointly 
committed. We are subjects of a normative state, created by our matching expressions of readiness 
and independent of our individual psychological states. And this state grants us a special standing 
with respect to each other’s actions. It obligates each of us to do our part, on pain of rebuke, and 
to receive the assent of the others before leaving. 
 
§ 4.2 The Obligation to Notify Explained 
In this section and the next, I discuss the advantages of Gilbert’s view specifically with respect to 
the judgments suggested by our empirical research, so for ease of reference, let me restate them: 
(i) exiting a collective action involves an obligation to make that exit public,  
(ii) this obligation is present in “morally wrong” cases of collective action, and  
(iii) exiting the collective does not involve an obligation to seek the permission of the 
co-actors. 
The experimental evidence for (i) is discussed in §3.3 “The Walking Case”. Plainly, (i) is 
encompassed by the “obligation criterion”. Being obligated to perform the actions in accordance 
with the joint commitment to intend entails at least an obligation to make an exit from that joint 
commitment public. In fact, it entails more, problematically so, but I leave that to the section after 
next.  
                                                          





The ease of this explanation stems from the fact that Gilbertian joint commitment results 
in different persistence conditions for collective intention than quasi-psychological views. 
Collective intentions, on Gilbert’s view, are not constituted by the presence of various individual 
intentions and their relations, contra quasi-psychological views, but instead are triggered by a 
specific process, namely matching expressions of readiness, and then persist until they are 
rescinded or satisfied. Since the obligation to notify primarily applies to cases that are not likely 
to involve satisfaction, because once I no longer have an individual participatory intention, it 
becomes unlikely I will fulfil my role in the completion of the collective action, we can ignore that 
disjunct here. And since the rescission procedure for joint commitments involves more than an 
individual change of mind about participating, because it requires the other person’s permission, 
no individual is capable of ending a joint commitment on their own. As a result, there is no issue 
about whether collective intention can explain the obligation to notify. So, unlike for quasi-
psychological collective intentions, when the obligation to notify comes into force here — that is, 
when a participant drops their participatory intention — the non-psychological collective intention 
is still there to do the explaining. 
So, in explaining (i) non-psychological, normativist views are at a distinct advantage over 
psychological views, whether normativist or non-normativist. 
 
§ 4.3 The Robber Case 
The experimental evidence for (ii) comes from studies run by Javier and me on what we call the 
“Robber Case”.24 Unlike the other studies, this story is not from the philosophical literature, since 
none of the collective actions in the thought experiments found there are suitable for empirical 
                                                          





research. Gilbert doesn’t specify what evil act her immoral collective actors are perpetrating25 and 
in part because Bratman, as a non-normativist, is attempting to provide counterexamples, his evil 
collective actions are so extreme that they introduce confounding variables and pragmatic 
difficulties.26 Again, full details about the experimental design, vignettes, and results can be found 
in the appendix to this chapter. 
Our vignettes start out with people trying to take money from an ATM. They differ with 
respect to the evidence of collective action and the moral valence of the action, which allows us to 
examine the effect this change may have on participants’ intuitions about the mutual obligations 
between them. Given the results of the Walking Case, in which increased evidence of collective 
action between low and high conditions did not translate into increased ratings of normativity, we 
reduced our conditions from three to two. If normativist views are correct, whether psychological 
or non-psychological, then participants will be normatively sensitive to increased evidence of 
collective action independently of the more general moral transgression. However, only non-
psychological, normativist views predict that, as collective action is introduced, participants will 
judge that there is an obligation to notify, despite the fact that the collective action is morally 
wrong. So that is the question we asked. 
101 American adults (49% self-identified as female) were recruited online via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Four additional participants were excluded from analyses for failing to complete 
the study. Participants were randomly assigned into our two conditions, producing a 2x1 between-
                                                          
25 See the story of Ulrich and Vance (2009, p. 183-4). 
26 They include slavery and genocide (2009, p. 152). People’s negative opinions of these things are so strong that 
they color their judgments in messy ways, and they raise problems with the IRB. Since our point can be made with 
less disturbing morally wrong cases, there is no convincing reason to subject participants to vignettes involving 
slavery and genocide. However, testing these cases could help us better understand how moral considerations 
interact with other normative phenomena. Our assumption about the strength of people’s judgments about things 





subjects design. Fifty participants were assigned to our control condition, with fifty-one 
individuals to our collective action condition.  
In our control condition two people are lined up at an ATM booth. The machine 
malfunctions and $20 bills start spraying out of the ATM. One person begins to furiously collect 
as many bills as possible, while the other person catches the few solitary bills that hit them, and 
then suddenly peels off and walks out of the booth. In our collective action condition, two people 
are actively breaking into an empty ATM booth late at night. One man has the crow bar and is 
furiously trying to take the cover off the ATM; the other man has a bag ready to collect the cash. 
In the middle of the process of breaking into the ATM, the bagman suddenly peels off and walks 
out of the booth. Afterwards, participants are directed to answer three questions, with the first two 
presented in random order, followed by our standard demographic questions: 
1. Notification Measure: ‘Should the person who peels off notify the other that they’re 
leaving’ with a seven-point scale anchored at 0 (‘No obligation at all to notify’) and 6 
(‘Total obligation to notify’). 
2. Togetherness Measure: ‘To what extent were the two men acting together?’ along with a 
scale anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 6 (‘Completely’). 
3. Morality Measure: ‘Were the actions taken by the two people morally wrong?’ with a 
seven-point scale anchored at 0 (‘Not at all wrong’) and 6 (‘Completely wrong’); this 
question was presented following the previous two on a separate page. 
Participant scores across our three measures were not normally distributed.27 As our current design 
has only two conditions, Mann-Whitney comparisons between conditions were used along with 
Spearman’s Rho for correlations. Participants correctly tracked both manipulations. They rated the 
                                                          





behavior in the collective action condition (Mdn = 6) at the top score and thus significantly worse 
than in the control condition (Mdn = 5), although they also thought that the actions in the control 
condition were not morally correct.28  Additionally, participants’ scores for our togetherness 
measure were significantly higher in our collective action condition (Mdn = 5) than in the control 
condition (Mdn = 1).29 Most relevantly for our predictions, participants judged that the character 
who leaves the ATM booth had an obligation to notify in the collective action condition (Mdn = 
5) more than in our control condition, where medians reached the floor of our measure (Mdn = 
0).30 Though all of our measures were significantly correlated with one another, the strongest 
relationship was found between our togetherness and notification measures (rs = .561, p < .001).  
Following our predictions, individuals who gave lower ratings of togetherness were less likely to 
think that there was an extant obligation to notify, and vice versa. 
 Here is a box and whisker plot that represents these results. As stated before, in a box and 
whisker plot, the edges of the box portray the upper and lower quartiles, the “whiskers”, the two 
lines that extend outside the box, depict the highest and lowest responses, the horizontal line 
represents the median, “x” shows the mean, and points are the outliers. 
                                                          
28 U = 738.5, z = - 3.953, p < .001, rm = .39. 
29 U = 280, z = - 6.862, p < .001, rm = .68. 






Figure 4: Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across our three conditions in 
the Robber Case. 
As our results show, in both conditions participants thought the actions undertaken by the 
characters were morally wrong; however, in the collective action case the actions undertaken were 
judged to be significantly worse. And only in the collective action case did they judge there to be 
an obligation to notify. As I go on to explain, these findings support the normativist view that there 
is a distinct kind of normativity present between participants in a collective action that operates 
independently from general moral considerations. Even when people are doing something wrong 
there are still significant normative relations between them.31 
 Since non-normativists, such as Michael Bratman, claim that any obligation in collective 
action is a moral obligation,32 this experimental evidence suggests that the normativists get it right. 
Even if we put aside the difficulties non-normativists have generating an obligation to notify in 
regular cases of collective action, it is more difficult to see how they could generate such an 
                                                          
31 There are some limitations to the design, but they do not affect the strength of the conclusions drawn here. For 
discussion, see Gomez-Lavin and Rachar (2019). 





obligation here, since immoral collective actions do not seem to be the kinds of things that could 
involve genuinely moral obligations. Normativism does not have trouble explaining these results 
because according to it the commitments and obligations involved in collective action are 
independent of morality. The normative relations present in collective action are the product of the 
specific procedure of forming a collective intention. For Gilbert, this procedure is the mutual 
exchange of expressions of readiness. If the formation of a collective intention is itself an 
obligation-generating process, it generates normative relations whatever the moral valence of the 
act in question,. And so, the obligations generated in this way can exist alongside a conflicting 
moral obligation, and perhaps even be overruled by it. 
 A compelling solution to the problems psychological and non-normativist views have 
explaining (i) and (ii) is to adopt a normativist, non-psychological view. As such a view, Gilbert’s 
does the best job of explaining the first two results of our experimental research. Normativists 
seem equally capable of explaining (ii), should it generalize to non-obligation-to-notify cases, but 
only non-psychological normativists can explain (i). But we haven’t yet considered any of the 
more specific claims Gilbert makes about the nature of the normativity involved in collective 
action, and it is here that her view goes, partially, wrong. 
 
§ 4.4 The Walking Case: The Obligation to Seek Permission 
In §4.1, I said that Gilbert’s view involves at least the obligation to notify, but it also involves 
significantly more. One of these further requirements seems plausible, but we have not yet tested 






 Joint commitments create more than just obligations to notify; they create obligations to 
perform contributory individual actions in accordance with the collective action. Gilbert states that 
‘By virtue of the existence of the [joint] commitment, and that alone, the parties have rights against 
each other to actions that conform to the commitment’.33 These rights and entitlements to rebuke 
suggest that each party to the joint commitment has an obligation to carry out their part in the 
collective action.34 Such obligations go beyond the obligation to notify. Participants in the bank 
robber case thought that there is an obligation to notify, but it is not clear that they would also 
think that there is an obligation to perform an action in conformance with the overall collective 
action of robbing the ATM. 
 Briefly, the motivation for choosing the obligation to notify as the relevant indicator of 
normative relations is that it appears to be the weakest form of normativity specific to collective 
action. As a result, if our studies had shown that even it was not present in cases of acting together, 
the non-normativist side would have a clear advantage. Additionally, as discussed in §3.3, the most 
important case in the debate between Gilbert and Bratman is the walking together case, and in his 
example, Bratman denies exactly that obligation. Showing that this obligation appears to be present 
in cases of collective action is a step forward, but it does not confirm Gilbert’s claim that joint 
commitment generates obligations to do one’s part in the collective action. At the same time, it 
doesn’t give us any reason to reject it either. There simply isn’t any research yet on whether our 
everyday concept of collective action involves this further obligation. And it seems plausible 
enough that it does. 
 The problematic further requirement for Gilbert proceeds from her claim that, just as joint 
commitments must be created by all, they can be rescinded only by all. This claim entails that no 
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one can unilaterally exit a joint commitment, and is expressed in her “concurrence criterion”, 
which, as stated above, requires that, to leave a collective intention, absent special background 
understandings, participants must receive the concurrence of all the other participants. This again 
requires much more than the obligation to notify; it requires that participants seek the permission 
of the other parties to leave the joint commitment. Gilbert makes it explicit that the concurrence 
condition requires seeking permission to leave a collective intention in several places. With respect 
to the Heinrich and Andrea story, in which Heinrich suddenly leaves their joint walk,35 Gilbert 
says: “Andrea has a right to Heinrich’s continued walking alongside her, together with the standing 
to issue related rebukes and demands. The right can be waived in certain contexts if Andrea gives 
her permission to Heinrich to cease walking alongside her.” And, in earlier work, she explicitly 
calls it the “permission criterion” instead of the “concurrence criterion”.36 
 Our more recent empirical research suggests that such a condition is not an everyday 
feature of collective action.37 In order to test this we repeated the Walking Case, but this time with 
new measures and one new condition. To briefly recapitulate, our previous Walking Case involved 
three vignettes: the first has no signals that the two people are walking together, the second does, 
and the third increases those signals. In each case, one participant in the walk peels off. 
This time we included a fourth condition that involved an explicit exchange of promises, 
both to see whether we can get an increase of judgments of togetherness, which in our previous 
walking study didn’t change between the low and high collective action conditions, and whether 
explicit promises have a different effect than other behavioral signals that the participants are 
acting together. There is significant philosophical interest in comparing promises to other 
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behavioral signals for the following reason. If there is no difference between the no collective 
condition and the collective actions conditions, and there is a difference between the collective 
action conditions and the promising condition, it looks like seeking permission is a function of 
promising rather than collective action. 
Again, after being randomly assigned to one of these four conditions, our two dependent 
measures were displayed in random order. This time our dependent measures were: 
1. Togetherness Measure: ‘To what extent were the two people acting together’ anchored at 
0 (‘Not at all’) and 6 (‘Totally working together’). 
2. Permission Measure: ‘Does the person who peels off have to seek permission to leave from 
the person who stays?’ anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 6 (‘Totally’). 
Following our previous studies, with respect to the first dependent measure, we hypothesized that 
participants would rate togetherness significantly higher in the promising condition, the high 
collective action condition and the low collective action condition compared to the no collective 
action condition, but not between low collective action condition, the high collective action 
condition, and the promising condition. With respect to the second measure, we adopted Gilbert’s 
perspective, so our hypothesis was that participants would rate the appropriateness of seeking 
permission higher in the promising condition, the high collective action condition, and the low 
collective action condition compared to the no collective action condition. Additionally, again 
following Gilbert, we hypothesized that people would not rate the appropriateness of seeking 
permission significantly higher in the promising condition compared to the collective action 






 Our results speak against most of these hypotheses. We found a significant main effect 
across both of our dependent measures.38 Participants successfully tracked increasing evidence of 
collective action between our control condition (mdn = 1) and our additional low (mdn = 2.5) and 
high (mdn = 4) collective action and promise (mdn = 4) conditions (refer to figure 6). So, while 
there was a significant difference between the control and all other conditions, our participants 
also gave significantly higher ratings of togetherness in the high collective action condition 
compared to the low collective action condition, unlike in our previous studies.39 Even though in 
our earlier studies the separation of togetherness scores for our low and high collective action 
conditions was trending towards significance, the result is surprising.40 Nonetheless, since the 
important point for our purposes is that the participants were able to track collective action, I will 
not attempt an explanation of this difference here. 
As for our permission measure, while we did find a significant main effect, this was largely 
driven by participant’s ratings in our promise condition (mdn = 3), rather than our low and high 
collective action conditions. That is, participants gave significantly higher permission-scores in 
our promise condition, than in our control (mdn = 0) and low collective action conditions (mdn = 
0).41 It is worth emphasizing that in the low collective action condition the median score was 0, 
since it shows that people strongly judge that there are instances of acting together that do not 
involve an obligation to seek permission.  Additionally, the separation of scores between our 
promise condition and our high collective action condition (mdn = 1) was trending towards 
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significance.42 And comparisons of participant ratings for permission between our high collective 
action and our low and control conditions were not significant.43  
Here is a box and whisker plot that represents these results: 
 
Figure 5: Box and whisker plot comparing dependent measures in the Walking Case with 
permission variable. 
These results suggest that judgments of permissibility do not track judgements of collective action. 
This gives rise to result (iii): exiting a collective action does not require seeking the permission of 
the co-actors. 
 What this means is that, pace Gilbert, the obligation to seek permission does not appear to 
be a function of acting together, but rather of promising. There is no empirical support for Gilbert’s 
claim that her concurrence criterion is a legitimate criterion for assessing theories of collective 
intention. People can act together in the sense of collaboration without being obligated to seek 
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others permission to leave, as the judgments about the low collective action condition suggest. 
And worse, there is evidence that seeking permission is a function of something not essential to 
collective action, namely promising. This suggests that both aspects of the concurrence criterion 
are mistaken. In addition to the lack of a requirement to seek permission, the background 
conditions Gilbert refers to also work the other way. Absent special understanding, for example 
given by promises,44 people can unilaterally leave collective actions without wronging each other, 
so long as they notify.   
Again, we have only shown that Gilbert’s thought experiments do not generate the 
intuitions they are supposed to, according to her. But, since there is no empirical evidence to the 
contrary, we have reason to think that the obligation to seek the permission of the other participants 
before leaving is not a part of our everyday conception of collective action. And so, we have reason 
to reject at least this part of Gilbert’s joint commitment view of collective intention. 
 
§ 4.5 Other Objections, Methodological Considerations, and What They Mean 
Going Forward 
Because of differences in methodology between Bratman and Gilbert, the fact that the entailments 
of Gilbert’s normativist view don’t match up to our studies carries more weight than it does in the 
case of Bratman’s non-normativist view. The reason for this is best explored through a Bratmanian 
critique of Gilbert. And it is worthwhile to do so, since discussing this and related objections 
reveals some important features that an account of collective intention should have. 
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 Bratman argues that Gilbert’s joint commitments to intend are not intentions at all because 
they don’t satisfy the basic conditions on intention. Here is what Bratman says about Gilbert’s 
claim that agreement is sufficient to bring a collective intention into existence: 
If we are talking about shared intention of a sort that is set appropriately to explain 
joint activity, the claim seems to me false as a general claim. This is 
because…people can insincerely agree to, say, plow the fields together, even 
though each participant fully intends not to act in accord with that 
agreement…given the possibility of insincerity, an agreement seems not to ensure 
that there is a shared intention of a sort that explains joint action.45 
So, agreements — in other words explicit matching expressions of readiness — may bring about 
mutual obligations but they do not bring about something that plays the explanatory role of a 
collective intention. Collective intentions must explain collective actions. Knowing that someone 
has an agreement but that each individual doesn’t have a correlative personal intention doesn’t put 
you in a position to explain a collective action, because it doesn’t guarantee the individual 
motivational basis. In fact, it puts you in a position to explain why the collective action won’t 
happen. Without the participants’ having individual intentions to do their parts, there is good 
reason to think that the collective action will not be performed. So, according to Bratman, the 
disjunction criterion is inconsistent with an account of collective intention that is capable of 
explaining collective action. 
Extending Bratman’s argument, one might argue that Gilbert’s collective intentions are not 
really intentions because they violate both of the conditions on intention.46 Collective intentions 
                                                          
45 (2014, p. 116). See also, (2014, p. 112). 
46 As discussed in Chapter 1, this is an extension Bratman may not accept, since he is agnostic about the self-





in this sense do not appear to tend to cause collective actions in the appropriate way, and the 
individuals who lack participatory intentions certainly do not take it to be settled that they are 
going to complete the action. 
 Gilbert doesn’t see this as a problem for two reasons. First, she argues that her collective 
intentions actually do a better job of fulfilling Bratman’s characterization of the roles of collective 
intention than his account does, including the explanatory role.47 Remember from the last chapter 
that Bratman’s view that collective intentions explain collective actions is broken down into the 
way that collective intentions fulfil three more specific roles: coordinating individual action, 
coordinating individual practical reasoning, and providing a background framework for bargaining 
and decision-making.  
For Gilbert, coordinating action and planning is a matter of what each of the parties has 
reason to do as a result of the joint commitment. She claims that “any commitment one is subject 
to gives one reason to act accordingly”, so two people who are jointly committed each have “reason 
to act, make plans, and so on, in conformity to the joint commitment”.48 One consequence of this 
is that valid practical inferences may start from  premises about what we intend to do and then 
move to conclusions about individual reasons to perform contributory actions. For example, a 
participant in a shared intention can reason as follows: ‘We intend to dance a tango, my going to 
the dance hall is required for that, therefore I have reason to go to the dance hall’. Since the 
inference concerns what one has reason to do, and not anything about the psychological states of 
an agent at a particular moment, there is no need for a participatory intention to complete the 
inference.49 And insofar as giving reasons is having independent motivational force, “shared 
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intentions have this in common with personal intentions”.50 Further, she claims that “given a 
shared intention the corresponding personal intentions are redundant from a motivational point 
of view” because once we have a collective intention we already have reason to act in accordance 
with it.51 Joint commitments to intend therefore motivate individual actions in accordance with the 
collective action and guide individual practical reasoning in a way that ensures consistent actions 
and plans. 
Further, because on her view a single thing — the joint commitment — governs each 
party’s practical reasoning, rather than different things — the meshing individual intentions —, 
and because this single thing is such that neither has control over it, it provides a better framework 
for bargaining. That each individual can simply reconsider their personal intentions causes 
difficulties for bargaining, if those intentions are the only things making us bargain. Here is how 
Gilbert states the worry: “If I know that you are ready and able to do away with the shared intention 
should you not get your way, I may be less inclined to ask for what I need, as opposed to what you 
are already prepared to give”.52 Since joint commitments are under the control of all parties, 
because of the concurrence criterion, this worry doesn’t arise for a joint commitment account of 
shared intention. On the joint commitment view, shared intentions are more robust; they are not 
swayed by personal desires to be rid of them. And so, they provide a more stable and felicitous 
framework for bargaining. Thus, Gilbertian collective intentions explain collective actions because 
they explain why collaborating individuals coordinate their actions and plans, and bargain in the 
ways that they do. They do so because the joint commitments give them reason to. 
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Second, and more importantly for our purposes, even if Gilbert fails to explain how her 
joint commitment account satisfies the three roles Bratman specifies for collective intention fails, 
her approach to the issue of collective intention and action may reduce the force of his criticism. 
Rather than starting from an independent account of intention that involves functional roles, 
Gilbert sets up her account as explaining “shared intention sentences”, such as “We’re going to go 
shopping”.53 A shared intention is nothing more than “what people refer to when…they utter 
everyday sentences of the form, for example, ‘We intend to do A’, ‘We’re going to do A’, and the 
like, and are not using them elliptically for ‘We both intend to do A’”.54 This is a special case of 
Gilbert’s approach to all social phenomenon, and she gives a lengthy defense of the idea that one 
of philosophy’s valuable uses is revealing, clarifying, and articulating everyday concepts so that 
they can be used in the social sciences.55 One of these everyday concepts concerns the 
‘togetherness’ involved in acting together in the sense of partnership or collaboration. Given this 
approach, the relevant question for evaluating Gilbert’s view of collective intention on its own 
terms is not how well it explains the functional roles of intention, but whether it matches up to 
everyday uses of shared intention sentences. On her view, if it turns out that the view that best 
captures those usages employs a concept of intention that doesn’t match Bratman’s 
characterization, so much the worse Bratman’s characterization, at least in the collective case. It 
is merely a side-benefit for Gilbert that, according to her, her view is better than Bratman’s, on 
Bratman’s terms. 
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Bratman’s approach is very different. He begins characterizing his project through two 
questions that connect his old with his new work. Here is the first, with its introduction: 
I began my 1987 book, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason with a question: 
What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take 
seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further 
practical reasoning?56 
His answer to this question is his “planning theory of intention”, some of the details of which are 
discussed in Chapter 1. Explaining acting together in the sense of partnership or collaboration is 
an extension of this account of agency, as implied by the second question: 
In the present book I turn to a follow-up question: What happens to our 
understanding of small-scale cases of acting together…when we take seriously the 
planning theory of individual agency? 
The result is that his theory of individual agency takes a foundational role. According to Bratman, 
we have independent reason to think that planning structures are central to our individual agency, 
and we can then investigate whether they also explain social phenomena. Thus, for Bratman, it is 
a side-benefit of his theory of planning agency that is also explains some “robust form of sociality”. 
 We might think that this disagreement between Bratman and Gilbert comes down to the 
following difference: Gilbert starts with what she claims is an everyday social concept of acting 
together and employs intention as a label, while Bratman starts with a technical understanding of 
intention and applies it to the case of acting together. What is then a condition on intention for 
Bratman — that it has a certain explanatory role, for example — simply has no import for Gilbert.  
                                                          





Yet the answer is not that simple. Both argue that their accounts can do what the other 
wants such an account to do; both think that their account succeeds on the other’s terms. As we 
saw, Gilbert thinks that her view of joint commitments to intend satisfies the conditions on 
intention. About the consequences of her joint commitment view, she asks: “Does it mean that a 
sensitive understanding of the nature of intention is not relevant to an understanding of shared 
intention?” and gives the non-committal answer “Not necessarily”, before going on to explain how 
her account does meet the functional roles of intention. And, in certain places, Bratman gives 
import to pre-theoretic understandings of acting together in the sense of collaboration or 
partnership. For example, he sometimes introduces his discussion using shared intention sentences, 
which he takes to give us that which needs to be explained.57  And, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, Bratman argues that his philosophical account serves as a model for something that 
“broadly coheres with pre-analytic talk of shared intention and of shared intention and shared 
cooperative activities”.58 
Rather than evaluating these different approaches and taking sides, I want to use the 
preceding discussion to highlight some important points for this dissertation. 
First, the fact that both Bratman and Gilbert rely on pre-theoretic talk to give the 
explanandum suggests that despite the difference of starting place, direction of priority, and 
difference in argumentative strategy, both have a similar aim: to give a philosophical account of 
shared intention that explains our everyday conception of acting together in the sense of 
collaboration or partnership, which may in part be revealed by thought experiments, examples, 
and experimental research.59 
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Second, the experimental results of the permission studies in the walking case are 
particularly troublesome for Gilbert. Her argumentative structure places her judgments about the 
everyday features of collective action at the foundation. In her most direct response to Bratman, 
her argument runs as follows.60 After introducing the topic and generally characterizing various 
potential positions, she attempts to establish the three conditions for an adequate account of 
collective action introduced above, the “disjunction criterion”, the “obligation criterion”, and the 
“concurrence criterion”. The basis for these “everyday” criteria is nothing more than “observations 
on the way people think and talk about shared intention in everyday life”, which are illustrated 
through a series of thought experiments meant to elicit the appropriate intuitions.61 The 
concurrence criterion is then used in the argument against views like Bratman’s and for her joint 
commitment account.62 The fact that her thought experiments don’t elicit the intuitions she thinks 
they will, at least in the case of the concurrence criterion, means that there is a deep problem for 
Gilbert. It is not simply that there is some mismatch between the philosophical account and our 
everyday view or that it fails to explain one judgment but provides an explanation of the rest; rather 
one of her underpinning premises is false. We have good reason to think that the concurrence 
criterion is not an everyday feature of collective action. Since Gilbert’s joint commitment view 
entails the concurrence criterion, it is an inadequate view of collective intention, on its own terms. 
Third, Gilbert’s response to Bratman that the everyday features of collective action take 
precedence over conceptual constraints on intention is not available to me given the structure of 
this dissertation. While I clearly think that everyday judgments have some weight in evaluating 
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theories, in that we have reason to accept the theory that best explains those everyday features, I 
am also committed to the claim that a philosophically explicated concept of intention is useful for 
that purpose. If it turns out that there is no way of explaining everyday features of acting together 
in the sense of collaboration using a concept that meets the broad conceptual conditions on 
intention, then we should stop attempting to use intention in this way and instead turn to some 
other concept that allows us to give better explanations. I take it this is what is required for “a 
sensitive understanding of intention” to be relevant to an account of collective intention. This 
places a constraint on the view I present in the next chapter, a constraint which requires a 
reconciliation of holding a non-psychological view with the conceptual conditions on intention.63 
As Gilbert does, I must present an argument for why my account is an account of collective 
intention and not some other collective phenomenon. And unlike Gilbert, the success of that 
argument is required for the plausibility of my view. 
 A final criticism of Gilbert reveals another desideratum for the theory I present in the next 
chapter. That criticism is reported by Bratman but comes from Facundo Alonso,64 who argues that 
the source of the obligations of joint commitment are unclear. If they are not given by a moral 
principle, where do such obligations come from? While this critique is only alluded to in Bratman, 
and not fleshed out into an argument, it does raise a genuine challenge to normativist views. Roth 
appears to give an answer to the question with the concept of practical intimacy; the normative 
relations between us when we are acting together arise from the way your intention governs my 
action and practical reasoning. But Gilbert says very little about the source of the obligations of 
joint commitment; why think that the mutual exchange of expression of readiness is an obligation-
generating process? What Gilbert does say is that the obligations are “apparently a function of the 
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fact that the joint commitment is indeed joint”.65 This suggests that it is the fact that it is a 
commitment of ours that grounds the obligations. The point of framing it this way, for Gilbert, is 
to make the obligations “associational”66, or based on important aspects of relationships between 
the people involved, rather than committing one to “moralism”.67 However, this only pushes the 
question back, since it is unclear why the fact that it is something of ours is enough to generate 
obligations. And because Gilbert claims that joint commitments are primitive, she in effect rules 
out any further answers.  
Whether or not this is a legitimate criticism of Gilbert, I do take it that a demand by a non-
normativist for further answers to this question is something to which a normativist should 
respond, if they want to make their view appear plausible to those with different points of view. 
Denying that the obligations of collective action are given by moral principles, which usually 
include a normative story about their origin and force, while maintaining that there are such 
obligations requires specifying what the alternative source of these obligations is. 
 
§ 4.6 Conclusion 
A normativist, non-psychological view holds that collective intentions are normative states that 
inherently involve non-moral obligations and entitlements between co-actors, rather than 
something composed of individual psychological states. Gilbert’s joint commitment view of 
collective intention is an instance of such a view. It is an instance that we should reject because 
one of the obligations it entails is that we seek the permission of the other participants in order to 
leave a collective action. The reason Gilbert’s view has this entailment is her insistence that 
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collective intentions are formed and rescinded by the will of all. She holds that only once all have 
expressed their readiness is anyone committed, and only once all have given their permission is 
anyone released, which generates the obligation to seek permission. Experimental research 
suggests that there is no such obligation.  
Because the structure of Gilbert’s argument explicitly rests on the intuitions that lead her 
to her three conditions (disjunction, obligation, and concurrence), this criticism is particularly 
effective against her view. But it is something to which all views of collective intention must be 
sensitive. If collective intentions explain collective actions, we have reason to prefer views that 
explain the features of collective action revealed by experimental research. Further criticisms of 
Gilbert’s view suggest two additional desiderata for a normativist view: it must meet the 
conceptual conditions on intention and it must provide a normative story about the source of the 
obligations of collective action. None of these criticisms generalize to all non-psychological views. 
Instead, they are all directed at particular features of Gilbert’s. As a result, while we should reject 
Gilbert’s joint commitment account, we have no reason to reject non-psychological, normativist 
theoretical commitments. The view I present in the next chapter maintains these commitments and 







Appendix A: Details of the Robber Case 
 
Vignettes 
No Collective Action Condition  
Only two people are in line for at an ATM booth. Suddenly, $20 bills start spraying out of the 
ATM. One person begins furiously collecting as many bills as possible. The other person catches 
the few solitary bills that hit them, and then suddenly peels off and walks out of the booth. 
Collective Action Condition 
Two people are breaking into an empty ATM booth late in the night. One man has a crow bar 
and is furiously trying to take off the cover of the ATM, the other man has a bag ready to collect 
the cash. In the middle of the process of breaking into the ATM, the bagman suddenly peels off 
and walks out of the booth. 
 
Appendix B: Details of the Obligation to Seek Permission Study 
Vignettes 
No Collective Action 
Two people are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. Starting at 65th street, they walk 
beside each other, until, as it happens, one of them peels off at 59th street. 
Low Collective Action 
Two people are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. They spot each other at 65th street, 







High Collective Action 
Two people are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. They spot each other at 65th street, 
and they walk together, chatting, laughing and maintaining their pace, until, as it happens, one of 
them peels off at 59th street. 
Mutual Promises 
Two people are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. They spot each other at 65th street, 








   The Higher-Order Interdependence View 
Chapter 5  
 
 
What we are looking for is a view of collective intention that explains collective action, and, on 
the basis of empirical research, we are assuming collective action includes (i) an obligation to 
notify other participants when leaving the collective action, (ii) normative relations in morally 
wrong cases, and (iii) no obligation to seek permission from the other participants in order to leave. 
So far, we have seen that to provide this explanation such a view must involve causal and cognitive 
interrelation between the participants, create some metaphysical distance between the participants’ 
individual intentions and the collective intention, and include a normative component, one that 
does not require too much but does specify a source. 
 This chapter aims to find a view that meets these desiderata. I begin by introducing and 
extending a seemingly non-psychological, and potentially normative view proposed by David 
Velleman as an interpretation of Gilbert’s view.1 Gilbert has subsequently rejected it as an apt 
interpretation,2 but I think that it gets Gilbert wrong in a way that avoids the problems with her 
                                                          
1 His view is presented in “How to Share an Intention” (2015, pp. 187-210). He characterizes it explicitly as an 
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recognizes that some earlier formulations of her view were stated in a way likely to cause confusion about whether 
she holds a conditional personal intentions view. She admits “the reference to the expression of a ‘conditional 
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that “though I have been so interpreted [as thinking that joint commitments involve an exchange of conditional 
personal commitments], I do not believe that it was ever my intention to suggest this” (2013, p. 47). For reference, 





view and furnishes the beginnings of an adequate account. There are three central ideas of 
Velleman’s view from which I build. First, intentions aren’t necessarily mental states, a point that 
is already implicit in quasi-psychological and non-psychological views, as previously discussed, 
but is here made explicit and defended. What is essential to intentions is that they are 
representations that fulfil the conceptual conditions previously spelled out, and, potentially, several 
kinds of representations can fulfil these conditions, such as utterances and inscriptions in addition 
to mental representations. Second, public representations that play these roles can be jointly 
constructed through particular communicative acts on the part of each participant. Third, these 
communicative acts are matching conditional intentions. In the first section, I explain these ideas 
and how they fit together. 
My project is to generalize this into a view of collective intention, to move from Velleman’s 
claim that collective intentions can be public representations created by matching expressions of 
conditional commitments to the claim that they are. In other words, instead of presenting a 
possibility proof of a single instance of a collective intention, as Velleman does,3 I argue that this 
view serves as a plausible account of collective intention. This task is undertaken in the second 
section. In that section, I discuss the nature of the conditionals involved, whether they are external 
or internal, and the nature of the conditions, whether they are causal or constitutive. I also try to 
make good the claim that this is a kind of non-psychological view, and address how the framing 
of intentions and decisions in Velleman’s view fits with our common conception of intentions as 
states and decisions as acts. This discussion aims to clarify the relations between the concepts at 
play and note the ways in which their use here departs from common understandings of them. 
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I then attempt bring into view how, if such a view is normative, it does the best job of 
explaining our empirical research. That attempt contains further considerations of the conceptual 
conditions on intention and the relation of collective intention to individual psychological states, 
and the way collective intentions are formed and rescinded, as well as a discussion of the normative 
properties of collective intention. 
The final section, in addition to responding to an outstanding objection, offers a novel story 
about the source of interpersonal normativity in collective action, using the concept which gives 
this view its name, “higher-order interdependence.” Collective intentions involve a special kind of 
interdependence between individuals, a kind that distinguishes acting together in the sense of 
collaboration from the other things we do together and generates obligations between the 
participants. People who form a collective intention owe each other something because they co-
determine their actions and practical reasoning in an obligation-generating way. 
 
§ 5.1 Velleman’s View 
Velleman gives himself a modest aim. Rather than searching for necessary and sufficient 
conditions for shared intention, he is satisfied with a possibility proof, that is, finding one case in 
which people share an intention.4 I think this case can be extended, and can serve as the starting 
point for the presentation of an account of collective intention.  
 The distinctive problem involved in sharing an intention, according to Velleman, comes 
from understanding what an intention is. Again, in line with the discussion in Chapter 1, although 
stopping short of his own views on intention,5 he argues that, intuitively speaking, having an 
                                                          
4 (2015, p. 188). 
5 Velleman claims that intentions are “self-fulling expectations that are motivated by a desire for their fulfillment 





intention is having made up your mind to do something.6 Making up your mind is resolving a 
deliberative question; it entails settling the issue. And so, as discussed, an intention represents 
itself as causing you to perform an act, and you therefore take the issue of whether you will perform 
the act to be settled. As Velleman states this idea, an intention is an attitude that:  
settles the issue actually and notionally. That is, the presence of this attitude will 
cause the issue to turn out one way rather than another, thus resolving it in fact; 
while the attitude will also represent the issue as turning out one way rather than 
another, thereby resolving it in your mind.7  
For collective intention, the issue is that an agent can only settle on something that she is in a 
position to settle. The issue must be up to her. And it appears that one issue cannot be up to two 
people because one person settling an issue excludes the other person from settling it. Given certain 
power relations, one person may be able to settle an issue for another, but it seems like they cannot 
both individually settle one and the same issue.8 Sharing an intention is not one person deciding 
for all, but all deciding or being decided. Explaining how people settle on something jointly, rather 
than one settling it for the other, is the distinctive problem of sharing an intention. 
 The solution is to appeal to conditional intentions.9 By contrast to categorical intentions 
about other people’s actions, for example a parent’s intention to get their child to clean his room, 
conditional intentions do not presuppose that the intender can settle what the others will do.  
Instead, individuals exercise conditional discretion over the issue to be resolved and, because of 
the nature of the conditions on their discretion, their each conditionally settling the issue adds up 
                                                          
own content. Note that Velleman’s account of intention specifies more than just a representation that has a certain 
content and effects, as discussed in Chapter 1, it also specifies what causes the representation. 
6 (2015, p. 187-8). 
7 (2015, p. 191) 
8 This issue is discussed in more detail with respect to Roth’s idea of ‘practical intimacy’ in §3.5. 
9 For discussion of conditional intentions focused on the individual case, see Davidson (2001, p. 92-50), Bratman 





to their categorically settling it together. We exercise conditional discretion by conditionally 
committing10 ourselves to a course of reasoning and action, where the condition on each 
commitment is the conditional commitment of the others.  
It is important that the condition on the commitment involves only the others’ intention and 
not their action. This avoids the worry that a structure of conditional commitment never results in 
any action. If my action were conditional on your action, and yours on mine, we would never act. 
But if the condition on my commitment to act is only an expression of conditional commitment to 
act by you, where the condition on your commitment is the expression of my conditional 
commitment, once everyone has expressed the conditional commitments, we are all categorically 
committed. All the conditions are satisfied. So, as with Gilbert, only when everyone has done 
similarly is anyone committed. 
 This solution has interesting implications for what, at least this kind of, collective intention 
can be. Most controversially, it seems like it needn’t be something mental. The state that causes 
us to act and represents itself as causing us to act must be jointly constructed and held, and so must 
be out in the open, between us. This leaves us with public representations, such as utterances, 
inscriptions, or depictions, as candidates for collective intention. Velleman focuses on utterances; 
I will too, because they are the simplest case. It is clear that some verbal representations are jointly 
constructed and held. Take, for example, a story that one person starts and another finishes. There 
is one story, one public representation, that is created by and belongs to both. And verbal 
expressions of conditional commitments with the right structure are just like this. When one agent 
says something that has the form, “I will if you will” and the other says, “Well, I will if you will,” 
                                                          
10 Since I am treating intentions as commitments to act, I use commitment and intention interchangeably. The 
conditional intentions Velleman discusses are “personal” commitments with a conditional form in Gilbert’s terms, 





their communicative acts combine to produce a single story that is public between them, a verbal 
representation that’s equivalent in content to “we will.” They are individual utterances that 
combine to form a single, jointly held representation. While it is not common to talk of non-mental 
intentions, we do talk quite comfortably about oral or written commitments. And since intentions, 
in the sense we have been talking about them in this dissertation, are commitments, we shouldn’t 
let this unfamiliarity throw us off. 
This jointly held representation is an intention because it meets the conceptual conditions 
on intention: it causes us to act and represents itself as causing us to act, settling the question in 
the world and in our minds. Take the case of going for a walk. Each of the statements, in this 
example, “I will go for a walk if you will” by one speaker and “Then I will” by another ascribe to 
themselves a conditional causal power to get both to go for a walk. And they actually have this 
power. They have this power because, when the condition is fulfilled speakers must take a walk or 
speak falsely. On Velleman’s view, the desire not to speak falsely is what solves the motivational 
issue, but he is open to other motivations.11 In general, all we must assume is that the speaker is so 
constituted that in virtue of having made that utterance and its condition being fulfilled she ends 
up taking the walk, whatever the specific motivation. The statements also represent themselves as 
being the cause of our taking a walk – that is, each of us has a belief that they will follow through 
                                                          
11 (2015, p. 198, fn. 20). Note that, just as is the case with individual intentions, people may utter them insincerely 
(see Velleman, 2015, p. 203-4, for a parallel discussion of this issue) or the motivation may not be enough to get the 
actors to follow through. Say, for example, two people are discussing jumping across a cliff. They each may utter “I 
will, if you will” but then back down because they are scared. This case brings up issues of both insincerity and 
motivational force. First, each may simply be uttering this as a “dare,” trying to seem more courageous than their 
partner, while at the same time hoping the other backs down and believing that there is no chance they will follow 
through if the other doesn’t. In this case, what they have uttered are not intentions, because intentions are not 
compatible with a belief that one won’t follow through (as discussed in Chapter 1). Saying “I will if you will” in 
these circumstances is not uttering a conditional intention at all, because I won’t if you will. Second, take the case in 
which the individuals sincerely utter an intention – that is, they have the belief that they will if the other will. Now 
imagine that when it comes time to actually jump, they get scared and decide not to. Here there is a genuine 
collective intention that fails. The motivational force is not strong enough to overcome their fear. However, since 





on the collective action as a result of the utterances -- thus settling the matter in our minds. Further, 
each statement represents itself as causally and logically dependent on the other, such that they 
only come into effect in the presence of each other. And so, it solves the central problem of sharing 
an intention. The interdependence of our verbal intentions is what allows joint discretion over an 
issue. Expressing my conditional intention in the presence of yours partially makes up your mind, 
and you expressing yours in the presence of mine makes up my mind.  Once combined, we have 
made up our minds together. There is a single representation, public between us, that causes our 
action by representing itself as causing it, a single token intention literally shared. 
  
§ 5.2 Extending the View 
A possibility proof, if correct, gives us a sufficient condition. Here it is for this view of collective 
intention:  
Individuals, A, B…N have a collective intention to X if 
1. A, B…N have uttered and not yet rescinded a matching conditional intention to X 
2. A, B…N have not yet performed X. 
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge. 
Even with the fundamental features in place, some questions about these conditions remain 
open.12 First, we should be clear about the canonical form of the conditional intentions. There are 
                                                          
12 There are two issues worth mentioning which I take to be closed by Velleman’s discussion. One is the semantic 
ungroundedness of the content of the intentions, given that they must “match.” Because the content of each intention 
is dependent on content of the other, it is hard to see exactly what that content is, and whatever it is, it is self-
referential in a potentially problematic way. What I intend is some action conditional on your having a like 
intention. But I don’t mean like intention just as an intention towards the same action. It must be an intention that is 
like the whole intention, not just its consequent, which means that it must be conditional, and conditional on what I 
intend. So, the content of my intention depends on the content of your intention, whose content depends on my 
intention, leaving it unclear what the content is. The solution to this, proposed by Velleman, is recognizing that the 
content can be determinate or indeterminate, as long as it is the right kind of indeterminacy. We can have intentions 
that are alike in their indeterminateness, and “in that case their content isn’t indeterminate…since it is perfectly 





two options, because there are two ways for intentions to be conditional, internally or externally. 
Externally conditional intentions are intentions that are conditioned on background features of the 
world that must be satisfied for an intention to exist in the first place. They have the form, “If C, I 
intend to X.” Internally conditional intentions have the conditionality inside the content of the 
intention. They have the form, “I intend to (X if C).” In the case of mental intentions, the difference 
is that internally conditional intentions exist whether or not the condition is satisfied. It is just that, 
even if there is such a token intention in the mind of an agent, it doesn’t require anything of the 
agent who has one, unless the condition in the content of the intention is satisfied. With externally 
conditional intentions, there is no token in the mind of the agent unless the condition is satisfied 
or the agent has an expectation that it will be. The condition of an externally conditional intention 
is an existence condition for the intention. So, which kind are we talking about?13 
According to Roth, we have a dilemma.14 If the condition is external, it fails to settle 
anything. The idea is that if my intention is externally conditioned on yours, and yours mine, then 
the existence of my intention is conditioned on itself. I intend to go for a walk, only if I so intend. 
But this doesn’t close the deliberative question: am I going for the walk or not? It is still up in the 
air, since I have control over whether the condition on your intention is satisfied, and so control 
                                                          
fn. 11, 235-6). The other is circularity. One might think that the exchange of speech acts, the joint decision, itself 
requires a collective intention. But as Velleman argues, “this joint act of deciding is not a shared activity of the sort 
that requires an antecedently shared intention’ because we can each make the speech act with distinct individual 
goals of initiating the process that will eventually lead to a collective intention (2015, p. 209-10). 
13 There is some confusion in the literature about which kind Velleman is talking about. Gilbert thinks that he means 
externally conditional intentions (2013, p. 43, fn. 25) on the basis of the following framing: “What you’re saying is, 
‘Given that you have willed likewise, I will it, too’” (2015, p. 205). This does seem external. But other formulations 
do not, for example “I hereby frame an effective intention that’s conditional on your framing an effective intention 
as well” (2015, p. 204) or “I hereby intend to X, provided that you intend likewise” (2001, p. 120). Roth is also 
unsure, and considers the consequences of both, see below.  Note that for interpretivists, there is no difference here, 
since there won’t be any observable differences in behavior. It seems to me that Velleman’s discussion of semantic 
grounding (previous footnote) assumes that the conditionality of the intentions involved is in the content. 
Independent of the interpretive issue, in the following, I argue that we should see these conditional intentions as 
internally conditional.  





over whether you have the intention that satisfies the condition required for me to have an intention 
in the first place. As a result, I’m not committed to anything. If the condition is internal, on the 
other hand, then the intentions are not interdependent. True interdependence, according to Roth, 
requires that I don’t even have the intention if you don’t. As a result, when conceived of as 
internally conditional, these intentions are, in fact, independent, since I can’t remove your intention 
simply by dropping mine, as I could with externally conditional intentions. This is a problem since 
normally, “I wouldn’t have an intention concerning our walk unless you also had such an intention" 
and “it is the recognition of this dependency that motivates the conditional intention approach in 
the first place.”15 
I don’t think either horn is very sharp, but I do think the discussion is instructive. In 
response to the first horn, what Roth fails to recognize is that the intentions here are 
communicative acts and the condition on the intentions concerns the intentions of others that are 
also communicative acts. The entire process concerns public representations, things expressed 
under conditions of common knowledge. We are not talking about mental intentions. So, the 
answer to the question, “Are we going for the walk?”, is, roughly, “Did I say I would, and did my 
partner say the same?”. The “saying” is itself the conditional intention, and the condition is the 
utterance that is a matching “saying” by my walking partner. So, once both of these intentions are 
out in the world, under conditions of common knowledge, it is simply not true that “The structure 
of interdependent conditional intentions regarding some activity A is as compatible with our doing 
nothing as it is with our A-ing.”16 Because there is a public fact of the matter, there is no confusion 
about whether the conditions are satisfied, by the assumption of common knowledge. If the 
matching speech acts haves been performed, then the conditions are satisfied until one says 
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otherwise. Because everything is out in the open, it is not like everyone’s intentions need to be 
formed in isolation, hidden from the others, and then revealed so that we can find out whether our 
conditional intentions match, which seems to be Roth’s picture. 
Nonetheless, we should model the reciprocal conditional intentions involved here as 
internally conditional. The reason why is tied to Roth’s second horn, which challenges the 
interdependence of the intentions since each could be had independently of whether the other 
person had the corresponding intention. And, as he says, what we want to capture is the idea that 
I wouldn’t have my intention unless you do. The answer to this challenge is that it mischaracterizes 
the interdependence of the intentions. What is interdependent is not the origin or existence of token 
intentions in the minds of the participants, but the “activation” of the intentions, in two ways.17 
First, the intentions are logically or rationally interdependent in the sense that one person’s 
intention serves as a premise in the derivation of the other person’s conclusion. Each person’s 
intention is the other person’s p in their modus ponens. I intend to go for a walk if you intend to, 
and you do, so I do. Nothing about this kind of interdependence is affected by the internal 
conditionality of the intentions. I still need to discharge the condition when it is in the content of 
my intention for that intention to have rational force on me, and I depend on your intention to do 
that, whether it would exist without mine or not. The second kind of dependence, causal 
dependence, is a little trickier, but, in the end, no more problematic. Roth frames the causal 
dependence as backward-looking, that is, what caused something rather than what something 
causes. He seems to be under the impression that my intention has to cause yours or yours has to 
cause mine in order for them to be interdependent. But, by contrast, the causal dependence 
                                                          
17 We might also think that intentions are dependent on each other in a third way. Ludwig (2015) emphasizes the 






involved in these intentions is forward-looking, that is what these intentions cause rather than what 
caused them. My intention only has causal power in the presence of yours, and vice versa. On their 
own, the intentions aren’t going to cause anything. And that is the sense of interdependence in 
question. The issue is not whether one intention exists without the other or is caused by the other 
but whether one is activated without the other. Internally conditional intentions are rationally and 
causally interdependent in the sense that accounts for what happens when we act together in 
partnership or collaboration. 
In fact, existence interdependence gives us reason to prefer internally conditional intentions 
to externally conditional ones, at least at the stage in the production of a collective intention when 
the conditional intentions are being uttered. It is hard to see how we could get the appropriate 
reciprocity of the conditional intentions if the interdependence we are looking for is existence 
interdependence or backward-looking causal interdependence.18 Say my intention is externally 
conditional on yours. Then for me to have an intention at all, yours must exist already. So, it can’t 
be the case that yours is also dependent on mine, in the same sense of dependent, which makes 
mine subordinate to yours. But this is not how we experience such situations. We do not think that 
the intentions of the person who agrees to act are subordinate to those of the person who proposes. 
Worse, it is unclear how achieving reciprocity would work for spoken intentions. Your intention 
is already uttered, so it can’t be dependent on mine for its initial existence. Nonetheless, the only 
way to get strict reciprocity for spoken intentions is for their utterance to be simultaneous, which, 
even if possible, should not be a requirement of the view. Further, since causal relations are 
                                                          
18 For an account of ‘reciprocity’ as a model of agential interaction, a historical overview of its explication and use 
in social science and philosophy, and an argument for why we should value it, see Gould (1983). What I aim to 
capture in the following discussion is that “the actions of one with respect to the other are equivalent to the actions 
of the other with respect to the first” in important ways that match our agential experience of forming a collective 





asymmetric, only one intention can be caused by the other; consequently, for backwards-looking 
causality, there is no possibility for reciprocity at all. This gives us reason to treat the conditions 
as internal conditions. Analyzing the conditional intentions as externally conditional leaves unclear 
how we should understand the initial condition intention. Any intention uttered first already exists, 
out in the world, so there is no question about whether its existence is dependent on any of the 
others or whether it has been caused by the other’s not-yet-uttered intention. The only available 
explanation of such intentions is that they are internally conditional. Analyzing them this way 
gives us what we need since the activation of the rational and causal force of these intentions with 
internally conditional intentions is interdependent and reciprocal, and in a way which isn’t affected 
by the order of utterance. 
So, the canonical form of the intentions involved is “I intend (X if C).”19 That allows for 
the kind of independence we need, existence and backward-looking causal independence, and the 
kind of interdependence we need, rational and forward-looking causal interdependence. Let me 
note that it is possible for an internally conditional intention to be externally conditional as well. 
It certainly could be the case that a condition on my internally conditional intention to do 
something together is your suggesting it. What is important about these kinds of cases though is 
that they still have conditionality in the content, because the participants frame intentions with 
                                                          
19 There are two side issues I would like to mention. The first is also discussed by Roth (2004, p. 405). It is that the 
conditionals in the content of the intention cannot be material. If I have a conditional intention as above, and the 
condition is not satisfied, namely you don’t have a matching conditional intention, I can conclude that I am not 
committed to the action. So, either you have a matching intention and I’m committed, or you don’t and I’m not. I 
wouldn’t be able to reach this conclusion if the conditionals involved are material, since then I may be committed 
even if you haven’t expressed a matching intention. I will not provide a detailed analysis of the conditionals in 
question. The second is that this is not the canonical form of the intentions themselves on Velleman’s view, but 
rather of the attribution of intention. For Velleman, based on his analysis of intention, the canonical form of the 
intentions themselves is “I will X if C,” which, when combined with some implicit background conditions, comes to 
“I am hereby causing myself to X if C.” In order to stay neutral on the specific analysis of intention, I leave my 





matching contents so that the intentions are effective, and they are reciprocal, in that each is 
rationally and causally dependent on the other. 
Second, does the condition specify a causal or constitutive view of collective intention? In 
other words, is the analysis one that gives genetic conditions of collective intention or one that 
gives the realizers of collective intention? Treating intentions as communicative acts20 leaves us 
only one option; the sufficient condition I present at the beginning of this section gives us a causal 
condition not a constitutive one. 
A causal view specifies a process by which something is formed and rescinded and how, 
once formed, it functions. It is about a series of events, horizontally aligned, and aims to pick out 
a pattern of events that triggers an upshot state that persists until fulfilled or rescinded. A classic 
example of such a phenomenon is promising.21 Having promised is an upshot state triggered by a 
speech act that persists until the promiser completes the act or the promisee releases the promiser. 
A constitutive view, by contrast, specifies the underlying elements that “make up” something.22 It 
is about the presence of certain underlying states, and the vertical relation those states are in to the 
overlaying state in question.  
We have seen this distinction before in the case of collective intention between, on one 
side, psychological and quasi-psychological views, and, on the other side, non-psychological 
                                                          
20 These acts are purposeful, not intentional, according to the framework developed in Chapter 1. In other words, the 
agent who utters one of them either has the goal of initiating the creation of a public representation or satisfying the 
condition on someone else’s initiation. But the individual goals that motivate the utterances do not themselves 
constitute a collective intention, because they do not meet the conceptual conditions on intention. For further 
discussion, see Velleman (2015, p. 209-10). 
21 Velleman discusses promises in this context as well (2015, p. 202-204), though the aims and conclusion of the 
discussion here depart from that discussion. Note also that I go on to say more about the distinction between 
promising and collective intention in the next section. 
22 Again, I am assuming that constitution is not identity. For discussion of constitution and identity, see Gibbard 
(1975), Lewis (1986), and Wasserman (2002, 2004). People occasionally use constitution to signal identity, which is 
in general harmless, but I would like to avoid that usage here, since I think the causal/constitutive distinction picks 
out an important difference between the views with respect to their ability to explain the obligation to notify, which I 





views. Bratman gives us a constitutive view, Gilbert a causal one. Perhaps unsurprisingly,23 given 
the origins of this condition in an interpretation of Gilbert, this view is a causal view; the condition 
given above is a causal condition that’s sufficient for the existence of an intention. Certain 
individual intentions with specified contents are events, communicative acts, that, when combined 
in the specified way, lead to an upshot state of having a collective intention. Collective intentions 
are not states that require the persisting presence of underlying individual psychological states, at 
least not always. So, within the framework of this dissertation, this view is non-psychological. 
There are two problems with this answer, one new one, to which it is easy to respond, and 
one old one, which causes more difficulty, but is forced on us by the answer to the first. The new 
one is that treating utterances as intentions is a strange way to talk about intention.24 Intentions are 
normally conceived of as states, not acts. There may be a mental act that precedes an intention, a 
decision, but intentions must be maintained as well as formed, and acts are not maintained in the 
same sense; they are simply occurrences. One reason it sounds strange is that, in English, the verb 
“to intend” only has state verb reading; it doesn’t have an event verb reading. That is why it doesn’t 
sound right to say, “I intended slowly” or “My intention happened yesterday.” Intending or having 
an intention is something that persists through time. By contrast, forming an intention, deciding, 
in the paradigmatic case, is something that occurs or happens, which is why it sounds fine to say, 
“I took my time deciding” or “I formed my intention yesterday.” Yet this view requires that 
intentions are sometimes events, since some intentions are communicative acts and communicative 
acts are events. 
                                                          
23 Again, there is some confusion about the correct interpretation of Velleman’s original position in the literature. 
Roth is unsure about the correct interpretation (2004, p. 405, fn. 36), although he takes Gilbert to be giving a genetic 
account and Velleman a constitutive one. His interpretation of Gilbert is based on personal communication with her 
(2004, p. 404, fn. 33) and his interpretation of Velleman is based on the idea that exercising shared discretion 
requires a constitutive account, but doesn’t give reasons for this requirement. 





In response we must only say that this account is not an account of the semantics of the 
verb ‘intend’ in English. We are instead talking about the concept of intention, which is defined 
functionally, and which may or may not match up to the way people talk about intentions or 
intending in any particular natural language. Even though the topic may be approached by looking 
for the truth conditions of declarative sentences involving the word ‘intend’ or its cognates,25 what 
we actually want here is not an analysis of ordinary usage of certain words. Instead, we want a 
better description of what happens when people act together in the sense of collaboration or 
partnership than has previously been offered, and an explanation of how we do it. We are using 
empirical research for the description, and we are using the concept of intention for the 
explanation. Note that this is reflected in the empirical research. We do not ask participants about 
whether they would apply the word intention (or right or obligation) in one way or another, but 
rather what people do when acting together and what they think is required of people when acting 
together. Collective intention is then a theoretical concept meant to give an explanation of the 
results of that research, and, in turn, those results give us some information about acting together 
in the sense of collaboration or partnership. 
 Answering the linguistic challenge this way rules out part of Gilbert’s answer to the 
conceptual challenge. Remember that Bratman challenges whether Gilbert’s is an account of 
intention at all, because it is compatible with a situation which is not fit to explain people’s doing 
something, but rather their not doing it, since it is possible on her view that none of the individuals 
have participatory intentions.26 Gilbert’s collective intentions do not tend to cause the action in the 
appropriate way, since they can exist without the appropriate causal mechanisms — the 
participatory intentions of the individuals — being in place. And so, they do not meet the causal 
                                                          
25 Bratman (1993) and Velleman (2015, p. 187). 





condition on intention. Note that this conceptual challenge is not an issue for quasi-psychological 
views, since on them, the underlying participatory intentions, understood as a state of the agent 
that persists through time, are there to do the causing, directly. Part of Gilbert’s response is to show 
that her intentions do fulfill the roles of intention, and the response here echoes hers. Another part 
of her response is her claim that it doesn’t matter since her account is about explaining ordinary 
usage of “shared intention sentences.”27 Given the response to the linguistic challenge, there is no 
recourse to ordinary language arguments.28 So, unlike Gilbert, the answer provided by this view 
to the conceptual objection raised by Bratman must work.  
Here's the short answer: Gilbert’s response works, and because of the similarities between 
the views, we can construct a parallel response for this view. Collective intentions “act at a 
distance,”29 they act indirectly on individuals’ practical reasoning by giving them reasons, and on 
their minds through the individual’s memories and beliefs about the formation of the collective 
intention. On this view, they have to, because, as combinations of utterances, they aren’t around 
when the act happens. They are long over. But they have specifiable rational and psychological 
consequences that translate into causal consequences. Once uttered, they interact with the beliefs 
and motivations of the agents in question, for example the motivation not to speak falsely, to guide 
practical reasoning and individual action. That is what allows collective intentions to fulfill the 
conceptual conditions on intention. So, for the longer answer, I need to spell out these 
consequences and how they have the effects that they do. I’ll only deal with the case of successful 
collective intentions here. I address the unsuccessful case, since it involves the obligation to notify, 
                                                          
27 Gilbert (2009). 
28 Note also that the response to Roth’s first horn relies heavily on the idea of intentions as acts, and so further 
cements me to this position. 





in the next section. In the successful case, all participants have beliefs about the formation of the 
collective intention and participatory mental intentions. 
Just as an individual intention gives an agent a reason to perform the action when the time 
comes, a collective intention gives each of its participants a reason to perform certain actions when 
the time comes. But what do the participants have reason to do? Again, just like the individual 
case, each of them has reason to promote the satisfaction of the intention, because each of them 
has an in effect30 conditional intention, activated by the other’s in effect conditional intentions. 
Because each of them has a standing commitment to do so, and that is what commitments demand, 
each participant is required to enact the patterns of thought and reasoning needed for successful 
execution of their intention. As with Gilbertian joint commitments, standard collective intentions, 
on this view, give one reason to act accordingly and allow the standard practical inferences to go 
through: “We intend to go for a walk, my walking at a particular pace is required for that, therefore 
I have reason to walk at that pace.” That is, people with a collective intention have reason to 
coordinate actions and attitudes in accordance with the content of the intention they collectively 
have, because it entails that they have a standing conditional intention with that content whose 
condition is satisfied. Since each of the participants only performs a subset of the required actions 
and only has a subset of the subordinate attitudes, they have reason to work out who is going to do 
what. Say we are going for a walk. The fact that we have each expressed a conditional intention, 
and the condition on each is satisfied, gives each of us reason to negotiate about roles, intend the 
means to completing our parts, filter out incompatible actions, support each other’s completion of 
accordant sub-actions, and, in general, find a way to work with, and not just around, each other to 
perform the action specified in our intention. And since we are creatures that tend to act on such 
                                                          





reasons when we have them, collective intentions tend to cause collective action, and so fulfill the 
causal condition on intention. 
Further, because each of us remembers the formation of the collective intention, knows that 
we have a collective intention, and, roughly, understands what that gives us reason to do, each of 
us takes that collective intention to settle what we are going to do. Therefore, the causal view of 
the formation of collective intention through reciprocal conditional intentions, understood as 
communicative acts, gives us a non-psychological view that meets the conceptual conditions on 
intention, and results in a state that coordinates action and practical reasoning, and provides a 
background for bargaining.31 
So, we have a clearly specified and defensible sufficient condition. One may think 
providing a sufficient condition is enough. Bratman, for example, claims that is all he is trying to 
do in several places. For example, he states that the “central concern” of his account is “with 
relevant sufficient conditions for shared intention and modest sociality” because this approach 
“allows for the possibility of multiple constructions, each of which provides some such sufficient 
basis for the social roles and norms characteristic of shared intention” and “the best thing to say 
might turn out to be that shared intention is multiply realizable.”32 Whether or not Bratman 
succeeds in arguing only for a set of sufficiency conditions,33 the broader point stands. It would be 
extremely difficult, perhaps impossible if Bratman is right that collective intention is multiply 
realizable, to rule out the possibility of another set of conditions being sufficient for collective 
                                                          
31 The conceptual conditions on intention are discussed in Chapter 1, while the way these conditions guide 
coordination and structure bargaining in the case of collective intention is discussed in §3.2 and §4.5. 
32 (2014, p. 36). See also, (1999, p. 144).  
33 Brian Epstein doesn’t think Bratman succeeds. He argues that since Bratman appears to reject other conditions for 





intention. This is surely too much to ask, and it is not clear how useful it would be. So, instead, I 
take a different tack. 
What I am going to do is show that this view gives the best explanation of the empirical 
research compared with other existing views, not that no other possible account could give an 
explanation as good or better. The last three chapters argued that none of the major kinds of current 
views both meet the conceptual conditions on intention and explain all three empirical judgments, 
and I believe that holds for all current views in the literature. This section attempts to show that a 
viable sufficient condition can be developed from Velleman’s account, and that it meets the 
conceptual conditions on intention and fulfills the roles of collective intention. The next section 
attempts to make good the explanatory claim. Since collective intention explains collective action, 
the best view of collective intention is the one that gives the best explanation of collective action.34 
So, if the attempt in the next section succeeds, the view under consideration gives us the best-
justified hypothesis about what collective intention is, at the moment. We then have reason to 
accept it, at least until something better arises.  
 
§ 5.3 Explaining Collective Action 
Let us assume that collective intentions resulting from the above-specified account involve 
normative relations of the sort sought by normativist views. So, the requirements given by the 
collective intention are directed obligations to the other participants. If so, they give the best 
explanation of normative properties of collective action and spontaneous cases of collective action. 
The next section discharges the assumption. 
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 Here again are the judgments:35 
(i) There is an obligation to notify other participants when leaving the collective action;  
(ii) The obligation to notify is present in cases of morally wrong collective action; 
(iii) There is no obligation to seek permission from the other participants in order to leave 
a collective action. 
Having intentions that act at a distance allows this account, like Gilbert’s, to deal with (i), 
the obligation to notify. Because a collective intention’s causal power is mediated by individual 
participants’ practical reasoning and beliefs or memories about the initial creation of that intention, 
a participant can be party to a collective intention without having a mental participatory intention, 
for example if she forgets or changes her mind. All that is required, in the case of forgetting, is that 
the person has a disposition to follow through on what they have reason to do upon being reminded. 
The process of creating a collective intention takes the decision out of any one mind and puts it in 
the world, because the collective intention is literally the combination of a series of public events.  
Once it is in the world, changes in an individual mind are insufficient to change the collective 
intention. Spoken intentions reach across time and continue to give their subjects reason to 
conform to them until it is time to act, unless they are rescinded. Through a disposition to act on 
past commitments, which I am assuming we have, they tend to cause the people who have them to 
do so. Since collective intentions are the product of two or more public intentions, one individual 
lacking a corresponding mental intention does not end the collective intention. The persisting 
presence of individual participatory intentions is not required. As a public upshot state, collective 
intention is not the kind of thing that is directly changed by a private change of mind.36 
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36 I use the modifier “directly” because a private change of mind may of course start a causal process that results in 





 So, how does a collective intention end? Let’s start with the two-person case. One way is 
by executing the behavior specified in its content. But that is in the successful case, dealt with in 
the last section. Ending a collective intention, in the way relevant to unsuccessful cases, is as 
simple as denying that the condition on the conditional commitment of the other person is fulfilled, 
by rescinding your own conditional commitment. As a public, joint representation, the collective 
intention exists until it is rescinded publicly by a communicative act, the negation of the one that 
created it. The public representation is the result of the conditions on the conditional commitments 
being fulfilled. And so, an equally public expression that the condition is not fulfilled makes it the 
case that it is no longer in place. Since the condition on the conditional commitments concerns 
conditional willingness, the public expression that denies that condition must deny the utterer’s 
conditional willingness. If the condition is not fulfilled, there is no categorical commitment. 
Nonetheless, even after I mentally decide I want out, the collective intention is still there to guide 
my behavior, since my participatory intention is not required for its further existence. And it 
governs my behavior by telling me that I must notify the other participant that I’m no longer 
willing, thus denying that the condition on their conditional commitment is satisfied. Only by 
notifying them do I end my participation in a collective intention. In the two-person case, 
discharging my obligation to notify the other that I’ve changed my mind about participating is all 
it takes to end the intention. Scaling up, each denial releases the person who utters it, and once all 
or all but one of the participants have done so, there is no collective intention.37  
The key idea is that intentions understood as communicative acts can be in effect without 
the corresponding mental intentions, in part because the condition on other intentions involved is 
just the communicative act, and so still activates the other intentions. Consequently, when a 
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participant lacks the requisite mental intentions, and is aware that they lack those intentions, they 
have an obligation to de-activate the other intentions. Unlike quasi-psychological views, this view 
has the right metaphysical commitments to explain the obligation to notify, and moreover, seeing 
collective intention as a combination of reciprocal conditional intentions provides a plausible story 
about why it’s there. 
This story also explains (iii), the lack of an obligation to seek permission. In the two-person, 
minimal collective action case, once I deny the condition on the other person’s conditional 
commitment, deactivating their intention, there is no longer a collective intention. There is no 
longer a collective intention because when I make clear that the condition on their conditional 
intention is not satisfied, by communicating that I am no longer willing, their conditional intention 
is no longer in effect, and I no longer have a conditional intention. All that is left is one conditional 
intention that doesn’t have any rational or causal force because its condition isn’t satisfied. Without 
the combination of these two intentions, no collective intention persists. Since there is no longer a 
collective intention governing my behavior, there is nothing left to obligate me to seek the 
permission of the other participant, and I do not need their concurrence, contra Gilbert. Therefore, 
in one sense, I still cannot unilaterally leave a collective intention: simply changing my mind is 
not enough. But, in another sense, I can: absent special background conditions, I need do no more 
than make this change of mind public. And this is the same in cases with more people, since 
discharging my obligation to notify ends my participation in an ongoing collective intention, and 
so ends the requirements it places upon me. So, even when the collective intention continues to 
exist, it doesn’t govern my behavior. Unlike on Gilbert’s view, nothing about the formation or 
rescission of collective intentions on this view entails an obligation to seek the permission of the 





Another benefit of this account is that it brings out the practical differences between 
collective intentions and promises.38 As discussed in Chapter 3 with respect to Scanlon’s account, 
promising, understood as a special case of intentionally inducing expectations in others, involves 
consent. The promisor needs the consent of the promisee to get out of the promise. If collective 
intentions were an exchange of mutual promises to act, we would expect that in our studies people 
would think that the leaver needs the permission of the leavee to leave. And, although she has other 
reasons for thinking there is a difference between joint commitment and promising, this is also 
what Gilbert’s view predicts.39 The view currently under consideration, however, maps out an 
intermediate space. Unlike promises, with collective intentions, one does not need the consent of 
the other to leave, but one does have to let the other know. 
The power of the walking case comes from how small-scale the collective action involved 
is, and the fact that, even there, these obligations are present. However, there is no reason to think 
that in more robust cases of collective action other obligations are not involved. If, for example, 
participating in a collective action would be costly, perhaps someone has to buy all new camping 
or skiing equipment, participants may promise each other that they will follow through, in order 
to assure them that the costs involved are not going to be wasted. In such cases merely notifying 
seems insufficient, and it is. But, it is insufficient because further obligations have been incurred 
by promising and other forms of assurance, and these further obligations are added to the baseline 
normativity of collective action on the basis of things that are not present in all collective actions.40 
This is exactly what we found in our second walking case, in which people judged participants to 
                                                          
38 By “practical” here, I mean what is required of people who are acting together. Another difference, discussed by 
Velleman (2015, p. 203), concerns what happens with insincere utterances. An insincere promise still obligates, but 
an insincere spoken intention is no intention at all, since it doesn’t fulfill the causal condition. 
39 Gilbert thinks joint commitments are more fundamental than promises, in that promises are a special case of joint 
commitment (2013). 
40 Candidates for grounds of these further obligations include, for example, Scanlon’s principles, the “Principle of 





be acting together with or without exchanging promises, but only with an exchange of promises 
did they think the leaver had to seek the permission of the leavee. So, this view allows for the 
possibility that, if collective actions are such that, for example, moral considerations of avoiding 
cost or harm are in play, one participant may need to ask for the permission of the other to leave. 
But such an obligation is present only in these cases, and, in these cases, only because people 
engage in other obligation-generating processes. And, at least on some views, we engage in these 
further processes in order to create expectations about behavior to avoid loss. But collective 
intentions are not about what you expect others to do; they are about jointly determining what you 
and the others will do. I address this further in the next section. 
 (ii), the presence of normative relations in cases of morally wrong collective actions, 
follows straightforwardly. Saying that intending to do something gives one reason to do that thing 
doesn’t entail that thing has anything going for it beyond the intention to do it; intending to do 
something doesn’t imply anything about the desirability or morality of that thing, and that is true 
of mental or spoken intentions, individual or joint.41 The process of creating a collective intention 
is a particular process that creates an upshot state. People who utter a conditional commitment to 
act in the presence of other matching conditional commitments create a collective intention, and 
all that comes with it, none of which includes a judgment about the morality of the action. They 
therefore have an obligation to fulfill or rescind the commitment, regardless of the act in question. 
It is important here to note that having reason to do something in virtue of a collective 
intention does not entail that one should do it, all things considered. Reasons given by a collective 
intention are one input to practical reasoning, perhaps a powerful one, since they seem to override 
inclination and desire in many cases, but one that can itself be overridden by moral considerations. 
                                                          





Nonetheless, moral reasons and collective intention reasons are different kinds of inputs to 
practical reasoning, as our Robber Case suggests. Both individual and collective intentions can 
give defeasible reasons for doing an immoral thing. 
So, if this view entails normative relations between the participants, it has a plausible story 
for all three judgments, something that no other view in the literature has. Why think the view is 
normativist? 
 
§ 5.4 Explaining Normativity 
The answer is that this view involves what I call “higher-order interdependence,” an answer that I 
think is completely novel. But let me build up a little to what it is. 
The question that ends the last section is expressed in several places in the literature. Here 
is Gilbert, claiming that it is plausible to suppose that a view based on conditional commitments 
“can be ruled out a priori” because it is “hard to see how a combination of conditional personal 
commitments can, through satisfaction of their conditions, create a set of commitments such that 
the committed people are answerable to one another for violating them.”42 Roth agrees with the 
nature of this challenge for conditional views, since he thinks that “it is not at all clear that” such 
views “capture any sort of participatory commitment of the agents involved.”43 
The force of the challenge comes from a perceived difficulty conditional views have 
finding a source for the normativity in collective action, and especially for the directed nature of 
that normativity, since conditional intentions themselves do not seem to entail any normative 
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relationship with the thing they are conditional on. The following passage from Roth gives a nice 
example of this attitude: 
If I were to form the conditional intention to go for a bike ride so long as it is sunny, 
it doesn’t follow that when it is sunny, I somehow owe it to the weather – that I 
have a “commitment-to-the-weather” – to go for a ride. It’s not ever clear what this 
would mean. It doesn’t seem to me that anything of significance would change were 
I to condition my bike ride on the behavior or intentions of other people. One’s 
conditional intention to take the surface streets if many people take the 405 does 
not generate in one any commitment to those many people on the 405 to take 
surface streets. Nothing intrinsic to the conditional intention itself generates any 
such commitment. So conditional intentions will not account for the contralateral 
commitments in shared agency. 
Roth is of course correct that having a commitment to the weather doesn’t make any sense, and 
that the kind of interdependence of intention that exists between the intentions of people driving 
on the highway doesn’t give rise to any special, directed obligations between highway drivers. He 
is wrong to think that this is the kind of interdependence involved in the view. A preliminary point 
is that part of what makes this form of interdependence so weak is that the people involved do not 
know of each other’s intentions. Since we are assuming common knowledge, we can immediately 
strengthen the idea of interdependence, and get it closer to something useful for our analysis here, 
by adding that each participant knows about the other’s intentions.  
At the moment, this slightly strengthened form is the only kind of interdependence 
countenanced in the literature. A nice analysis of it is given by Bratman in his recent work, partly 





settling on a course of action. He calls it “persistence interdependence” and adds it to the 
participatory intentions familiar from his account.44 The individual intentions of two people are 
persistence interdependent when each will continue to intend only if the other continues to intend, 
and each knows whether the other continues to intend. Two people having persistent 
interdependent intentions is certainly a common phenomenon, plausibly involved in every case of 
people doing things together, ranging from people avoiding each other on the street to the non-
insider-trading commodity traders. Let’s return to the traders. It is easy to imagine a case in which 
the intention of one trader to buy a particular commodity is dependent on the intention of the other 
to buy that commodity and vice versa, and that all of this is common knowledge. And yet, despite 
these persistence interdependent intentions, they do not have a collective intention, they are not 
acting together in the sense of collaboration, and there are no obligations between them.  
This is not an argument against Bratman. He has other resources to reach this conclusion 
about these kinds of cases, which he does. But it could be used as an argument against this view. 
If persistence interdependence was the only interdependence involved, we might be forced to 
appeal to some of the further resources specified by other views in order to generate the normativity 
involved. But I don’t think these other resources are necessary. Genuine collective intention 
involves a different kind of interdependence and we can distinguish trader cases from cases of 
genuine collective action, cases that involve directed obligations, purely based on the kind of 
interdependence involved. 
  What is special about the interdependence in genuine cases of collective intention is that it 
is higher-order interdependence. Say you and I have a collective intention, on this view. It is not 
just that my conditional commitment is dependent on yours and yours is dependent on mine, it is 
                                                          





that mine is dependent on yours being dependent on mine and yours is dependent on mine being 
dependent on yours. Unlike persistence interdependence, which requires only first-order 
interdependence, here there is conditionality in the condition on the intentions. The conditionality 
of my intention on yours is in the condition on your intention, as is the conditionality of your 
intention on mine in my intention. Since these intentions are conditional on conditionality, their 
interdependence is higher-order.  
Higher-order interdependence is all we need to separate collective actions from parallel 
action, even parallel action with coordination, persistent interdependent individual intentions, and 
common knowledge. Cases involving non-agents are immediately ruled out, since the conditions 
there do not involve any recognition of the agency of others. So, no commitments to the weather. 
Even persistence interdependence entails a mutual recognition of agency. In order for my 
intentions to be dependent on what I take your intentions to be, I have to take you to be the kind 
of thing that has intentions, namely an agent. But that alone is not enough. Only in cases of 
collective action do we go a step further and frame intentions in which my intention is dependent 
not just on your having an intention that specifies the same action, but your having an intention 
that is dependent on mine.45  
If we are trading foreign currencies, I only care about what your intention is so that I can 
plan my action, not our action. I may recognize that your intention is dependent on mine, but that 
only matters to me insofar as it allows me to predict your behavior in order to plan my own. I don’t 
care why you have the intention you have, and the same for you. It’s none of my business, just as 
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that other forms of higher-order interdependence are involved in many social relationships, such as love and 
friendship. Nonetheless, I think that this specific kind of interdependence, which is higher-order and between 





it’s none of yours. My intention is not contingent on yours being contingent on mine, it is just 
contingent on yours. My intention remains the same whatever the higher-order nature of the 
condition on your intention is. But if we intend to go to the zoo together, my conditional intention 
is not just dependent on yours, it requires more. It requires that your conditional intention be 
contingent on mine too, and the same for you. If you have a contingent intention to go to the zoo, 
but it is not contingent on mine being contingent on yours, then the condition on my intention isn’t 
satisfied. I’m under no pressure to go to the zoo, since my intention isn’t activated. And if I still 
decide to go, it’s because I form my own individual intention, with the knowledge that I may see 
you there. When, by contrast, each of us has our intentions on the basis that the other person’s 
intention is dependent on his or her own, we are collaborating, we are going to the zoo together in 
the fullest sense. It is not just that we mutually recognize each other’s agency, and then make our 
intentions dependent on a prediction about what others are going to do, as we do with persistent 
interdependent intentions;46 instead, we go the further step of representing that mutual recognition 
in our own intentions. In order to have a condition on my intention that involves the conditionality 
of your intention on mine, I have to not only represent you as an agent, I have to represent you as 
an agent who is at the same time recognizing my agency by making their intentions conditional on 
mine. Since you’re doing the same, we are each representing this mutual recognition. In doing so, 
we grant partial authority to the other to determine what each of us is going to do. 
  It is this kind of interdependence that amounts to a joint making up of our minds about 
what we are going to do, as opposed to acting in light of what we think others are going to do. And 
it is this kind of interdependence that makes the causal story this view tells a genuine creation of 
a public representation that plays the roles of intention. In doing so, we are, in a sense, co-
                                                          





determining our individual action and practical reasoning, turning each other’s higher-order 
conditional commitments, which alone have no causal force, into a categorical commitment, which 
does. Individual intentions settle what I am going to do, collective intentions settle what we are 
going to do, both in fact and in our minds. Since we must carry out the action in fact, there is joint 
control of each member’s behavior, joint control granted by the act that makes one a participant in 
a collective commitment. In creating a public representation like this, the participants jointly settle 
how each participant will behave in fact; each participant places their behavior under the joint 
control of all, granting to all a special license to guide the execution of the collective action. And, 
since it represents the matter as provisionally settled in our minds, it grants the same license about 
our practical reasoning, about how to create consistent plans, about what other options, individual 
or collective, need to be ruled out. 
The higher-order interdependence of our intentions generates the normative relations 
present in cases of collective action. Framing intentions with it is an obligation-generating process. 
Because they settle matters jointly through higher-order interdependence, each participant is 
dependent on the other to determine what each of them is going to do, and is explicitly framing 
their own intention so that this is so. When we collectively intend to go to the zoo, the conditional 
intentions we frame make it such that we co-determine our action.47 And that is not just incidentally 
so, it is part of the condition on the intention. Because they are dependent on each other in this 
way, participants in the collective action are obligated to perform various actions for one another 
and reason in particular ways. They are also licensed to remind one another of the collective 
intention, appeal to it in the deliberation and negotiation, and criticize other participants for failure 
to respond appropriately to it. The individuals involved are not just guided by the rational pressures 
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associated with their own individual, mental intentions, which would only result in failures of 
rationality when violated. When we have a collective intention, I am answerable to you, because 
my expression of the intention puts pressure on you by giving you reasons to do certain things, 
things in accordance with the collective intention, and you to me for the same reasons, and all of 
this is explicit in the framing of our intentions. Being answerable to someone means that they have 
a special standing to demand an explanation. If I drop my mental participatory intention to go to 
the zoo, which may be perfectly rational, I am still obligated to you to tell you that the condition 
on your conditional intention is no longer satisfied, all other things being equal. And if I fail to do 
so, you have the standing to demand an explanation for my violation of the collective commitment. 
I’m still answerable to you, even without a corresponding mental intention, because that is the kind 
of condition we put on our acting together. Your standing is the other side of my obligation to you. 
The collective intention gives me an obligation to notify, and you license to demand an 
explanation. The source of this license or standing amongst the participants is the public 
representation, and the representation is joint because of the interdependence of the conditional 
commitments. 
Why do we frame intentions with higher-order interdependence? When we form a 
collective intention, we choose to give ourselves these obligations.48 This is in stark contrast to 
Bratman’s view. On his view, the requirements given to us by collective intentions are simply 
foreseeable rational constraints. But here, the obligations are not an unintended but foreseen 
consequence, we choose to incur them as such.49 Giving up full control over our actions to others, 
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49 This view of choice-dependent obligations and normative interests follows Owens (2012). The presentation here 
leaves out the nuances of his analysis. I am treating the obligations of collective intention as “third-grade” choice 
dependent in his terms. He describes that grade as “exhibited by the exercise of a normative power, where I change 
what someone is obliged to do by intentionally communicating the intention of hereby so doing…when a normative 
power is exercised, the speaker must present himself as intending to hereby change the normative situation, to 





making ourselves answerable to others, may seem like a cost, one that it is implausible to assume 
people choose when they act together in the sense of collaboration. The first point in response is 
that one does not lose control over one’s own action, one just agrees to co-determine actions with 
others. And this may be worth it. It might be that we are not choosing to obligate ourselves for its 
own sake, but rather because it is the best way to coordinate our activity. It is of course possible 
that choosing to obligate ourselves is simply the easiest solution to achieve some other end, for 
example efficiency in the things we do together. It is likely that these non-normative interests are 
sometimes the reason we frame some higher-order interdependent intentions. After all, it is the 
ability of exchanges of higher-order interdependent intentions to fulfill the roles of coordinating 
action and reasoning that makes them collective intentions. And, showing how they do this by 
creating obligations between the participants, making participants answerable to one another, 
rather than just relying on rationality constraints is enough to defend the claims of this dissertation. 
Since it isn’t required, I will leave further discussion of why we frame intentions like this to future 
research, but I am tempted by the claim that sometimes we are not motivated by the efficacy of 
collective intentions; sometimes we have a more substantial interest in shaping our relationship 
with others using these obligations. 
We can now discharge the assumption. We have an explanation of why this kind of 
conditional intentions generates normative relations, and a plausible explanation of why we frame 
them, with a tentative suggestion that there may be more to it.  
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§ 5.5 Conclusion 
If the arguments in this chapter are correct, an account of collective intentions that holds that they 
are combinations of individual conditional intentions made public and not yet rescinded can 
explain the results of our empirical research. It does so by giving a causal account of how collective 
intentions are formed and rescinded and a story about their psychological consequences. This story 
treats collective intentions as non-psychological and normative, and it not only explains our results, 
but also meets the conceptual conditions on intention and explains how they fulfill the roles of 
collective intention. Since it meets the basic conditions on an account of collective intention, and 
gives the best explanation of the empirical research, of existing views, we have reason to prefer it 
to the other views here canvassed. 
The account says that collective intentions are created by individuals performing certain 
communicative acts, which are themselves intentions, and combine into a public representation 
that governs the behavior of the participants in the appropriate ways. The individual conditional 
intentions combine, in the presence of one another, into a categorical collective intention, because 
the condition on each intention is the conditional intention of the others. The collective intention 
is then the result of the conditions on the conditional commitments being satisfied.  This process 
amounts to a joint decision or a joint state of being decided that is normative because it involves 
higher-order interdependence. The intentions involved are framed in such a way that each in part 
determines what the others do; each participant’s intention is not only conditional on the 
conditional intention of the others, but is also conditional on those conditional intentions being 
conditional on her own conditional intention. This involves a representation of the mutual 
recognition of agency present in the condition of the conditional intention. We choose to frame 





of coordinating action and practical reasoning, but possibly to satisfy a deeper interest of ours. 
When we act together in the sense of collaboration or partnership, it is higher-order 
interdependence that binds us together, granting us a special standing in relation to the actions and 
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